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1 THE UNITY OF ROUSSEAU’S THOUGHT

In his final years, looking back over his life, Rousseau insisted upon the essential unity of his work. Rousseau admitted that whilst his arguments ‘might not be true’, and might even be ‘false’, they nevertheless formed an ‘interconnected system’ which was ‘in no way contradictory’ (i.930). The unifying principle behind Rousseau’s thought was identified with the constant purpose which inspired it: the development of ‘a doctrine which, being as sound as it was simple, and without making any concessions to Epicureanism and hypocrisy, was aimed only at the happiness of the human race’. In his final work, Rousseau claimed that his ideas formed ‘a body of doctrine so solid, so well connected and formed with so much meditation and care’ that it was more plausible than any other system (i.933) (7).

The thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau forms a unity in all essentials; it exhibits a unity of purpose and is organised around a theme that remained consistent throughout Rousseau’s life. Rousseau himself affirmed this to be the case. However unstable a person Rousseau may have been, however erratic his behaviour in relation to other persons may have been, Rousseau the writer is characterised by a singular and naked honesty. And Rousseau the writer was clear that his work articulates a unity of purpose.

What makes Rousseau’s philosophy so vibrant and meaningful is its grounding in the most profound questions of being. Rousseau valued rational understanding as much as any philosopher. He also felt that this reason was thin and misleading if it is concerned with pure intellect detached from human being. Hence Rousseau’s view that true philosophy rests upon an inner determination which makes it clear that the philosopher loves the truth rather than merely wants to identify it. Philosophy needed to rest on something more profound in the human ontology. For Rousseau, the philosophical enterprise is inextricably connected with a consideration of being as a whole. Limited to intellectual activity alone, philosophy is not a genuine search for truth and is certain to leave the most important questions unanswered to the extent that it fails to engage with humanity’s whole existence. Philosophers need to penetrate beyond the intellect to identify the principles which were ‘engraved in the human heart in indelible characters’ (i.1021) and so find truth in the comprehension of the depths of being. This exploration of the inner landscape is genuine philosophy. In coming to understand essential being, the philosopher would come to comprehend the fundamental features of human society, thus reaching the level of universal principle. The moral ought-to-be of philosophy is thus grounded in something real, in human nature and its potentialities, not in something impossibly ideal, some abstract standard. Rousseau purported to give human beings a vision of the ideal human society that they would all, by nature, create and flourish in if they were to become truly human beings. For Rousseau, this concern with the problem of the ‘nature of man’ was incompatible with the more abstract concerns of traditional metaphysics (ii.699).


The presentation of Rousseau’s political philosophy tends to concentrate upon The Social Contract. Understandably so, since this is Rousseau’s most carefully reasoned piece of work on politics. However, emphasis upon this work to the exclusion of Rousseau’s other writings, the bulk of which were read more prior to the French Revolution than the Social Contract, invites distortion. Rousseau is sometimes characterised as an ‘ambiguous’ writer whose argument can be interpreted in a number of different ways. And, certainly, Rousseau has been understood in radically different ways. Few other thinkers have been more badly treated in interpretation than Rousseau, by followers as well as by critics. The philosopher Hume was a friend who became an enemy, making the statement that Rousseau’s problem was that he has ‘feeling’ rather than reading. The truth is that Rousseau was as well-read as anyone, including Hume. To all the calamities that befell Rousseau in life may be added the fact that his doctrine came to be applied to the ‘totalitarian democracy’ of the modern, centralised nation-state when Rousseau was clearly thinking of small-scale city-states or city-republics, like ancient Athens or contemporary Geneva, the one his intellectual home, the other his physical home. Rousseau is presented as the emotionalist, the romantic, as the thinker who advocates a ‘return to nature’. Certainly, Rousseau advocates that a naturalist education is crucial to human happiness. At the same time, however, there is no sense in which Rousseau merely advocated a return to simplicity and nature as a solution to the problems of civilisation. For Rousseau is also a political and social thinker who engaged with the civilisation unfolding before his eyes; he treats the practical problems of government in a more realistic way than one would expect from someone frequently dismissed as a romantic.

Rousseau is a much more coherent and consistent thinker than those giving his work a superficial glance would suggest. Rousseau insisted on this point: ‘All that is daring in the Contrat Social had previously appeared in the Discours sur l’inegalite; all that is daring in Émile had previously appeared in Julie’ (C Bk IX). Any ‘ambiguities’ that appear are merely superficial (C IX). When Rousseau asserts the fundamental unity of his thought, arguing that it is based upon ‘one great principle’, he deserves to be taken seriously.


Rousseau is presented as the emotionalist, the romantic, as the thinker advocating a return to nature and arguing that a naturalist education is crucial to human happiness. Emilie ou de l’Education does not discuss education in any narrow sense but in terms of the and unfolding of human nature. In this work, Rousseau proceeds from the assumption of the natural goodness of human beings to demonstrate how the moral corruption that makes human beings seem less than good has its origins in the malign influences of existing society. But at the same time, Rousseau is also a political thinker, treating the practical problems of government in a more realistic way than one may be inclined to believe given the tendency to read Rousseau as a ‘back to nature’ thinker. In addressing the corrupting influences of contemporary society, Rousseau invests law and politics with an educative and moral purpose. What impresses in Rousseau’s political solution is the philosophical foundation. Rousseau produced a theory that united ethics and politics in a dialogic culture that affirmed that reason as opposed to force should govern human affairs.

Rousseau believed that contemporary philosophers had repudiated abstract metaphysics only to embrace a superficial empiricism limited to the exploration of ‘sensations’. Such empiricism was merely the converse of abstraction and could only produce a soul-destroying materialism. Rousseau is concerned that a philosopher should avoid the twin reefs of abstraction and empiricism by becoming aware of the dangers of being led off-course by absolutes and of getting lost in a consideration of isolated facts (ii.245/6). For Rousseau repudiated both abstract speculation and the narrow experimental method. A myopic concern with absolutes encourages a philosopher to go beyond the confines of attainable knowledge; an overriding concern with particular facts causes a philosopher to neglect guiding principles. Rousseau recognized the significance of historical, physical or psychological facts but was clear that these facts did not exist in their own right and could only be properly understood through fundamental principles.

Rousseau identifies la saine raison or la raison simple et primitive as one of man’s most sublime gifts in that it can have ‘no other aim than what is good’ (ii.370). Rousseau thus affirms a distinction between the reason of the honest thinker and the thinkers who reason to expound subtle and insincere arguments. 

The most striking thing about Rousseau is his rationalism. Frequently considered as a ‘back to nature’ philosopher who values the ‘primitive’ and the simple, Rousseau believes above all that human beings are rational animals. Rousseau is part of that rational tradition which extends from Plato to Spinoza and after, which believes that the more human beings are rational, the more they are free. The reason that Rousseau embraces reason so firmly as an instrument of knowledge is on account of its essentially natural character. Human beings are rational by nature; they have a rational nature which they use in order to realise their potentialities. In affirming the natural goodness of all genuine human capacities, Rousseau identifies reason to be one of the most striking and effective of them all. Further, reason is a powerful safeguard against tyranny, whether the tyranny of passion or human will. The development of the rational capacity enables human beings to protect against the tyranny of others through the ability to distinguish the universal truths available to personal inspection from any irrational opinions which human authority may attempt to impose. There may well be many truths which are beyond reason, but it is impossible that any known truth could ever be against reason. 

Whilst feeling enables human beings to love the good, only reason makes it possible to know the good. Certainly, reason will degenerate into error when it is abstracted from the other human powers. However, the activity of reason will certainly be beneficial when it is properly related to the fundamental needs of the self.

One of Rousseau’s most significant arguments is that reason makes it possible for human beings to identify meaningful relations between themselves and their environment; reason, that is, enables human beings to organise their inner lives in connection with the outside world. ‘Reason is the faculty of ordering all the faculties of our soul in accordance with the nature of things and their relations with us’ (iv.1010). Rousseau’s rationalism, therefore, is predicated upon the connection between human nature within and without, extending the relation between each individual and all individuals within human society to a relation between society and nature. Ontology and ecology are thus united as different aspects of one and the same nature. The active quality of reason enables human beings to transcend the mere ‘sensation’ of empiricism. Through this active rational quality human beings are able to go beyond the realm of ‘images’, which are merely the mental expressions of the objects of sense, to the realm of ‘ideas’, which are the ‘notions of objects determined by relationships’ (iv.344).

For Rousseau, then, philosophy does not concern truth or knowledge or intellect as values in themselves but only in relation to a profound examination of and reflection upon all of the many aspects of human nature and how this nature is expressed and embodied in relation to the world.

There is scant evidence of Rousseau the romanticist and emotionalist in the Social Contract. Rousseau’s argument is impeccably rational and logical in terms of the language he uses, the concepts he employs, and the conclusions he draws. One searches in vain for the figure of the ‘noble savage’ in The Social Contract. Rousseau certainly repeats his criticism of the corrupting effects of luxury, but this is integrated into a rational account of a possible political order as a feasible alternative to modern civilisation. Rousseau’s critique of the contemporary social order and its commercial values is motivated not by yearnings for the noble savage in some lost Edenic past but by a very civic concern that the conditions for a citizenship enabling an active sovereignty be established.

One must begin by recognising the obstacles that stand in the way of Rousseau’s philosophical project. For Rousseau, genuine philosophical inquiry proceeds from a personal commitment not just to seek or even to know the truth but to love it. The problem is that the corruption of civilisation to which Rousseau draws attention implies also the corruption of reason. From the very start, then, there would seem to be a question mark against the viability of Rousseau’s project. Rousseau demands that truth be distinguished from falsehood, the authentic and original from the artificial and accidental, but gives reasons which explain why such differentiation is impossible. If the social processes generating civilisation have perverted all values – moral, spiritual and intellectual – then it is difficult to imagine how Rousseau’s philosophical project can even begin, let alone succeed. Even if one can imagine the possibility of the authentic philosopher, somehow abstracted from the general corruption, it still is true that this philosopher lacks a starting-point which exists outside of himself or herself. Further, even if one passes by these problems, there are no grounds for supposing that the authentic philosopher will be able to communicate the truth to people who are corrupted and hence incapable of understanding it. It is the old question of how the prisoners chained in Plato’s cave could be made to understand that all that they see on the wall in front of them are mere shadows and not true reality?

Rousseau is aware of the problem. Before the truth can be expounded with any prospect of it being understood and accepted, the source of error needs to be exposed to make people aware of the extent of their corruption. Rousseau’s work is thus separated into two parts – the early works of criticism and the later works of construction. In the early writings, Rousseau purports to reveal the evils of modern civilisation, ‘destroying the illusory prestige which gives us a stupid admiration for the instruments of our misfortune’. Having identified the problems in the early writings, Rousseau in the later writings proposes an effective remedy (i.934/5).

There is a serious argument to be had here concerning the character of Rousseau’s ‘naturalism’. For Rousseau justifies the creation of the civil bond out of nature as being ‘artificial’ rather than natural. The ethico-rational state that Rousseau projects as a permanent possibility is not ‘natural’ but is created by human beings as an artificial civil community embodying the general will. The difficulty is really one of terminology. In going beyond nature to establish the just principles of civil union, Rousseau is revisiting Aristotle, only with different terminology. For what Rousseau presents here as ‘artificial’, the origin of the civil union beyond nature, is considered by Aristotle to be a ‘natural’ act on the part of human beings. The human being, Aristotle argues, is a zoon politikon, a being that can only become an individual human being in the society of others. The social state, then, is the natural state for human beings. The ethical and rational society realising moral and civil liberty is also the society which is required for the realisation of the potentialities of human nature.

The ethico-rational political society, then, is artificial in being the conscious product of human beings but is also natural in being rooted in the inherent sociability and rationality of human beings. The social state, in other words, is the natural state of human beings in the way that the isolated existence of individuals, which is how Rousseau presents the state of nature, is not. ‘Back to nature’ to Rousseau would have meant the repudiation of the civic bond uniting each and all in favour of an isolated existence of warring monads. Rousseau’s position is far too complicated to be grasped in terms of ‘back to nature’ slogans. Rousseau rejects both the possibility and the desirability of returning to the happiness of the past. That happiness is lost and lost for good. Rousseau’s critical rejection of the corrupt present is focused on going forward to nature, to the full and free realisation of human nature within physical nature. Rousseau is clear on this point: ‘Human nature does not regress and one can never go back to the times of innocence and equality when one has once left them’ (i.935). Thus Rousseau follows his criticism of contemporary corruption with constructive arguments for a civilisation beyond corruption. As against notions of going ‘back to nature’, Rousseau argues in favour of going forwards to the realisation of human nature.

Rousseau sought to give a rational account not merely of the existence of society but specifically of the good society. The good society is the constituent part of human happiness and well-being and rests upon the creation and maintenance of a social bond that is capable of bringing individuals together whilst leaving them as free as they were in the state of nature. The unity of the social bond makes possible a greater, richer freedom for individuals.

The end of the state is freedom but the realisation of the end of freedom entails also the abolition of the state. Rousseau’s ethico-rational community is beyond the state as an order grounded in coercion. Such is the paradoxical formula which Rousseau bequeaths political philosophy. It is a formula which can be traced in later philosophers whom Rousseau influenced. The republic of ends envisaged by Kant is a stateless society of uncoerced rational-dialogic interaction. Kant’s noumenological society had been anticipated by Rousseau in his state based upon the social contract. Marx developed this formula as an object of political action and social transformation, showing how the stateless society could be realised in the historical process.

For Rousseau, the social contract is the foundation of the political association of human beings and is essential to secure a society embodying ethical agency. Being ethical, this society connects human beings with their higher selves and enables human beings to realise their essential human capacities. Thus Rousseau can be presented as being firmly in the Aristotelian tradition in affirming that the human being is a zoon politikon whose essential humanity can be realised only by developing a politikon bion or public life. The political association of human beings, therefore, is necessary if human beings are to lead a truly human existence as human beings, realising the essential potentialities which define the human being.

The conception of politics as necessary for a truly human existence is ancient and has its most forceful expression in Aristotle’s theorisation of the polis. This tradition upholds politics as the architectonic art that is concerned with achieving the common good of all human beings.

This tradition stands in marked contrast with the Christian and liberal devaluation of politics in which politics is at best a necessary evil that is imposed upon humankind as a result of the sinful or aggressive nature of the human being. The Christian view rests upon the concept of original sin. In this view, politics imposes the civil peace – the ‘peace of Babylon’ – and seeks to minimise the damage caused by human beings in their sinful pursuits. This view of human beings as naturally evil lends itself easily to the legitimation of an authoritarian state resting upon force.

Augustine’s poor view of human nature reappears in liberal thought as a conception of human beings as naturally selfish, competitive, acquisitive and as primarily concerned with gaining private advantage over and against each other. The Hobbesian nightmare of the war of all against all may read back into nature the character of an emerging bourgeois society (see C.B. Macpherson on the theory of possessive individualism) but the point to understand here concerns the reduction of politics to being merely instrumental in the keeping of the civil peace. Politics has no greater moral significance other than as a force imposing order. This standpoint rests upon the assumption of the human incapacity to achieve the good. Order rather than good is the objective of politics. Later liberal thought is more optimistic in arguing that free individuals left alone to pursue private interests would produce the general interest. Nevertheless, this is an anti-politics in that this beneficent activity is located purely in the private sphere, in civil society envisaged as a market free from political regulation and where human beings operate as separate individuals. Even in this most optimistic liberal theory, politics remains no more than a necessary evil, an instrument of force for keeping the civil peace, which, as a coercive instrument lacking ethical value in itself, is best to minimise in its scope. Politics is ‘artificial’, to employ Adam Smith’s vocabulary, a force whose influence is best to restrict as far as possible.

In this formulation which denies the possibility of an ethical politics, the liberals go half the way with the anarchists. Both are agreed on the evil nature of the state. The liberals, unlike the anarchists, however, argue that the state is nevertheless necessary. The negative evaluation of politics ensures that the political life which the ancient tradition of politics affirms to be essential in realising the truly human life becomes the state resting upon force and staffed by professional politicians and civil servants removed from the demos, the body politic.

Historically, this devaluation of politics is associated with the separation of the state from civil society and the rise of the abstraction of the modern state and individualised bourgeois society. As civil society, as the sphere of a universal egoism and antagonism, comes to establish the context for the activities of real individuals, so politics as something supra-individual, concerning human affairs, comes to be transferred to and monopolised by the state as an abstraction from civil society. Politics is thus identified with the state as the communality in ideal form that is denied in real society. 

The question is whether Rousseau really did theorise this modern nation state, as admirers and critics allege; or whether his active conception of sovereignty and citizenship imply a more humanly and democratically scaled politics for city-states and city-republics.

Rousseau’s de jure state founded by the social contract is made necessary by the egoism and antagonism of the state of nature. But there is a distinction to be made here in this presentation of the state as a necessary ethical agency. Rousseau’s social contract does indeed differentiate the state from society and would appear to valorize society over against the state as an abstraction. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s revaluation of the social is quite distinct from the Christian and liberal devaluation of the political. Rousseau’s valorisation of society is an attempt to realise the moral community that would no longer require the state, either as an ethical agency or as a coercive instrument of the civil peace.
This distinction can be clarified through an understanding of the themes that Kant borrowed from Rousseau. Kant’s republic of ends is committed to a society in which individuals treat each other as ends and never merely as means. The republic of ends is not a state in the traditional sense but implies a noumenological society. This society rests upon reason and morality as against coercion, upon the internal coordination of human beings as moral agents rather than upon imposition by the third party of the state. In terms of the distinction drawn by Christian and liberal thinkers, it is a social and not a political community.

There is an attempt here by Kant to overcome the old dualism between the world of spirit and the world of flesh, between the City of God and the City of Man. The social order projected by Kant is not organised through force but through self-legislated principles of practical reason. Human beings are co-Legislators in this social order. For Hegel, the competitiveness of civil society is part of the necessary order. The internal moral coordination that Rousseau and Kant project cannot be achieved at this level. Hence Hegel affirms the need for the state as an ethical agency. Only the state is capable of transcending the particular interests renting society from within. Politics, then, represents a rationality and universality denied to society. It was Marx who recovered the idea that the realisation of ethical agency in human affairs, the world of flesh, is to be achieved socially rather than politically. Communality and Universality, therefore, become characteristics of the real society of the lived experience of individuals and not of a political realm abstracted from the real sphere.

In the Social Contract, Rousseau addresses the problem of how freedom can be secured in a society that is both just and human. Rousseau states the problem with which he is to deal succinctly:





Human beings in a state of nature are led to create a state which obligates its associates through a sovereign power established over them. This sovereign defends and protects the persons and goods of each individual associate but its legitimacy does not rest upon its ‘common forces’ but upon right. The sovereign is an ethical power in that the individuals who choose to associate and create the sovereign do so through a social contract in which each obeys only themselves and, as a result, remains as free in a political association as they had been in a state of nature whilst overcoming the obstacles to freedom that had emerged in that natural state.

Rousseau’s point that individuals may be ‘forced to be free’ is easily misunderstood and too easily misinterpreted as the betrayal of individual freedom to the totalitarian state. Rousseau is attempting to distinguish his freedom through the civil association of individuals from the freedom characterised by the separation of individuals from each other in a state of nature. Outside of political association, the individual is free insofar as s/he is not restrained by others in the pursuit of private personal ends. Individuals cannot be ‘forced to be free’ in this natural state. The ‘forcing’ of individuals to be free requires that autonomy be combined with authority. Autonomy in this sense is not a natural freedom but a lawful freedom. Rousseau avoids the simple identification of autonomy with the absence of restraints but instead recognises the necessity of restraints of some kind or another. In a state of nature, the absence of restraints upon the ‘individual’ issues in a sociality which is characterised by the mutual antagonism of self-interested individuals; this is a universal restraint which inhibits the autonomy of all. The real question that Rousseau addresses pertains to the character of restraint. Who composes this restraint and how is it applied?

Rousseau determines to achieve that form of restraint that individuals have chosen for themselves, for protection, certainly, but for a form of protection that embodies autonomy. Associates, then, obligate themselves in exchanging natural freedom for lawful freedom. Rousseau’s autonomy, therefore, entails individual respect for and obedience to the laws. The critics of Rousseau who assert a totalitarian implication here fail to note the fundamentally democratic and ethical character of this freedom as a lawful freedom that all are involved in making, imposing and maintaining. Rousseau treats human beings as moral agents who are obligated only by laws of their own making; human beings obligate themselves. The laws to be obeyed by individuals are self-legislated. ‘Forcing’ individuals to be free means no more than that the law, made by all individuals, expresses and establishes in communal form the highest good which is in the interests of each individual to achieve.

Rousseau is quite prepared to address the political implications of the principle of self-legislation. The principle of autonomy is thus realised only by human beings participating in the making of the laws, individuals legislating to themselves as citizens of the self-made polity. Thus Rousseau justifies voting in popular assemblies as a ‘consequence of the contract itself’ (SC IV.II). Direct democracy alone, however, cannot realise sovereignty. Voting in a simple sense is an interested activity in which individuals pursue their own individual good, with no connection to the good of all. The realisation of sovereignty, however, requires disinterested voting on the part of individuals. The social contract, therefore, entails ‘total alienation’.





Individuals, therefore, are to disregard their private interests when voting. What is of concern to each individual as an indivisible part of the whole is the sovereign, the interest of the whole itself. The individual, therefore, disregards his or her own particular interest and instead wills the general interest. Thus the will of individuals as citizens is the general will. In achieving the sovereignty of the general will, human beings realise their essential autonomy. Human beings thus become the moral agents that they all potentially are as human beings. In putting the general interest of all before their own private interest, human beings become the moral agents presumed by the principle of self-legislation. Human beings become indivisible parts of the political body as a collective body set up to enable human beings to escape the restraints of the state of nature.

One has to be careful in constructing Rousseau’s argument. Rousseau is not investing ‘the state’ as such, i.e. the institution, with a moral significance over against the individuals constituting it. The general will is not the ‘will’ of the state as a supra-individual, collective body. The general interest is the interest of the de jure state, i.e. the state as ethical agency. But this general interest pertains to the true interest of each individual, i.e. is something that inheres in each individual and is part of the essential human capacity which human beings need to realise in order to become and be truly human. The general interest, then, refers to what the individual human being would will if reason were sovereign. Thus, though general, it is always an individual’s will that is involved. It is a general interest that achieves an individual’s interest as a moral and a rational being.

The general interest, therefore, is the interest of the community of real individuals. It is not ‘the state’ or ‘the community’ as supra-individual, collective bodies, abstractions possessing a ‘will’; the general interest pertains to the individuals composing the collective body, morality and law by consciously associating together to realise a common interest that enhances their freedom as individuals. The general interest is thus the true interest of each individual. The realisation of human beings as rational beings requires the constitution of an association of individuals who put themselves under a general will that is their own will apart from their particular wills.

Rousseau is thus attempting to reconcile particular interests and the general interest through reason. As individuals, human beings act in terms of private interest. Individuals pursue private ends, with the result that human society comes to be characterised by mutual antagonism. The social contract is an attempt to dissolve this antagonism, affirming that human beings as citizens are rational beings capable of evaluating issues and making decisions with respect to the general interest. The general interest, then, is not the sum of the private interests of the individuals constituting society. The citizen thus deliberates and decides in disregard of the private interest and thinks only of the general interest in determining what is to be done. Individuals are to treat others as they would have themselves be treated; and they are to treat themselves as they would treat others – as indivisible parts of the whole. The social contract constitutes such a form of association. The individual as citizen and, hence, as rational being, judges and acts from the standpoint of the general interest.

The general interest, then, is formed by citizens in disregard of private interests and concerns a higher interest which secures the good of each and of all simultaneously. The social contract, forcing individuals to be free, thus gives political form to Kant’s categorical imperative. It realises a freedom that transcends the merely empirical or subjective freedom of individuals in an antagonistic existence; it realises the true human interest of human beings as autonomous moral agents.

Rousseau’s freedom, then, is a moral order that recognises freedom as something pertaining to the relations between each individual and all individuals. Freedom requires a generality which transcends purely private, individualistic inclinations. Freedom requires obedience to laws that individuals have themselves made; the laws that obligate individuals are of their own making. Reason is in control and autonomy is achieved for all as a public good.

There is a need to distinguish a principle of the state from the empirical state. It is commonplace to argue that the state rests upon force (Trotsky, Weber, the anarchist tradition in general etc.). It is much more interesting to explore the idea of the state as an ethical and communal agency and to investigate the way in which this idea contradicts the actual state. Thus Rousseau’s de jure state is legitimate in that its commands rest upon the rational will of the citizens whereas the actual state is illegitimate in that it has to impose its commands upon individuals through coercion. Rousseau’s ethical state is the essential conditions for human beings realising their potentialities as moral agents. 

What is interesting to develop is the idea of the state as something more than a coercive instrument contrived to impose the civil peace. There is little in Rousseau’s argument on the historical necessity of the state that is not better formulated by Hobbes. But Rousseau clearly distinguishes himself from Hobbes over the principle of autonomy. Rousseau’s idea of the state can be distinguished from his account of the necessity of the state, which in large part corresponds to Hobbes. For Hobbes, individuals concede their rights completely to the state. But this, for Rousseau, is illegitimate in that it violates the principle of autonomy. Human beings do not give up their autonomy in Rousseau’s argument. Rousseau’s sovereign is not external to contracting individuals, as with Hobbes. Rather, Rousseau’s ‘form of association’ incorporates the principle of autonomy. The people themselves are sovereign and remain sovereign when putting themselves under a collective authority as their own authority. The will of the sovereign, then, is the true will of each individual in so far as reason rules. In obeying the sovereign will human beings are obeying their own will. Human beings have constituted a collective authority and put themselves under it whilst at the same time preserving their autonomy. Rousseau, therefore, combines authority and autonomy in a lawful, rational freedom. And, in so doing, Rousseau has established a reciprocal relation between rulers and ruled (SC I.V).

Rousseau, in effect, is pursuing the distinction between individual freedom and general freedom whilst attempting to reconcile the two. Individual human nature, left alone, resists putting reason in control. Human beings, as homo sapiens, are capable of rational self-determination. But the problem is that the human being, as homme privé or homo economicus, is subject to irrational determinations. The natural inclinations of human beings, then, have the result of motivating the behaviour of individuals through self-interest. A civil society resting upon private property thus structures social reciprocity so as to prevent individuals, as private beings, from appreciating rational self-determination enabling truly human being. The purpose of politics is to educate human beings to transcend irrational self-interest and achieve rational self-determination. Rationality is achieved as human beings become citizens. The citoyen takes precedence over the bourgeois. Rousseau is quite prepared to acknowledge that the state as a coercive apparatus will remain as a necessary institution for so long as human beings are governed by their natural inclinations, i.e. natural in a society structured by private property. But as politics educates human beings towards citizenship and as reason assumes control, the need for the state diminishes and society is more internally, morally coordinated.

The state, then, exists as the necessary political coordination of individuals in the absence of an internally and morally coordinated society. But were reason to be in control and hence were human beings able to transcend their natural, selfish inclinations, the state would disappear and reason would come to replace coercion. This is the logical conclusion of Rousseau’s idea of sovereignty. For Rousseau, whilst human beings are reformable and can, therefore, be educated to citizenship, human nature is such as to make it probable that coercion will remain, to a greater or lesser extent, the basis of all organised politics. The need for the state as an organised coercive apparatus will never, therefore, disappear altogether.

There is a need, therefore, to distinguish between what is an ahistorical ideal implicit in Rousseau’s conception of sovereignty and the recognition that since human beings will remain to some extent resistant to reason, the state as a coercive public force will remain necessary. More optimistically one can write that the ideal can be realised historically insofar as human beings are receptive to reason.

Both Rousseau and Hobbes argue that the coercive force of the state ends the state of nature by creating a political body based upon the will of the sovereign power. The difference is that Rousseau’s sovereign is not external to the people, as in Hobbes, but actually is the people. And given that the people are united by the general will the common force of politics is not coercion, but the reason of citizens. Human beings create a form of association in which each associate realises autonomy under the general will. The state does not disappear for Rousseau, but would indeed pass away as an apparatus based upon coercion as opposed to an association of citizens as moral agents. Thus a political association which organises human beings under a coercive apparatus would be transformed into an association of autonomous moral agents who coordinate themselves through the internal compulsion of reason.

The division of society into rich and poor is an obvious obstacle to the de jure state envisaged by Rousseau. Rousseau is aware of this and argues that in such a state ‘no citizen should be rich enough to be able to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself’ (SC II.II). It would seem to follow from this that the de jure state presupposes a classless society. This argument, however, is anachronistic. The division and conflict examined by Rousseau pertains not to classes as definite social groups structured by the objective relation to the means of production. This is Marx’s later definition. Rousseau simply refers to the division between rich and poor. Thus the de jure state tolerates ‘neither rich people nor beggars’. From riches and poverty only tyranny results:





Rousseau also argues that social groupings constitute a threat that would, if unchecked, undermine the de jure state. Individuals in these social groups would generate common interests held against the general interest of the community as a whole. The emergence of the general will is blocked. Thus, to sustain the sovereignty of the general will, Rousseau is led to establish a direct and unmediated relation between the individuals and the state.

This introduction can be concluded with extensive quotation from Rousseau himself which expresses clearly the nature of the problem with which Rousseau wrestled and the solution he effected.

I should have desired that, in order to prevent self-interested and ill conceived projects, and all such dangerous innovations as finally ruined the Athenians, each man should not be at liberty to propose new laws at pleasure; but that this right should belong exclusively to the magistrates; and that they should use it with so much caution; the people on its side be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws, and the promulgation of them be attempted with so much solemnity, that before the constitution could be upset by them, there might be time enough for all to be convinced, that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which make them sacred and vulnerable, that men soon learn to despise laws which they see daily altered, and that states, by accustoming themselves to neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement, often introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove.
I should have particularly avoided, as necessarily ill governed, a Republic in which the people, imagining themselves in a position to do without magistrates or at least to leave them with only a precarious authority, should have imprudently kept for themselves the administration of civil affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such must have been the rude constitution of primitive governments, directly emerging from a state of nature; and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of the Republic of Athens.
But I should have chosen a community in which the individuals, content with sanctioning their laws, and deciding the most important public affairs in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers, had established honoured tribunals, carefully distinguished the several departments, and elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellow citizens to administer justice and govern the state, a community, in short, in which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of the people, each class reciprocally did the other honour.





In the Social Contract, Rousseau asks:





Rousseau thus meets the objection that within any political community the laws decided upon will bind those who have not consented to such laws, leading to the possibility that political alienation will continue since individuals will be forced to conform to alien wills. The question is: is this a condition of political alienation? Decisions may go against individuals but this will not necessarily entail disaffection. Political alienation results only if any political order, as entailing supra-individual force, is thought greater than and opposed to the individuals constituting that common force. But if this common force of politics is used for the common good and rests upon the principle of popular sovereignty as something active, direct and continuous, then political alienation does not exist. Rousseau answers his own question thus:





Rousseau’s political philosophy can therefore be conceived in terms of the problem of securing and ensuring the freedom of human beings in the necessary transition of individuals from the asocial natural to the social civil world. Rousseau is concerned fundamentally with the problem of how the freedom of the individual and of the whole community can be reconciled so as to make the one consistent with the other. Rousseau is searching for the principles which would make such a reconciliation of each individual and all individuals a morally valid and legitimate act constituting political order. Rousseau’s critique of contemporary society and politics is fundamentally moral and his recommendation of the social contract rests upon an underlying philosophy of human freedom as both rational and reciprocal. Reason must be placed in control if freedom is to be realised. But Rousseau’s reason is quite distinct from that of the philosophes. Rousseau is not directing an intellectual criticism against identifiable ills and superstitions that accompany contemporary society, which can be isolated and remedied by piecemeal administrative tinkering or simply by the exchange of error for ‘truth’. Rather, Rousseau’s critique rests upon the ground that existing society is based upon premises which deny the freedom of the individual and is therefore inimical to the moral dignity of human beings as free and rational beings. The task is to conceive that kind of political and social order which corresponds to such principles and thus secures the freedom of the individual.

It needs, therefore, to be understood that whilst Rousseau’s is a moral criticism, his political philosophy is also an eminently practical one. Rousseau can easily be mistaken for a ‘utopian’ thinker whose morality sets an impossible ideal removed from political reality. Not so. Certainly, Rousseau integrates principles of human freedom in an overall philosophy of political society. He is no mere empiricist or pragmatist; but neither was the great realist Aristotle. Rousseau is concerned to theorise the arrangements of a political order, not a utopia, and hence goes to some lengths in discussing how human beings can live together in such a way as to lead a moral life as free beings. Rousseau’s philosophy entails action; it is practicable as well as principled. Rousseau’s description of the myriad ways in which the self was estranged could serve to reveal how self-estrangement could be overcome.

Rousseau thinks both in and against the Enlightenment, modernity and liberalism. He came to argue for the complete transformation of the social structures of modern liberal society in order to realise the core liberal values of autonomy, authenticity, individuality, spontaneity. If Rousseau is ‘totalitarian’ this is not because he is anti-modern or anti-liberal but precisely because he sought to show the conditions required for the fulfilment of the ideals and possibilities of liberal modernity.

Rousseau affirmed the possibility of transforming society through the institutions of the modern democratic state. This had two aspects - economic and educational. Rousseau’s state would undertake substantial economic reform, involving both the redistribution of wealth to ensure egalitarian power relations, abolition of the division between rich and poor and enabling the control of the means of production by the workers’. These reforms would generate self-sufficiency so that individuals would achieve economic independence and therefore not be subject to the necessity of having to compete with each other and attempt to dominate and exploit each other or become one of the ranks of the dominated and exploited.

Rousseau’s educational reforms would raise a new generation to be psychologically independent, possessing a sense of self that was not linked to performance in a competitive social system. Rousseau sought to create educational enclaves that would protect children from environing social pressures. Free from external conventions and constraints, the children would be brought up to discover and to trust themselves, in the process developing authentic identities of their own. ‘All wickedness comes from wickedness. Make man strong and he will be good’ (Émile, I 33). For Rousseau, growing up amounted to individuals growing into their own true selves; and the true self would be strong enough to be good in the world. Security here rests on each individual having a sense of their own self, knowing who they were, and thus not having to prove their self in competition in which victory is earned at one another’s expense. Such realised selves would be able to enter into human relationships based on sharing and giving, on reciprocity and mutuality based on a plenitude that stemmed from the fullness of self. Such cooperating beings would generate and sustain a public life based upon the active participation of all and which would be a medium of self-realisation and self-expression. Such a society implies an extensive public sphere based on the extension of public spaces for the interaction and intercourse of citizens. Rousseau could conceive of the enlargement of the state power precisely because it was constituted by the full and active participation not simply of the people but of the authentic, autonomous, outward looking, other regarding citizens who constituted the people. The state would be dynamically powered from below, its policies and actions being directly and strictly controlled from by the people. Rousseau’s portrayal of the communal festival defined an ideal in which private and public happiness united to show how the path to individuality and communality was one and the same.

Rousseau defined a whole range of concepts and ideas which were to prove to be highly influential. Not the least reason for Rousseau’s influence has been the allegedly paradoxical or ambiguous nature of his thought. Rousseau can be cited in justification of parties and policies which are diametrically opposed, from Jacobinism to anarchism and various other points in between in the radical, democratic and socialist movements of the past couple of centuries. Much of what Rousseau has been alleged to have argued is misleading or inaccurate. If one takes the trouble to restore Rousseau’s concepts and principles to their proper place in his structured argument, there is little that is paradoxical or ambiguous. Rousseau’s phrase ‘forcing individuals to be free’ is striking in its apparent paradox, but perfectly logical and consistent when one establishes Rousseau’s meaning. The fact is that Rousseau was much more logical, rational and consistent than lazy references to his ambiguity would suggest. Rousseau’s consistent theme is clear enough – to confront liberal modernity with the disparity between its theory and its practice. Rousseau was the first major thinker to show that to realise the ideals of modern liberalism it was necessary to radically transform the structures and institutions of liberal modernity.

2 THE DISCOURSE ON THE ARTS AND SCIENCES

Rousseau’s political philosophy begins in 1750 with the publication of a ‘A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences’. By pure chance, Rousseau discovered the announcement of an essay competition organised by the Dijon Academy. The question proposed by the Academy was ‘Has the Revival of the Sciences and the Arts helped to purify or to Corrupt Morals?’ ‘Instantly’, Rousseau was to write in his Confessions, ‘I saw the universe, and I became another man’.

If ever anything has resembled a sudden inspiration, it was the movement which occurred to me when I read these words. All at once, my mind was dazzled by a thousand lights, by a crowd of ideas presenting themselves together with such force and in such confusion that I was thrown into inexpressible agitation. I was overcome by a giddiness like that of drunkenness and such a violent palpitation oppressed me that … I flung myself under a tree where I lay for half an hour … If only I had been able to write down a quarter of what I felt under that tree, with what clarity I would have pointed out all of the contradictions of our social system! With what force I would have exposed all the abuses of our institutions! With what simplicity I would have demonstrated that man is naturally good and that it is only through these institutions that he became wicked!

C Part II Bk VIII

The argument of the first Discours is governed by the antithesis between the ‘original’ nature of man on the one hand and the corruption of modern civilisation on the other; this antithesis is developed in terms of a contrast between the freedom implied by true being and the enslavement and estrangement which is the human condition in the modern world. Rousseau is concerned not so much with historical details as with the moral theme. This allows him to separate the original elements of man’s being from the artificial elements added by the process of civilisation. By ‘original’ Rousseau means ‘what belongs incontestably to man’. Rousseau is therefore concerned to distinguish the essential and authentic as given by true original being from the accidental and artificial elements added by civilisation.

The historical facts of human evolution from the ‘state of nature’ to the modern world are secondary to Rousseau’s moral theme. The fundamental concepts of ‘nature’ and the ‘nature of man’ are the normative and critical principles which allow Rousseau to distinguish between the original and true aspects of human being and the inessential aspects added by civilisation. These are the concepts by which to evaluate the historical process, judging the facts of human existence from innocence to enslavement and corruption. In the concepts of nature and original nature, Rousseau discovers the meaning of history, the extent to which the historical process unfolds or inhibits nature. The end of the historical process is the fulfilment of humanity in general through the full and proper development of all the essential potentialities of human being. These potentialities cannot be realised until human beings have comprehended their relationship with the universal order. The concept of the ‘state of nature’ is subordinate to the metaphysical nature of the universal order or the ideal nature of the fulfilled human being, but it does relate to nature in terms of the biological and affective impulses animating human beings in their existence.

In contrast to previous thinkers, who had treated human existence in a fairly static way, with primitive human beings being assigned the characteristics of social beings, Rousseau conceived humanity as a species which acquired new powers and capacities through the course of historical development. Rousseau affirmed the human capacity for self-development and possible improvement. The only other philosopher who had given so much prominence to social processes in the development of a being governed by feeling and instinct to rationality and freedom is Spinoza.

Rousseau took the view that human beings are by nature good and become contrariwise only through their institutions. This view has radical implications. Corrupt institutions are subject to human intervention and alteration and, if human beings are to realise their potentialities, ought to be altered as a moral imperative. Rousseau bases his philosophy upon the human capacity for growth and development. The innate goodness of human beings is in sharp contrast to the evident wickedness of contemporary civilisation. In affirming human capacities for improvement, Rousseau is able to critically assess modern political and social institutions on account of their obstructing human growth and development, indeed on account of their perverting human nature and preventing human beings from becoming what they potentially are.

Rousseau thus emerges as a democratic philosopher who not only criticises tyranny as inimical to human freedom but demands that form of state which would facilitate human freedom in terms of the full development of the individual personality in an appropriate environment. Rousseau signalled his intent in this direction by changing the title proposed by the Dijon Academy to: ‘Has the Restoration of the Arts and Sciences had a purifying Effect upon Morals?’ Altering the question enables Rousseau to place the historical account of the impact of the Renaissance within a moral framework.

Rousseau’s main concern is to criticise the arts and the sciences as instruments of moral corruption. As a philosophical statement, the Discourse has limitations, which Rousseau soon recognised. However, whatever the adequacy or otherwise of Rousseau’s view in this essay, the more important point is that Rousseau raises the whole issue of the values and principles upon which society rests. Are they moral? Do they generate and sustain a society which fosters or inhibits human freedom?

In treating the question of values, Rousseau distinguishes between nature and artifice. Rousseau thus argues that in contemporary society, manners have taken the place of morals. He proceeds to argue that a society which has been reduced to an aggregate of individuals conforming to the externally given patterns and norms of social activity is not a society at all but a herd. The state of nature enjoyed a happiness denied to later generations on account of the primitive human being’s ability to identify himself spontaneously with his own true nature and be content with the immediacy of this true being. Whereas the primitive individual was able to live in himself, the modern individual has constantly to live outside himself. The modern individual can exist but he cannot be. The modern individual is subservient to the pursuit of artificial needs which can be satisfied only with the help of others. Society is therefore characterised by a condition of dependence. 
Rousseau’s very contemporary point is that in modern society, the more that individuals are brought together, the less together they really are. For the real social bond requires a ‘reciprocal penetration’, an interpenetration between each and all that is denied by the uniformity and conformity of the artificial social environment in which individuals have come to imprison themselves. Rousseau makes points in this early critique of contemporary society that he would later incorporate into his mature political philosophy.

Before art had moulded our behaviour, and taught our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rude but natural; and the different ways in which we behaved proclaimed at the first glance the difference of our dispositions. Human nature was not at bottom better than new, but men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer see the value, prevented their having many vices.
 In our day, now that more subtle study and a more refined taste have reduced the art of pleasing to a system, there prevails in modern manners a servile and deceptive conformity [uniformité, uniformity]; so that one would think every mind has been cast in the same mould. Politeness requires this thing; decorum that; ceremony has its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always follow, never mind the promptings of our own nature.

We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call society, all act under the same circumstances, exactly alike, unless very particular and powerful motives prevent them. Thus we never know with whom we have to deal.





The second part of the Discourse begins with Rousseau discussing the origin of the arts and the sciences in order to examine their effects upon history. Rousseau’s argument is that since their origin is ‘evil’, arts and sciences are corrupted, their evil origin being ‘too plainly reproduced in their objects’ (DAS 1973:14). So Rousseau derives astronomy from superstition; eloquence from ambition, hatred, falsehood and flattery; geometry from avarice; physics from idle curiosity; and even moral philosophy from human pride. The arts and sciences are the products of human vices. In their immediate objectives, the arts and sciences are implicated in moral, political and social failings. Thus the arts are associated with luxury, jurisprudence with injustice, and history with tyranny.

More important than these radical, indeed, provocative, criticisms, however, is to understand the way in which Rousseau’s mind was working with regard to morality and politics.





To adopt the later Marxist idiom, human beings have been reduced to the status of commodities to be bought and sold on the market. Rousseau does not identify the economic mechanisms involved in this enslavement to external imperatives but instead concentrates upon the ethico-political aspect of the question. At this stage of his intellectual development, Rousseau’s is fundamentally a moral critique of the vices of modern society.





Morally, human beings are more or less equal. However, in terms of intellectual abilities and special aptitudes, human beings are not equal. For Rousseau, the arts and sciences have so perverted the sense of values that any individual possessing special talent risks losing sight of his or her basic humanity whilst the popular masses, working to satisfy the universal needs of humankind are denied both material reward and moral dignity. Rousseau is thus criticising specialisation in the arts and sciences for undermining moral dignity and recognition as the common denominator which establishes the unity of humankind. Specialised activity threatens to undermine the integrity of both individual and society.

Rousseau concludes with an argument for the guidance and the enlightenment of humankind by an elite. Since the arts and sciences are ‘evil’ or corrupt in origin and corrupting in their effects, no genuine guidance or enlightenment can come from them. Guidance and enlightenment must, therefore, come from outside the existing order. Rousseau thus puts his faith in the men of genius, the likes of Bacon, Descartes and Newton as ‘teachers of mankind’. ‘It belongs only to these few to raise arguments to the glory of the human understanding’ (DAS 1973:25). This elite of genius alone possesses the special insight into the nature of things that distinguishes them as the true teachers of mankind. These individuals of genius alone can be counsellors of princes and politicians. Rousseau presents his own version of Plato’s philosopher–ruler.





Rousseau is seeking to bring power and knowledge together on a moral basis; reason is put in control for the good of all humankind. The masses, amongst whose number Rousseau counts himself, are to abandon pretensions to glory and be content with obscurity. Rousseau’s argument here needs to be quoted in full lest it be misunderstood.

Let the learned of the first rank find an honourable refuge in their courts; let them enjoy the only recompense worthy of them, that of proposing by their influence the happiness of the peoples they have enlightened by their wisdom. It is by this means only that we are likely to see what virtue, science and authority can do, when animated by the noblest emulation, and working unanimously for the happiness of mankind.
 But so long as power alone is on one side and knowledge and understanding alone is on the other, the learned will seldom make great objects of their study, princes will still rarely do great actions, and the peoples will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt and miserable.





In conclusion, Rousseau is developing the argument that human beings are unhappy because they are ‘in contradiction with themselves’. Rousseau develops this thesis through the antithesis he establishes between knowledge and morality, the individual and the herd, manners and morality. The discrepancy between the natural and the artificial, the true and the superficial, is the source of the disharmony and unhappiness exhibited by contemporary society and serves to deny the moral dignity of human beings.

Rousseau thus develops the argument that in the transition from nature to society human beings have come to impose a civilisation of uniformity and conformity, deceit and lies, upon themselves. In superimposing the artificial upon the natural, human beings have burdened themselves with a social necessity that imposes social behaviour as a series of lies, false needs, and spurious values.

In taking up the question of political order and the task of constructing political arrangements, Rousseau will further his concern for authenticity which alone can recover human happiness and dignity. Rousseau thus seeks a resolution of the antithesis which generates conflict and contradiction. Rousseau’s ensuing project is one of reconciliation.

3 ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE INEQUALITY OF MANKIND

Rousseau continues the themes of conflict and diremption outlined in the Discourse but subjects them to much closer treatment in On The Origin And Foundation Of The Inequality Of Mankind. Again, the Dijon Academy had proposed the question for an essay competition and, again, Rousseau saw the title proposed as an appropriate subject to discourse upon. Much better in content and reasoning than his first discourse, ‘Inequality’, published in 1755, won no prize but indicated clear intellectual development.

The essay on the arts and sciences is fundamentally a moral criticism of contemporary society. In the discourse on inequality, Rousseau grounds the moral question more firmly in a social and historical framework. Rousseau deals with the ‘fall’ of man as a moral, social and political being and hence takes up the transition of human beings from a primitive to an unhappy, civilised state.

Rousseau identifies inequality as one of the most serious problems of modern life. In modern society, individuals are forced to compete with each other for scarce resources. The result is a growing inequality as victory goes to the strong, the weak being reduced to a condition of dependence. The physical inequality associated with the ‘harsh yoke of necessity’ comes to be overlain and exacerbated by a ‘conventional’ or artificial inequality which issues from the antagonistic, exploitative relations in which human beings are entangled. Where once human beings in general were subjected to a single form of physical necessity and dependence, now they come to be split into two groups: strong and weak, masters and slaves.

Rousseau begins by differentiating between two kinds of inequality, the one natural or physical, the other moral or political:





The second kind of inequality – moral or political – is thus conventional and involves human consent. It is an inequality that is subject to human alteration; it is a remediable inequality.





Rousseau discusses human beings in a state of nature. Here human beings live in an animal state at the level of pure sensation, seeking to satisfy the basic needs of food and rest in the immediate environment. Human beings in a state of nature, therefore, lack the supernatural, social, artificial characteristics of the civilised human being. In this immediate, primitive existence the problem of evil does not arise; the state of nature is an amoral existence in which consciousness is limited.

In the Discours sur l’inégalité Rousseau is concerned to demonstrate the origins of this inequality. The transition from the state of nature to civil life is the product of a long historical process. This process is characterised by a growth in the ‘consciousness of freedom’ as the human individual transcends a condition of subjection to ‘mechanical’ forces to exert himself as a ‘free agent’ (iii.141). Rousseau affirms the capacity of human beings to perfect themselves through generating more complex modes of beings. 

What distinguishes human beings in a primitive state from the animals is the possession of free will. This free will is essential to the human being, furnishing the basis for action and its morality, but also for the dignity of the individual as a human being, i.e. as a moral, choosing being able to arise above the passive direction of the senses and of instinct.

The spiritual soul, the consciousness of the possession of free will, further distinguishes human beings from animals, as does perfectibility. For Rousseau, these distinguishing characteristics remain potentialities in the primitive state. Human beings living at the level of pure sensation and instinct are passive in a moral sense; they are not conscious as human beings but are instead completely subject to the impulsions of sensational and instinctual existence.

Rousseau’s Natural Man depicts a non-alienated condition of being in which the individual ‘lives with himself’, ‘always has all his powers at his disposal’, ‘carries himself whole and entire about him’. Thus, the modern world, in which individuals were estranged from each other from their selves, ‘is by no means the original state of man, but merely the state of society, and the inequality which society engenders, that alter and transform man’s natural inclinations’ and destroy the original unity and wholeness of being (Inequality 136, 192-3). The condition of self-estrangement could only be comprehended through the social functions it has served throughout history. Thus Rousseau demonstrates the extent to which both the ascriptive statuses of traditional society and the achieved identities of modern society operated to prevent individuals from being themselves. Rousseau also shows how both forms of self-estrangement served to buttress and legitimise the inequalities particular to these societies.

Rousseau denied that discontent had its origins in human nature and was therefore a constant force in human history. Discontent played no role at the start of history. ‘Savage man, once he has dined, is at peace with all of nature, and the friend of his fellow-man’. Discontent developed to become the most powerful human motivation only in time.

Evolution toward a more conscious existence as a human being is linked to passions and derives from the creation and satisfaction of needs. Needs and wants increase with knowledge and gradually remove human beings from the primitive state subject only to physical requirements.

Rousseau’s point is that the human being living in the primitive state cannot be unhappy since needs are limited and capable of being satisfied on the level of immediacy. The human being in the primitive state is amoral in social behaviour. Since there is no social relationship between human beings in the primitive state there is no need to work out and respect obligation; there is neither virtue nor vice.





Rousseau is particularly concerned to assert this amorality. He does argue that any human being created by a good God must also be good. In terms of his argument as presented here, however, this goodness is a state of natural and passive innocence. Rousseau is attempting to repudiate Hobbes’ argument that human beings are inherently wicked and aggressive. Hobbes’ poor view of human nature forms the basis of an absolutist political system (I 1973:65). Rousseau is concerned to repudiate this view.

However, in formulating an adequate answer to Hobbes, Rousseau has to address the problem of the potentialities of human beings and how they can be placed in a political and social framework. In the primitive state, the human being lives in a state of limitation. It is not a state of unhappiness, given that there is a natural balance between needs and their fulfilment. The natural inequalities between human beings are unimportant and have not been supplemented by the superimposition of moral and political inequality. This latter inequality, which becomes the source of conflict and unhappiness, is the product of the social state, not the natural. And this inequality is irksome.

Having prepared the ground to analyse the history of the primitive human being, Rousseau introduces the distinction between amour de soi or amour de soi meme on the one hand and amour proper on the other.





The ‘establishment and distinction of families’ and the introduction of ‘a kind of property’ represented a decisive new stage in history (iii.164/7). The development of society forced all individuals into a competitive struggle, particularly for private property, which extended and intensified until individuals came to define themselves by their possessions. Rousseau was gravely concerned by the feeling of deprivation among those who were foolishly upset by their failure to obtain superfluous commodities. Such people are ‘unhappy to lose them without being happy to possess them’ (iii.168)’ (38). The first form of self-identity, based on amour de soi, was absolute: ‘each man regarded himself as the only observer of his actions, the only being in the universe who took interest in him, and the sole judge of his deserts.’ Amour de soi was concerned with the goal of  “self-preservation” and was essentially static. In time, a new form of identity emerged, based on amour-propre. This was ‘a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises only in society, which leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other, which causes all the mutual damage that men inflict on one another, and which is the real source of what we call honour’ (Inequality 154, 219).

Amour de soi may be translated as self-interest as distinct from amour proper as selfish interest. Amour de soi refers to what may be called enlightened self-interest, a concern for self-preservation. Amour proper refers to a selfish interest that develops with society, generating pride, vanity, competitiveness and all other such vices. Rousseau elaborates upon the distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre in a footnote.





The sense of self here was competitive. In time, competition extended to encompass every sphere of human activity so that ‘the rank and position of every man [were] established’. Rousseau identified the societal determination which ensured that property would obtain general significance; any area of life coming to be defined as property implied that all areas of life would come to be redefined as property. The implication of this is that the full range of human powers and abilities would inevitably come to be channelled into the acquisitive struggle. Further, competition prevents the faculties of individuals remaining at a constant level. Amour-propre was intrinsically dynamic, forcing individuals to develop their capacities to new levels. ‘Behold all the natural qualities of man put into action .. Behold all our faculties developed, memory and imagination in full play, selfishness [amour-propre] in operation, reason fully active, and the spirit almost at the highest point of its perfection’. Whilst ‘wit, beauty, strength, skill, merit, talent’ could for the first time come into their own, this was not for their own sake, but as property or weapons in the struggle against others (Inequality, 174). Rousseau exposes the ambiguity of modern civilisation in the fact that the development of authentic impulses and powers had been set in motion by the least authentic needs of human beings. Self-development was a paradoxical process which led to a profound ambiguity at the core of modern civilisation.

For Rousseau, amour de soi is legitimate whereas amour proper, as the source of vice, is not. The one derives from nature whereas the other develops only through the social state. Selfish interest is comparative; it indicates the consciousness that individuals come to possess of themselves and of others. Comparison and competition go hand in hand. Thus the transition from the state of nature to the social state may therefore be characterised as the degeneration of self-interest into selfish interest. For selfish interest arises in a social state in which human beings have come to acquire the capacity of reasoning and reflecting, evaluating and making comparisons between the self and others. Human beings now come to concentrate upon self-seeking in relation to others. And it is this concern with selfish interest that is the source of conflict and competition between individuals. The social state is thus a state of unhappiness.

Rousseau thus proceeds from the pre-social state of nature. In this state, human beings exist, passively, in an immediate environment. Human behaviour is neither moral nor political but is subject to the impulsion of need and instinct. There is none of that reflection or comparison which in the social state generates conflict and competition.

The transition from the state of nature to the social state represents the important intellectual development that is associated with the growth of moral awareness. It also represents the critical stage at which selfish interest began to emerge as something quite distinct from self-interest. The fulfilment of legitimate, but limited, needs was replaced by the multiplication of wants, artificial needs, vanity, competition.

Rousseau examines the origin of this state of affairs.





Self-interest developed only to be replaced by selfish interest.

In proportion as the human race grew more numerous, men’s care increased.

This repeated relevance of various beings to himself, and one to another, would naturally give rise in the human mind to the perceptions of certain relations between them. Thus the relations which we denote by the  terms great, small, strong, weak, swift, slow, fearful, bold and the like almost insensibly compared at need, must have at length produced in him a kind of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence, which would indicate to him the precautions most necessary to his security.




Everything now begins to change its aspects. Men, who have up to now been roving in the weeds, by taking to a more settled manner of life, come gradually to form separate bodies, and at length in every country arises a distinct notion, united in character and manners, not by regulations or laws, but by uniformity of life and food, and the common influence of climate.
Men began now to take the difference between objects into account, and to make comparisons; they acquired imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit, which soon gives rise to feelings of preference.





Rousseau thus describes at length the transition from the primitive state to the social state and its ‘petulant activity of our amour propre’.

The transition from the primitive to the social state postulates a revolution in the human condition brought about by agriculture and by human beings coming to discover the utility of metals.





The revolution shows its consequences in the development of selfish interest. This social state is characterised by the necessity of labour to supply more than what is required for subsistence; the division of labour; the development of private property and the concern for private property; the multiplication of needs; the increase and differentiation of skills leading to competition.

The cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution; and property, once recognised, gave rise to the first rules of justice; for to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something. Besides, as men began to look forward to the future, and all had something to lose, every one had reason to apprehend that reprisals would follow any injury he might do to another. This origin is so much the more natural, as it is impossible, to conceive how property can come from anything but manual labour: for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally create, so as to make them his own property?





In the social state, then, life comes to be subject to selfish calculation and this renders active the amour proper. The development of the faculties, increasing the inequality between human beings, now comes to have a social and artificial origin. Rousseau condemns this situation as one of distinction and deception. This stage brings to an end the independence and self-sufficiency which prevails in the state of nature and introduces the social state of social dependence and enslavement.





The discovery of metallurgy and agriculture brought about the second social revolution and totally transformed the basis of human existence. The emergence of a division of labour and of private property introduced the distinction between ‘mine’ and ‘thine’ into society and brought individuals into permanent conflict with each other. As a result, inequality emerged to become a permanent condition of human society. The rapid development of the human faculties such as memory, imagination, reason, and pride served to render life more difficult and complex. With the emergence of inequality, freedom came to be replaced by servitude. The fact that the rich and the poor could not exist without each other means that even the rich were enslaved by the poor. One of the distinguishing features of modern civilisation also emerged: ‘it was necessary for people to show themselves other than what they in fact were. Being and appearing became two different things, and from this distinction emerged the imposing ostentation, the deceitful cunning and all the vices which follow in their train’ (iii.174). (39).

Human relations came to rest upon calculation and utility. Human beings came to see each other as mere means to personal ends, sought to reduce each other to mere means. As Marx later argued in Kantian fashion, human beings were reduced to mere means to ends which were external to them. Rousseau focuses upon the instrumental relationships responsible for reducing human beings to the status of mere means:





The artificial and social environment that human beings have created for themselves, subjecting themselves to social dependence and slavery, is an environment of competition and conflict. Inequality generated anxiety, insecurity, and ultimately conflict, as each individual sought to acquire wealth and power in order to put himself above others. Rather than being content to satisfy their needs, individuals sought abundance for themselves and then, beyond that, superfluity. All became possessed by the ‘dark inclination to do themselves mutual harm’. Rousseau returns here to the theme of concealment introduced in the first Discours: individuals hide behind their masks in order to satisfy ‘their hidden desire to achieve their own profit at others’ expense’. Society soon degenerated into a condition of mutual enmity.  Individuals became ‘greedy, ambitious and wicked’. The ‘war of all against all’ which Hobbes assigned to human beings in the state of nature is, Rousseau argues, attributable to the defects of the social state, not to original human being. Where once early societies were based upon harmonious relationships, the discoveries of agriculture and metallurgy, the division of labour and private property generated ‘the most horrible state of war’ (iii.175-6)’ (39). Human beings have to become active, aggressive and egoistic in this society. In this society, insatiable ambition and acquisitiveness came to typify the behaviour of individuals.





Insatiable ambition and acquisitiveness mean that human beings come to seek more than they require to satisfy their needs. Indeed, the competitive nature of the social and artificial environment based upon private property means that human beings must seek to acquire more than they need. Human life is characterised by conflict and competition in the pursuit of artificial needs.





It is the rich who came to dominate in this competitive environment, coming to enslave human beings and subordinate them to their command. Indeed, each individual comes to seek personal aggrandisement and can succeed only at the expense of another. The outcome, inevitably, is the domination of those who succeed, the rich and the powerful.





Rousseau introduces here the idea of contract for the first time, as a means of moderating and regulating the competition and conflict. For Rousseau, the purpose of any such contract here is to bring some peace into the social state and thus overcome the state of war that prevails. For the disorder resulting from increasing social inequality threatens to tear the social fabric apart.





The social state had thus issued in a state of war:





Rousseau is thus aware of the tendencies to self-destruction in modern society. Universal egoism and antagonism will produce not freedom but mutual ruination. How to achieve a genuine reconciliation, one reflecting the equality and freedom of human beings, what could be called the principle of autonomy, overcoming this state of war, is a question that Rousseau would pursue in The Social Contract. At this stage, he is more concerned to argue the application of the idea of contract by the rich so as to protect their property and power. For it is the rich, those who have acquired the most property, who have the most to lose from the disorder and the insecurity accompanying the state of war.





Faced with the state of war and the constant threat of losing by force what has been acquired by force, the rich conceive the profoundest, the most selfish plan, ever contrived by the human mind – to defend their interests by regulating the universal antagonism and egoism of individuals, thus ending the state of war as anarchy. The rich thus contrive to create a contract which not only controls universal antagonism but also unites competing individuals, groups and associations under their leadership, holding the whole society together through stimulating the fear of an artificially invented ‘common enemy’ taking the form of other associations.





To bring this state of insecurity, enmity and war to an end, human beings devised ‘the most carefully conceived plan that ever entered the human mind’. This involved the creation of a supreme power which would govern individuals according to law and would ‘defend and protect all the members of the association, repulse common enemies, and maintain them in eternal concord’ (iii.177). This association transforms a natural right based on force into a legal right sustained by universal consent. This creation of political society through agreement or contract was, according to Rousseau, an enormous confidence-trick performed by the rich. The rich gained protection for their property, the poor obtained nothing other than permanent enslavement. Riches and poverty received legal sanction, with the result that natural freedom was lost for good. The rich achieved their objective by claiming the general interest, persuading all that the new society would be to the benefit of all. ‘All hastened to put on their chains in the belief that they were assuring their freedom’. ‘For the profit of a few ambitious men’ the whole human race was subjected to ‘toil, servitude, and misery’ (iii.176/8).





As political societies spread, civil right soon came to characterize human existence as citizens affirmed the need for a common rule. The need for a common rule, however, does not necessarily issue in rule for the common good. What Rousseau presents here is the rationale given by the rich to justify a common plan which works for their own sectional interest: it is to protect the weak, restrain the ambitious, and most importantly to ‘secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him’. The institution of rules and peace, to be binding upon all, then, is intended to secure the interests of the possessing class: ‘subjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the observance of reciprocal obligations’ actually institutionalises social inequality to the benefit of the powerful and the propertied. To conceal the true nature of this ‘reflected’ plan, the rich seek to take upon themselves the cloak of the common interest, to ‘defend all the members of the association’ and ‘repulse their common enemies’. The ‘harmony’ proposed is designed to preserve the main cause of disharmony, the division between rich and poor. Here, in the second Discours, Rousseau establishes the point that political power always favours the strong at the expense of the weak. This notion would run throughout Rousseau’s work as he sought to order human affairs according to moral right. The distinction between rich and poor made more sense before the emergence of the institution of private property. With this foundation of legal government, determining the position of individuals in society by law, this rich-poor distinction became a question of the powerful and the weak.

Rousseau has, in effect, theorised another stage in the evolution of the human race. The transition from the state of nature to the social state is completed by the transition in the latter from an unregulated to a regulated state of war. This attempt to regulate the state of war is contrived by the corrupt and the powerful in order to escape disorders and the risk of losing all and hence to put their power and property on the most secure footing of rules and justice and peace. Having achieved power and property by force, the rich now seek harmony. Rousseau theorises here not the rational state but the class state.

Far fewer words to this purpose would have been enough to impose on men so barbarous and easily seduced; especially as they had too many disputes among themselves to do without arbitrators, and too much ambition and avarice to go long without masters. All ran headlong into their chains, in hopes of securing their liberty; for they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political institutions, without experience enough to enable them to foresee, the dangers. The most capable of foreseeing the dangers were the very persons who expected to benefit by them; and even the most prudent judged it not inexpedient to sacrifice one part of their freedom to ensure the rest; as a wounded man has his arm cut off to save the rest of the body.




Thus humankind passes into the social state as a social and artificial environment imposing a universal antagonism and egoism and representing a new social dependence and slavery. But since such a state is also a state of war that threatens the interests of the rich, some kind of regulation is contrived by the rich. This is an artificial political or institutional order, a state of government. The mass of humanity actually acquiesce, indeed rush headlong into their new fetters.

This acceptance by the mass of humanity of this contrivance by the rich is considered by Rousseau as some kind of a contract. Acquiescence is the result of the masses coming to be persuaded that such a contract actually secures and protects the freedom of all. The masses are entirely mistaken. It is a contract contrived by the rich for the safeguarding of their property. The relations between the rich and the poor, the rulers and the ruled are thus put under rules of justice that rationalises and preserves social inequality.

This contract as a state of government does not, however, constitute a genuine social contract. It is an arrangement that settles the relation between the rulers and the ruled on terms determined by the rich. But this state of government, although it introduces rules of justice, is not a government that treats human beings as free and equal beings; rather, it is tyranny contrived by the rich. At this point politics and morality are separated from each other and develop in different directions. Selfish interest and private property mean that society comes to be governed by the false philosophy of materialism. The state of government is thus revealed by Rousseau to be an anti-social contract. 

Pointing to the way that magistrates attempt to turn their office into a hereditary right, Rousseau shows the pernicious influence that power has upon those who possess and exercise it. The inherent tendency is for leaders to be replaced by a single ruler who governs by his own power alone. In the process, citizens are reduced to a state of subjection. The promise of a society of free men gives way to the reality of a society of slaves.

But Rousseau is concerned with establishing a more positive point than merely exposing a confidence trick. This point would become central to his political theory as laid out in the Social Contract. It is to achieve freedom as authenticity through a genuine common plan that motivates Rousseau to conceive of the Social Contract. Whatever the injustice which supports a political society, the original purpose behind the foundation of political society is to secure the freedom of its members and the protection of their lives and property. This is the contractual principle which Rousseau seeks to establish: contracting individuals may be deceived but, nevertheless, they always appoint leaders so as to defend their freedom, not to destroy it. Since the civil association serves to legalize and entrench existing inequalities, thus blocking the exercise of true freedom, this end is never achieved. 

The state of government is an inauthentic, false contract contrived by the rich and imposing new fetters on the poor. It does not create true rules of justice or law; it merely uses the rules it institutes to cover power and material interest with legitimate authority. It is government based upon property and it is designed to secure the interests of the rich. Human beings have acquiesced in this false political society but, in so doing, have merely escaped the anarchy of the state of war by falling into the shackles of tyranny. This tyranny, it is understood, is the natural and inevitable outcome of amour proper or selfish interest.

Rousseau now has to address the issue of what an authentic social contract would look like. Rousseau assumes that the purpose of the political society is to secure the good of the community. He is thus critical of contemporary political society. The mass of humanity, exposed to the insecurity of the state of war, have opted for the peace and tranquillity contrived by the rich to preserve what they have appropriated by force. But, in acquiescing in this way, the masses remain passive as the rich convert government into their own private property.

Thus, the transition to the social state is characterised by social inequality translating into political power. This has its basis in the division between the rich and the poor. It becomes a division between rulers and ruled. This is the contemporary political society which, for Rousseau, is inauthentic. This state of government must be dissolved and reconstituted on a legitimate basis.

The natural development of selfish interest into the contemporary political society leads to rules of justice and peace that legitimises a society stratified by property, sustaining a system of illusory freedom in which individuals passively accept the rules of those imposed by those above them. In this society, the mass of inhumanity are not actually exercising their own will in any genuine sense but are, on the contrary, subject to the will of those above them. The only will that has any effect, ultimately, is that of the ruler at the top. For this inauthentic political society rests upon a power and a logic that must lead to a situation in which all authority is concentrated at the top.

Rousseau’s conclusion is that in exchanging the state of nature for the social state and, within the latter, the state of anarchy for the state of government, human beings have created new fetters for themselves and now exist in a condition of unhappiness. On top of social inequality, then, is the inequality of a political society that concentrates power and authority at the top, despite the institution of civil equality. This tyranny involves the equality of moral nullity. For the ruler lacks moral authority and lives under the constant threat of revolution.

Thus Rousseau concludes the Discourse. The Discourse is a critique of the inauthentic social state which issues from the degeneration of amour de soi into amour proper. The state of government has thus sanctioned private property and hence legitimised society as a sphere of vanity, ambition and selfishness. The natural outcome of this is that human beings come to treat each other as mere means and come to form an association in which they are reduced to the status of slaves. The state, in turn, becomes the property of the rich.

Human beings, in effect, have exchanged their natural freedom for a social slavery that is sanctioned and protected by an inauthentic political society.  Human beings are no longer independent and self-sufficient but have instead become enslaved to the wants that multiply in an artificial and competitive social environment. There is a loss of human dignity and recognition of this, in turn, results in unhappiness, frustration and, in a profound, moral, sense, in deprivation.

What needs to be understood is that Rousseau is not arguing that human beings should go ‘back to nature’. Given that Rousseau’s subject is the transition from the state of nature to the social state, such a recommendation to go back to nature would be anomalous. What Rousseau is actually arguing is that the human condition in the contemporary and inauthentic social state is one of moral nullity. Rather than going back to nature, Rousseau is concerned that human beings should look to recover their nature, corrupted in modern society, by going forward to a genuine social contract. Rousseau’s point is that the reappropriation of human nature by human beings, which is the achievement of moral status, is possible only in relation to social and historical development. Rousseau offers a critique of contemporary society from a moral perspective concerning human authenticity and autonomy. The transition from the state of nature to the social state is, however, a historical process that is immune from moral condemnation in being irreversible. The social state is a false and inauthentic social existence that Rousseau does not like. But Rousseau appreciates that its destruction in the pursuit of a simpler life is neither a practical nor a desirable option.

In fine, if present society denies human dignity and causes unhappiness, and if the return to an original state of primitive simplicity is impossible, then the only option is to go forward and complete the historical process through human beings coming to reappropriate their nature in a higher, more developed, state.

It is more accurate, therefore, to argue that Rousseau holds that human beings were happy in a primitive state, but only in a passive way, i.e. in an immediate environment subject to the impulsion of instinct and sense. For Rousseau, this passive and amoral existence is not the final condition for human beings. Rousseau upholds the doctrine of perfectibility and thus affirms that human beings are capable of evolving into something higher and truly moral. The unrest within modern individuals originated in deep impulses, ultimately the most distinctively human impulse of all, which was perfectibility. For Rousseau, this quality distinguishes human beings from animals: for ‘an animal is at the end of a few months, what it will be all its life; and its species at the end of a thousand years is exactly what it was at the start’. In contrast, the human being’s ‘faculty of self-perfection .. which is inherent in the species as well as in the individual .. draws him gradually out of his original condition, in which he might have glided through life serenely and innocently’; ‘with the help of circumstances, [it] gradually develops all his other faculties…’ Discontent thus sprang from the capacity for change and self-development which was humanity’s essential and distinctive trait. It is human nature to be historical, to be a creative change agent in challenging and transcending any fixed, static nature in order to be.

Rousseau understood that perfectibility, ‘this distinctive and almost infinite faculty’, was also ‘the source of all man’s miseries’. Over the centuries, it had generated ‘both his discoveries and his errors, his virtues and his vices; and at length it makes him a tyrant both over himself and over nature’ (Inequality, 142). For this reason, history was the story of both human self-development and self-estrangement.

In fine, Rousseau identifies three stages in the development of inequality: rich and poor, powerful and weak, master and slaves. In the final stage, the ‘monster’ of despotism rears ‘its hideous head’ (iii.190), bringing the historical process full circle; despotism is a new but corrupt ‘state of nature’ which is based on force alone. The freedom and independence which characterised the state of nature at the beginning of the historical process has given way to servitude and exploitation at the end of the process. The freedom and independence which is true original being, making individuals truly human, has been suppressed as society makes abject slaves out of individuals.

Arguing that Rousseau is demanding that human beings go ‘forward to nature’ rather than go ‘back to nature’ makes the point that Rousseau’s concept of ‘nature’ is not a nostalgic concept for measuring the extent of man’s degradation in the modern civilisation but a positive ideal encouraging the discovery of new wisdom and the regeneration of humanity in a future society which realises the unity of ontology and ecology.

In the transition from the primitive to the social state, human beings come to exchange their natural freedom for social enslavement and dependence. It may seem as though the transition from the primitive to the social state has been a mistake to be regretted and, if possible, to be reversed. But a return to nature is impossible. Human beings can overcome unhappiness and can achieve happiness only by moving forward to a state that rests firmly upon the foundation of rational, moral and political principles. Of course, this future state of freedom will reflect the evolution of the human race to a higher ethical plane. It will not be the primitive state, with its amorality and passivity. But it will exhibit happiness in a positive sense rather than, as in the primitive state, in a negative sense. Moral and political equality will be achieved with human dignity and recognition. Reconciliation overcoming deprivation, conflict and competition is Rousseau’s objective.

Whilst the primitive being in a state of nature had been fully self-possessed, he had also been a passing stranger in the world. This changed with historical development. In the process of obtaining an inner and an outer world, human beings came to lose themselves. The latent powers of human beings were activated to create history but were canalised into rigidly defined channels of operation. Human beings could not feel at home in the world that their creative agency had brought into existence since this agency had been heavily circumscribed in form and content to conform to an acquisitive, competitive social system which was an unintended consequence of human action, a human product that had escaped human comprehension and control. This alienation has reached its peak in the modern city where, ‘in the midst of so much philosophy. Humanity, civilisation, sublime morality, we have nothing but deceitful and frivolous appearances, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness’ (Inequality, 193). (152).

Human beings are thus faced with the task of employing their will and their rational faculty so as to create a moral and political environment that realises in a positive sense the happiness achieved negatively in the state of nature.
Human beings have left the state of nature and by a process involving their acquiescence, have come to enter the social state. But since this social state entails, in the first instance social dependence and slavery, human beings face the task of creating the true social state, moral and authentic, which goes beyond the state of government.

It is to misunderstand Rousseau profoundly, then, to claim that he is asserting that human beings should return to nature. On Rousseau’s own premises this is an impossibility. Instead, Rousseau is arguing that human nature can be recovered, realised, only by proceeding forward to a future society in which sociality rests upon morality and reason. This ethico-rational state does achieve happiness, but it is a happiness possessed of an altogether higher significance than that lost in the transition from the primitive to the social state. And this pressing forward to a future state is something that can be achieved by human effort and initiative. If amour de soi has degenerated into amour proper it is nevertheless the case that human beings can come to assume an evolved amour de soi, adopt an enlightened self-interest which enables them to acknowledge the possibility of an ethico-rational state as the truly human state.

Thus, despite parallels in the concern for happiness, the ethico-rational state secures the moral integrity and dignity of each human being actively and in a way quite distinct from the original, physical condition of self-preservation in the primitive state.

Rousseau’s criticism of inequality and defence of the principle of equality require further elaboration.

A New Politics – The Authentic Citizen

‘We must illuminate his reason with new ideas, and warm his heart with new feelings, so that he will learn that he can best expand his being and multiply his happiness by sharing them with his fellow men’ (Rousseau, Social Contract, original version).

The defence of Rousseau against charges of totalitarianism does not require so much a denial as a definition. What liberal critics understand by totalitarianism could be designed to alter Rousseau’s concepts in significant respects at almost every point, so that what emerges is caricature. In many respects, Rousseau does theorise a totalitarian community. 





The underlying direction of this argument is profoundly totalitarian. Rousseau’s reasoning concerning the unity of the authentic and autonomous self and the political community is total in being all-embracing. Rather than deny that Rousseau is a totalitarian, it is more profitable to make clear the terms of this totalitarianism. For these terms make it plain that Rousseau is, at least, as concerned with the individual and individual freedom as any liberal. Rousseau’s point is that values of individual liberty require a supporting social infrastructure and collective purpose to become anything more than a pious ideal. Rousseau repudiates the liberal antithesis of individual and community. Restoring the unity between the two makes it possible to highlight the public dimension of freedom in terms of individual freedom rather than sacrifice.

Rousseau characterises modern society as a world in which the individual is ‘always in contradiction with himself, always oscillating between his inclinations and his duties, neither man nor citizen, no good either to himself or to others. Such is the ordinary man of our day, an Englishman, a Frenchman, a bourgeois: he is nothing’. This formulation indicates that the unfitness of modern individuals for citizenship and their unfitness as human beings stems from ‘selfishness’ as the bankruptcy and emptiness of self. Creating the good person and the good citizen is a singular process, both categories being reenergized at the same source. Rousseau asks ‘can a man live for others if he is brought up to live for himself?’ Rousseau states that a man cannot truly live for others unless he is educated to live for himself. ‘If these two aims could be united into one, we could resolve man’s self-contradictions, and remove the one great obstacle to his happiness’ (I.8-9). Living for oneself is living for others; there is a reciprocity in Rousseau’s conception of authenticity.

Rousseau thus harmonizes the ideal of individuality and the ideal of community so as to show that the good person and the good citizen are one and the same being. Ensuring the one ensures the existence of the other since individuality and community are essential to human happiness. In his political writings, Rousseau established the principles of a public community which would enable individuals to be freely and openly themselves, expressing the fullness of their powers in a creative unfolding that embraces all equally, with the result that the personal authenticity of each served as a politically cohesive force in unison with the authenticity of all others. The creation of such a community would make it possible to free the immanent possibilities of modern civilisation.

Rousseau’s call for the unity of man and citizen is of a part with his affirmation of the unity of the state and civil society. Such views directly challenge liberal perspectives. Rousseau deliberately targets the liberal conception of the state as merely an instrument which permits individuals to fulfil their personal aims. Insisting on the institutional separation of the state from civil society, liberals argue that the purpose of the state is to protect the life, liberty and property of individuals through a constitutional and legal framework which ensures the continuation of private activities – competition for resources and the accumulation of wealth – in conditions of civil peace. Such a state would be limited and peripheral in its social functions, guaranteeing peace and order whilst leaving individuals free to pursue their private ends as they see fit. 

Rousseau makes clear how much he has in common with liberalism. ‘What is the purpose of political association?’ he asks in the Social Contract. His answer is a concise statement of liberalism: ‘The preservation and prosperity of its members’ (III,9, 419-20). Rousseau affirms the liberal conception of the state as a protective device for individual freedom. In his Encyclopedia article on Political Economy he writes: ‘Far from each individual being obliged to perish for the sake of all, all [are obliged to] pledge their lives for the sake of each …’ (Economy, 256). The benefits which the state owed its citizens were ‘rights of the state of nature’ (256) which, ‘great as they are, belong to all men’ (258). It was in specifying what it was that the state protected that Rousseau went much further than liberalism. Rousseau argued that the state could only ensure the true ‘protection to its members’ by securing ‘respect for their persons’ (257). This condition has radical implications in that it made it clear that the core liberal value of the integrity of the individual personality had been rendered problematical by the very institutions which liberals made crucial to individual freedom, particularly private property. Far from enabling individuality, spontaneity, creativity, autonomy, Rousseau’s theory revealed that the structures of modern society constituted a systemic threat to the freedom of the individual. Far from fostering individuality, this system imposed uniformity by compelling all individuals to participate in an endless competition for the endless accumulation of property and power. Vast inequalities opened up between individuals and were solidified in the social system as individuals were directed into rigid, polarized class roles, making them dominate and exploit one another lest they be dominated and exploited themselves. Rousseau was the first philosopher to show liberals the extent to which the liberal real contradicted the liberal ideal. Rousseau was the first to ask liberals the question that, to this day, they still would prefer not to answer – if liberal institutions such as private property, the institutional separation of the state from civil society, the instrumental conception of the state etc could be shown to not only not to support the core liberal value of individual autonomy but actually work to suppress it, would liberals sacrifice the institutions of the liberal order or the value system sustaining that order? If liberals genuinely believe in the value of autonomy, which it has affirmed from the first, then Rousseau makes it clear that liberalism would have to change its practice and recognise that the key institutional features of the individualist society would have to be altered. This would entail embracing the positive conception of liberty, removing the gap between the state and civil society and accentuating freedom as a collective project so that politics becomes the terrain upon which each and all realise their true potentialities in a collective, mutually supportive growth and unfolding. Such an expansive conception of the political extends the sphere of the state much further than the liberal instrument of the civil peace. Rousseau, nevertheless, drew this conclusion from the liberal premises that the legitimacy of the state stems from the benefits it could confer on individuals. Rousseau’s totalitarian conclusions from liberal premises follows the anthropological claim that human beings need each other in order to be themselves. Individual freedom, in other words, is necessarily collective. The liberal ideal, as a value system, requires ‘totalitarianism’ as Rousseau defined it, not as a state invested with a supra-individual will but as a social infrastructure constituted by the free association of individuals.

The source of the evil was not the rich and the powerful as such but the whole social system which divided humanity within and forced individuals to assume the roles of rich and poor, strong and weak, masters and slaves (Inequality 187). To provide the self-sufficiency enabling autonomy requires that the state undertake substantial structural transformation of the material base of social life.

For Rousseau, this transformation did not mean appropriating the property of the rich, since this would simply target individuals. Rousseau argued that it would be better to redistribute wealth through progressive taxation and preserve the right of property as ‘the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship’. The real target should be the social system. 

Rousseau’s point was that the liberal value of autonomy could only be achieved with equality. It has become conventional for individualist liberals to read Rousseau in light of the French Revolution, accusing him of having sacrificed liberty to the pursuit of equality (see Talmon). This accusation is plain wrong. Rousseau valued equality ‘because liberty cannot exist without it’ (Social Contract, II, 11, 391). Equality was an essential condition of liberty and was valued by Rousseau precisely for that reason. Rousseau could easily throw the accusation back at individualist liberals who value private property above all – they sacrifice liberty to the pursuit of inequality. 
The equality that Rousseau sought was attainable only through ‘a total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the community as a whole’, so that ‘since each man gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all’. In such a state, ‘each one, in giving himself to all, gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he gives others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase in power to protect whatever he has’ (I.6 360-1). Rousseau argues that in a society split between haves and have-nots, it is ‘vain and chimerical’ for the state to guarantee every man equal protection of ‘whatever he has’. Legal and political equality is merely abstract in conditions in which economic inequality ensures that some live their lives in a state of dependence upon others. Given the unity of the state and civil society, the state will ‘take the part of the strong against the weak, and of him who has against him who has not…’ (Émile IV 198). Since ‘laws are always useful to those who have, and harmful to those who have nothing’, political and legal equality can be a force for autonomy only in a social system in which ‘all have something and no one has too much’ (Contract, I.9 367). Thus Rousseau was not concerned with ensuring a strict equality of wealth, a precise distribution in which all received equal amounts. Rousseau’s point is along the lines that it is not power that corrupts but its absence. If all have some power to be autonomous then they would be free from the domination and exploitation of others, even if they should have more power. All individuals would have power enough to be autonomous. Inequality is a destructive force when it compels individuals to depend on others in order to exist. In this manner Rousseau argued that wealth should be distributed so that ‘no citizen should be rich enough to be able to buy another, and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself’ (II.11 392). 









4 A DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

It is not enough to say to the citizen, be good; they must be taught to be so; and even example, which is in this respect the first lesson, is not the sole means to be employed; patriotism is the most efficacious: for .. every man is virtuous when his particular will is in all things comfortable to the general will, and we voluntarily will what is willed by those whom we love.





Rousseau thus raises the question of political alienation. How is it that human beings feel that their country is something foreign to them? How can human beings come to be at home in the world? Patriotism is possible only if human beings can identify themselves, in their essential being or will, with their country.





Rousseau makes some very incisive comments on social inequality, going beyond redistributive measures to overcome the division between rich and poor to address the social mechanisms generating that social inequality. In terms that recall Plato, Rousseau defines the security of citizenship.





Even after Marx had exposed the extent to which inequality was systematically rooted in class division, the dominant social tradition still concentrated upon the redistribution of wealth. The crucial question, as Rousseau understood, concerns not wealth and its division but the means to accumulate wealth and the mechanisms of increasing division between rich and poor. Rousseau’s concern with the question was motivated by his concern that all human beings should become citizens.





Rousseau thus addresses the fact of private property as the basis of the social state. He is thus confronted with the problem of creating a just state which is lawful in that consent is voluntary whilst acknowledging that the basis of the social contract is private property. This is the problem of creating the general will out of particular wills.





The first two Discours’ and the Lettre à d’Alembert contain a searing indictment of the corruption of human nature which has been attendant upon the processes of civilisation. The displacement of ‘reality’ by ‘appearance’ which characterises modern civilisation is due to the reversal of natural values in society. In consequence, outward forms and habits no longer correspond to the inner character of people and do not express what people really are according to the ‘dispositions of the heart’. Rousseau draws the conclusion that modern society is false and artificial since ‘Man no longer dares to appear what he is’ (ii.250, iii.8). Rousseau is scathing of the modern subject, the free, autonomous subject celebrated by liberal philosophy as the epitome of freedom. ‘What he is is nothing, what he appears is everything for him’ (iv.966).

Rousseau exposes the falseness and artificiality of this modern world of appearances by use of the image of the mask. ‘The man of society is completely in his mask’ (iv.515). Moreover, the situation is even worse than a condition of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy, as the homage that vice pays to virtue, at least implies that virtue to some extent still exists, as an ideal, a conscience etc. Rousseau’s point, however, is that the mask worn in the world of appearances conceals not the reality of authentic human nature, but the human being who has been corrupted and disfigured by the processes of civilisation.

The mask is used to conceal the perversion of human nature, serving to prevent the full extent of corruption, how far it has penetrated into the human character, from being exposed as a problem. As a result, people come to identify with the masks they have to wear in order to live in corrupt society. It is but a small step from people denying their inner character to a condition in which they have no character left at all. People become the masks; the masks harden on their faces and become a shell, a prison, that suffocates the character within. As a result, human beings lose their authenticity and individuality, become mere puppets of external forces, with no true existential significance of their own. To function in artificial society, human beings learn to sacrifice their being to social convention, existing as distinct from living within a strict uniformity and dumb conformity; each person learns to think and act like all others and thus no-one ever becomes truly himself or herself. In order to function in an artificial world, human beings need to become artificial selves; an alienated world requires that human beings are alienated from their essential being. The alienation of being and the alienation of place are twin processes creating a general alienation – a corrupted world populated by corrupted individuals, superficially happy in their inauthenticity. Of course, this superficial contentment is accompanied by a permanent, uneasy awareness that all is not well. Corruption within and without is a loss of personal reality that means that ‘never being in himself, man is always a stranger to himself and ill at ease when compelled to withdraw into himself’. Whereas self-sufficient primitive man lives in himself, modern man lives outside himself, not according to ‘nature’ and what he really is but in the ‘opinion’ of others, what society expects him to be.

For Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, in describing the ‘war of all against all’, is guilty of attributing to natural beings the characteristics of individuals in modern society. To Rousseau, Hobbes’ portrayal of human beings as mutual enemies is an accurate description of the character of modern society. Rousseau castigates this ‘base and deceptive uniformity’ which casts all individuals in the same mould, and ‘this uniform and perfidious veil’. Social life is characterised by a bellicose struggle for existence, with some more successful than others in acquiring scarce resources; but this success is a sign of weakness rather than of strength in that it expresses the contemporary person’s inability to become truly individual, to become what he or she is, to realise the essential being that each possesses. For all of the military metaphors accompanying the Hobbesian struggle for survival, the market model of human society which reads individuals as atoms competing with each other for scarce resources, Rousseau demonstrates that those who give way to their selfish passions under the constraints of external institutional necessity are the weak, not the strong. The numbers of people who are drawn into this competitive, egoistic, bellicose existence indicates the extent to which the contemporary world has lost physical vitality and ‘force and vigour of soul’ (iii.8,22,23).

The strength of the ancients derived from their ability to identify their personal character with the spirit of their community. The moral power of the communities of ancient civilisation encouraged the development and flourishing of the inner power of its members. In contrast, the modern individual is entirely lacking in such ‘genius’. In being subservient to artificial needs, the modern individual is enslaved by external forces and has thus lost a sense of true self. Modern society is characterised by the diminution of authentic personal existence and demonstrates the concomitant tendency of people to partially develop their character and to satisfy only particular appetites at the expense of a free and full growth. The obsessive striving after material possessions as ends in themselves, far beyond what is necessary for existence, indicates the hypertrophy of personality upon which modern civilisation rests. Similarly, when abstracted from the human context of being, knowledge degenerates into ‘vain science’ and ‘futile curiosity’ (iii.9-14).

Rousseau is quick to note the irony of a modern society which claims superiority over the ancients over its absence of slaves is a society which is subjected to more subtle and intrinsic forms of dependence. ‘Civil man lives and dies in enslavement’ (Social Contract iv.253). This tendency of modern civilisation to pass off its sophisticated systems of bondage as freedom is the central theme running throughout Rousseau’s writing. The original purpose of existence is given in the act of being ‘born free’; nevertheless, the modern individual is everywhere ‘in chains’. These chains are not merely those of authoritarian political institutions and laws but are of social conventions, customs, systems, ultimately embracing the very subjectivities of people. The modern individual is in bondage to external things and can only live in a condition of dependence upon these things. In the process, the individual is denuded of moral strength, coming to consider the false wants of the artificial environment to be real needs necessary to existence. The endless pursuit of false goals results in a perversion and a progressive abatement of personal life.

Living an inauthentic existence, human beings become strangers to themselves, in time coming to lose all sense of being, of having an inner core which is capable of conferring unity and order on their existence. 

Rousseau identifies the pernicious influence of urban life as one of the principal causes of this alienation. Rousseau slams towns as the ‘abyss of the human race’, diverting individuals away from what their nature indicates they ought to be and infusing them with the false values of artificial being. 





Civilisation is a process which estranges human beings from their selves, from their being, from others but also from place, from an external world that has become an alienated environment. The alienation of the outer world is accompanied by a condition of internal conflict. In having to live as other than his or her true self, the individual is incapable of satisfying the ontological need for personal unity and is constantly at war with himself; internally restless and tormented, the individual is compelled to pursue happiness in external things and activities which can never bring true fulfilment. Therefore, in contrast to primitive people, who lived peaceful, harmonious lives, the modern individual is exists permanently ‘in contradiction with himself’.

The condition of inner contradiction which afflicts the modern person is expressed as a persistent anxiety. In living outside himself or herself, detached from inner being, the individual is subject to a permanent restlessness and insecurity, striving to achieve aims which are false in corresponding to the imperatives of artificial society rather than to the human ontology. The attainment of external goals can achieve a superficial ‘happiness’ but never the real contentment that comes from a genuine happiness. Rousseau draws the conclusion that, in being driven by an insatiable appetite for personal advantage, the myriad activities and ambitions of modern civilisation simply express the modern individual’s estrangement from and inability to realise his/her true nature.
Rousseau’s argument is premised on the assumption that the real pleasures of an individual ‘derive from his nature and spring from his labours, relationships and needs’ (24).

There is a constant theme of imprisonment in all of Rousseau’s writings on modern society. He describes the salons as ‘voluntary prisons’ in which individuals incarcerate themselves and become the slaves of ‘childish habits’. 
Whilst the happiness of past communities cannot be revoked to form the basis of life in the present, Rousseau argues that individuals can protect themselves against the deleterious features of modern civilisation by leaving the towns for life in the country. The individual escapes the moral and physical suffocation of living in close proximity to convention and gain space to move, breathe and grow with one’s nature in touch with physical nature. In ancient civilisation, entertainments proceeded within a communal and social context set against the backdrop of nature. Greek theatre is the epitome of this approach. Rousseau condemns the modern theatre as a ‘dark prison’, a place in which individuals are herded together to form the audience and sit silent and motionless, in thrall to the artificial form of entertainment, the spectacle, on the stage before them. Such a passive existence serves to enervate the inner moral being and thus render individuals incapable of personal decision and action. In complete contrast, the performances of the Greek theatre took place out of doors, with their subject matter and inspiration coming from the historical achievements and public affairs of the community. Such entertainment fosters greater openness between the individuals forming the community. ‘Make each one love and see himself in the others, so that all may be the better united (d’Alembert 1948:169). By achieving a unity of existence, individuals are returned to the ‘peace, freedom, equity and innocence’ which are the preconditions of ‘solid happiness’.





For Rousseau, the ‘idea of God is inseparable from the ideas of eternity, of infinite intelligence, wisdom, justice and power’ (1). The individual can find true freedom only through the acceptance of principles which are ‘written in the depth of man’s heart by conscience and reason’ (iv.857). This is because the meaning of human life depends on the eternal laws of nature and order created by God.

Rousseau frequently experienced an ecstatic identification with the beauty of the Nature around him, describing how he would ‘plunge head-long into the vast ocean of nature’. ‘I feel inexpressible ecstasies and transports as I merge so to speak into the system of things and identify myself with the whole of nature’ (i.1065/6). Rousseau found it easy to make the transition from this affective reaction to the beauty of the physical world to a more definitely spiritual attitude in the presence of Nature. In many respects, Nature was Rousseau’s Church. Rousseau was uncomfortable praying within the confines of a room or a building, preferring to express and experience religious feelings in the midst of nature (i.236).

Such a natural, unmediated approach to religious experience follows logically from the assumption of natural goodness. Rousseau proceeds from the optimistic view of the capacity of human beings to effect their own salvation. ‘If I exercise my reason and cultivate it, if I use the immediate faculties which God gives me, I shall learn of my own accord to know and love him, to love his works, to will the good which he wills, and, in order to please him, to fulfil all my duties on earth’ (iv.625). ‘Everything that a man knows naturally, I too can know, and another man may be as mistaken as I’ (iv.610; RW 171). Ultimately, each individual has the responsibility of having to judge for himself or herself, thus deciding the meaning of his or her own existence. None can avoid that responsibility in the end, however much they may seek to evade it.

However affective and emotional Rousseau’s reaction to the presence of Nature may be, Rousseau’s approach to religion is grounded in reality and reason. Rousseau is clear that religious ideas need to be tested according to the principles of nature and reason. For this reason, Rousseau rejected revelation as a privileged way to religious truth and expressed scepticism with respect to miracles.

Rousseau asks why God should need to have recourse to phenomena which run counter to the laws of the universe He has created, when the most impressive truth will always be ‘the most common, the simplest, and the most reasonable’? Rousseau points out that since our main ideas about God are based on nature alone, there is no need to invoke some supernatural authority to confirm them. For Rousseau, miracles are quite superfluous as supporting evidence for the truths of natural religion. These truths are firmly grounded in the evidence of our ‘own faculties’. Further, the assumption of the miraculous quality of any phenomenon beyond our rational comprehension is imprudent in presupposing the complete knowledge of the laws of nature. Such an assumption is unwarranted.

Rousseau considered Jesus to be the founder of natural religion and the remarkable embodiment of its human qualities, a good man persecuted in a wicked world. For Rousseau, the compelling force of the Gospels does not rest solely on their ‘elevated pure morality’ but also upon the striking personality of Jesus himself. For Rousseau, Jesus gives the unique and fearless example of a man living the truths he teaches. With an eye on the difficulty of living authentically in the inauthentic civilisation of his day, Rousseau notes the contrast between Jesus as the embodiment of ‘the simplicity of the most heroic virtues’ and the Jews as an example of ‘the basest nation’ of their day’.

Jesus’ authority rests upon the way he exemplified in his life those authentic human qualities which appeal to the human conscience and reason. The error of Jesus’ contemporaries and those who came after him lay in having forgotten this simple but vital fact. First St Paul and later the Church in general corrupted the basic principles of natural religion as advocated by Jesus and exemplified in his life. Rousseau emphasises that Jesus’ first intention was to raise up his own nation and make it a free people (iv.1146; RW 394). In accord with the views of the 18th philosophes, Rousseau argued that Christianity had come to gradually misrepresent and abandon the original teachings of its founder. Further, whilst affirming the uniqueness of Jesus’ person and example, Rousseau emphasised the essentially rational and human, i.e. universal, character of Jesus’ message. This is what Rousseau charges the Church with having forgotten. The truth, Rousseau affirms, is that we ought to recognize ‘a more than human virtue in his conduct’ and ‘a more than human wisdom in his lessons’ (iii.698/9)’ (85).

The emphasis that Rousseau places upon the virtue and wisdom of Jesus corresponds with his fundamental assumptions concerning the inherent goodness of the natural order. Jesus’ role in living a life of example is to encourage individuals to understand their own nature and hence find their proper place in the universal order of life.

Rousseau’s crucial point – emphasised throughout the whole body of his work – is that the order of the universe is the ultimate reality towards which all individuals should direct their aspirations, above and beyond calculations of their own private, selfish advantage. Human beings attain happiness, freedom, fulfilment only in finding their proper place in the universal order of things.

Rousseau is concerned with the perfect experience of our own being. Only then will human beings know a condition of ‘happiness, strength, and freedom’, and the ‘supreme felicity’ of being themselves. In the contemplation of God’s natural universal order, human beings will attain a correspondingly powerful sense of their own reality. The contemplation of God’s creation is thus the source of the earthly satisfaction of human beings. ‘I acquiesce in the order he establishes, certain that I myself shall enjoy this order one day and find my felicity in it, for what sweeter felicity can there be than to find myself part of a system in which everything is good’ (iv.603)’.

For Rousseau, the glory of virtue and the consciousness of one’s own essential being form the highest degree of happiness. As he puts it: ‘Supreme enjoyment is in contentment with oneself; is to earn this satisfaction that we are placed on earth and endowed with freedom, tempted by the passions, and restrained by conscience’ (iv.587). Rousseau goes on to write of the ‘pure pleasure’ which ‘springs from contentment with oneself’ (iv.591). The good man therefore finds ultimate happiness in the enjoyment of his own nature and in living in accordance with the principle which makes him what he is. This is the case at every level of human experience.

Rousseau affirms a distinction between physical and moral existence. Whilst for Providence the position of every material being is determined by its relation to the entire physical system, the value of every intelligent and sensitive being in the moral sphere is grounded in its own existence. Since the individual human being is a moral and spiritual agent, the ultimate meaning of his or her being depends upon the free acceptance of a person and intrinsically valuable existence rather than on bodily experience and physical environment alone. Further, since freedom presupposes the presence of a spiritual element in human beings, the enumeration of physical evils, no matter how many and how bad, can never impugn the moral basis of each individual’s being. No matter the particular evils and constraints of material conditions, it is better that a human being exists than not. For a human being to exist according to his or her own nature is the greatest privilege, a supreme fact that outweighs all others.

Having established the social, moral and spiritual foundations of Rousseau’s conception of freedom, we can now turn to Rousseau’s attempt to construct the political order which was capable of embodying principles of freedom. This was the central purpose of The Social Contract.

6 AUTONOMY AND AUTHORITY

With the elaboration of his moral and spiritual principles, the path is clear for Rousseau to complete the exposition of his general philosophy with reference to his political ideas. The individual has discovered the absolute values inherent in his relationship with himself, God, and the universe and is aware of the place he occupies in the ‘order of nature’ determining the real meaning of his existence. The precise nature of the relationship of the individual to others and the participation of each and all in the social and political order remains to be resolved. Rousseau presents a summary of the political theory contained in the Social Contract in the last book of Émile. Émile shows how the human being is educated to become an individual; however, the individual needs then to become a citizen, a participating member of the body politic. Since all justice comes from God and ‘universal justice emanates from reason alone’ (1), virtue and justice could be analysed according to the ‘nature of things and independently of human conventions’. However virtue and justice become more than abstract only when drawn into the relations of individuals to others. Rousseau is clear that having taken his place in the order of nature, Émile must also his place in the civil order. Rousseau thus completes his philosophy of human nature by examining the conditions and relations of the individual’s membership of and participation within civil society.

Rousseau’s influence has spread in many directions, so many indeed as to lead one to underrate the essential unity of his thought. This influence, moreover, has been somewhat ambiguous and controversial, certainly with respect to the extent to which the French Revolution was inspired by his thoughts and, indeed, could be taken as an accurate representation of his principles concerning the general will, popular sovereignty etc. Rousseau’s contribution to democratic thought is substantial and yet there are critics who consider Rousseau’s thought to be anti-democratic, or as an example of ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon), both implicitly and explicitly. Rousseau makes a powerful statement in favour of individual liberty. Yet liberals, affirming the negative conception of liberty as from as opposed to a positive conception of freedom to, consider Rousseau’s doctrine to be illiberal. At best, Rousseau is considered ‘ambiguous’ on questions of individual liberty and democracy. Does ambiguous really mean that the critic in question has failed to grasp Rousseau’s complicated reasoning? The issues are resolved only by treating the powerful inventory of themes and values in Rousseau’s thought as forming a unified conception.

Rousseau’s attempt to combine authority and autonomy has led to him being described as both the theorist of the totalitarian state and as the exponent of the anarchist society, two mutually exclusive positions. The complexities of Rousseau’s conception of self-legislation and self-government suggest both views but, on closer analysis, entail neither. Certain themes would seem to flow directly into anarchism, particularly the concern that freedom requires a more natural form of living, a simplicity of life and a politics that suggests small scale, self-governing communities; so too does Rousseau’s justification of the small property of independent producers.

Rousseau’s democratic social contract, affirming the unity of autonomy and authority, points to an ideal political society that is more in keeping with a libertarian reading of the ‘rational’ tradition of political philosophy, originating in Plato and Aristotle and embracing Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx. Rousseau criticises the individualistic and atomistic roots of the liberal democratic order, particularly the principle of representation, affirming a conception of active sovereignty as something that the individual members composing the demos exercise themselves as true citizens. That this sovereignty is exercised by each individual in relation to others indicates the extent to which Rousseau acknowledged the need for a supra-individual political order resting upon a principle of authority. It is the terms of this relation of each to others that is all important. Rousseau understands that genuine individual liberty is located within relationships that connect each individual to all individuals. Hence Rousseau searches for a democratic, non-authoritarian conception of authority which is compatible with autonomy. Democracy, in this conception, is much more than a mere instrument or mechanism for holding rulers to account by means of periodic elections. Citizenship here refers to more than the passive act of voting once in a while.

This active notion of sovereignty invokes a definition of power as something residing in the demos rather than in political institutions. Rousseau upholds an ascending conception of power as something that flows upwards from the people, threatening to dissolve institutional alienation as a check upon democratic power. Liberal theorists place a greater emphasis upon the institutional checks upon popular power as potentially repressive of individual freedom. Rousseau has been criticised in this respect for advocating a model of ‘totalitarian democracy’ (Talmon) and for presenting a view of freedom and democracy which possesses tyrannical implications (Berlin). For Berlin, Rousseau makes the majority all-powerful over against individuals and individual or minority opinion. In this way, the ‘sovereignty of the people’ works to destroy the ‘sovereignty of individuals’ (Berlin Four Essays in Liberty). In time, ‘the people’ becomes a mere fiction, an abstract collectivity wielded by politicians to oppress and tyrannise real individuals. There is a real problem here, however, in that Rousseau allowed sovereignty to be neither alienated nor represented; sovereignty, for Rousseau, has to be expressed directly, actively and continuously. The sovereignty of the people for Rousseau is the sovereignty of the real individuals composing the people. Once that connection with real individuals is lost, it ceases to be sovereignty. Only the political society and law resting upon the real will of individuals can be legitimate. It is possible that Rousseau underestimated the tendencies to distortion, indeed to substitution, in all politics and hence failed to appreciate how the politics of the public good could come to be experienced as an external imposition upon individuals and their partial, but very real, interests and associations. In checking one ill – the appropriation of the name of the public good by sectional interests – Rousseau invited another. Such is the criticism of Rousseau.

If this is true, Rousseau nevertheless provided the philosophical basis for constituting a genuine public sphere resting upon a genuine expression of both the democratic will of the people but also, even more importantly, the rational will of the people. Rousseau is not merely advocating a majoritarian democracy but a good society in which all individuals are in touch with their ethical human potentialities.

Rousseau’s political theory is expressed in three forms of one single principle:

1)	Historically, in terms of the social contract;
2)	politically-legally, in terms of popular sovereignty;
3)	philosophically, as the general will.

These three forms together constitute a unity. Thus ‘sovereignty is the exercise of the general will’. For Rousseau the state is based neither upon an original convention nor a determinate power but upon the active and continuous will of the members which compose it.

Since morality only emerges with the creation of society, a decisive turning point is reached when the individual is brought into contact with other individuals and is consequently presented with the problem of finding a common basis to ensure a peaceful co-existence together. The state of nature precludes the possibility of moral relations since the primitive being lives a solitary and independent existence subject to physical and instinctive impulses. It is only when the individual is brought into contact with others that the moral powers which have lain dormant at the primitive stage start to develop. The development of new relationships with other individuals entails also the development of the self, affecting the internal structure of human beings as well as their reactions to the external world. 

Transcending the natural freedom of the solitary, autonomous being, the individual adopts an expansive approach to the world, looking outwards towards other individuals. The expansive outlook makes possible the conscious exercise of reason, will, and conscience in unison in a truly human order. It also establishes the conditions of morality. ‘These words “virtues” and “vices” are collective notions which originate in human intercourse’ (ii.971). By participating in social relations, we learn that ‘our sweetest existence is relative and collective and our true self is not entirely in us. Such is man’s constitution in this life that he never succeeds in truly enjoying himself without the help of other people’ (i.813).

In addition to the principle of order, morality also requires freedom. In being based on self-preservation tempered by pity, natural freedom is compatible with the existence of physical nature. True human freedom, however, is possible only at a higher stage of human existence in which the individual has developed the capacity to exercise deliberate choice. By engaging in relationships with others the individual ceases to be passively subject to blind impulse and instead becomes reflective being who is capable of seeing himself as the object of his own and other people’s ‘look’, as well as of choosing, by a deliberate act of will, a particular attitude towards the world. With behaviour coming to be governed by will and reason rather than merely feeling, amour de soi takes on a more complex and reflective character. This is not to exchange one form of freedom for another through some kind of denaturing, the imposition of reason and culture upon nature. Rather, it is to realise human potentiality to the full, incorporating the lower and immediate within a higher freedom. This higher freedom is no less natural than the first, immediate freedom and, for Rousseau, is the most precious and distinguishing characteristic of human beings. From this perspective of the complete realisation of human nature in the truly human social order, a way of life is to be evaluated according to whether it conforms to this essential attribute. ‘To give up one’s freedom is to give up one’s being as a man, the rights of humanity and even one’s duties. There is no possible compensation for anyone who gives up everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man’s nature and to remove all freedom from his will is to remove all morality from his actions’ (SC I.4). The central issue, then, is not the fact of social relations as such but how to ensure that the freedom of the individual is placed on a proper basis in relation to the freedom of other individuals. This is to define freedom as a collective project which concerns a common human nature.

Rousseau’s political philosophy finds its most mature expression in The Social Contract (1762). After the discourses on inequality and on political economy, the task facing Rousseau is to work out the social and political arrangements of the ethico-rational state which is the future alternative for humanity. Rousseau has thus to reconcile the necessity of the social state with principles of authenticity and autonomy. The social state has not simply to be accepted as necessary as the product of an irreversible historical process; rather it must be shown to be compatible with a truly human life. Thus the social state is to be shown to be of positive value to human beings. The key principles are those of authenticity and autonomy. And these can only be embodied in a social context, within social relationships. And this requires a political society embodying a principle of authority. Rousseau’s task was to put authority on a free and democratic basis.

Rousseau argues that since society is constituted by individuals, and since human beings accept the need for society, even in inauthentic form, it follows that the ethico-rational state must relate those principles to society as a whole, the society of which the individual is a part. Society exists for the good of the individuals who constitute it. It is necessary, then, to study society through the individuals who compose it and these individuals through society. Those who would treat separately the political and the moral will understand neither the one nor the other.

Having acknowledged that the abandonment of the social state in order to return to nature is an impossibility, Rousseau’s task is to theorise the ethico-rational social state as the completion of an evolutionary process in which human beings achieve moral perfection. The social contract is to be understood in those terms.

The Social Contract confirms that human beings have attained a level of moral and political enlightenment which achieves happiness in the positive sense, i.e. as distinct from the negative happiness of the animal like existence and awareness in the primitive state. The moral individual, the free being to which Rousseau addresses his theory, is not the ‘noble savage’ but the citizen as a social being. This has profound implications as regards the role of reason in human affairs, morality, political consciousness, awareness of freedom as a human being. This, at least, is the human destiny for Rousseau. Even though the individual is happy in the state of nature, this is far from being the end for human beings. The kind of society in which the individual as an autonomous and authentic being could find fulfilment and integration is that ethico-rational society whose principles Rousseau sought to put on a sound foundation in The Social Contract.

Rousseau’s democratic conception is also fundamentally moral. It concerns human growth and development, the realisation of the higher potentialities of human beings as rational beings. The end is a political society capable of embodying human freedom. For Rousseau, one essential problem of politics concerns how democracy may be made an active principle of political institutions so as to facilitate the growth and development of the individuals constituting the people. Rousseau’s philosophical case would emphasise the necessity of democratic institutions in the formation of an active citizenship, the most obvious manifestation of the moral liberty of which Rousseau spoke.

Rousseau makes freedom the central principle in his investigation of the legitimate and just social and political order. He emphasises from the first that the only political society which is in conformity with freedom rests on general consent. And not just some tacit or passive consent but an active consent sustained by the free participation of its members. Rousseau is first and foremost a democratic theorist concerned to rest political institutions upon the real and active will of human beings. Will, not force, nor even consent alone, is the basis of the political order. Will is what makes the political order legitimate. Arguing that the suppression of freedom violates the essential nature of human beings, Rousseau insists upon this condition as something that is required by ‘natural right’.
Whilst Rousseau’s conception of ‘natural right’ differs from that of earlier thinkers, he insists at all times upon the need that human beings have to exercise their freedom and will in coming to form the civil association.
Rousseau is classical in his perspective but not anachronistic. That is, Rousseau seeks to recover and rearticulate certain themes of classical politics in a distinctively modern setting. In arguing that freedom is the basis of political life, Rousseau rejects two traditional explanations for the origin of political society. Repudiating a familiar argument which is identified in particular with Aristotle and the Aristotelian strain of political philosophy, Rousseau denies that society can be explained as a natural phenomenon. Rousseau denies that the human being possesses an innate sociability. What human beings do have are certain powers which bring them into close contact and relations with others. Rousseau thus founds the formation of society on rational individual choice rather than on spontaneous feeling. For this reason, Rousseau rejects any argument that makes society an extension of the family; any supra-familial authority requires free consent.

Rousseau declared himself in favour of ‘republicanism’, emphasising the duties and obligations of human beings as citizens. Yet Rousseau’s republicanism is not the republicanism of the classical world. Indeed, Rousseau could be quite critical of classical themes even whilst incorporating them. He repudiated the ‘democracy’ associated with Athens. Athens could not represent the ideal political society for Rousseau given that it did not uphold a clear separation between the legislative and the executive and, as a result, was beset with instability, conflict and crises. This said, however, the influence that Athenian democracy exercised over Rousseau’s own thought is apparent throughout The Social Contract.

The originality of Rousseau’s position can be seen in the way that he interprets certain key, and often conventional, doctrines of political theory. Thus the idea that the consent of individuals legitimates the state and government formed an essential component of seventeenth and eighteenth century liberalism. This liberal tradition introduced the idea of the social contract as the means of securing the consent of individuals. Nineteenth century liberal democracy, in turn, used the idea of consent to justify the extension of the franchise. Consent was something that could be periodically conferred upon political authority through the ballot box.

Despite obvious similarities, Rousseau’s argument is quite distinct from these positions. Certainly, Rousseau is concerned to identify the legitimate principle of government, the problem which had motivated Hobbes. Moreover, Rousseau also proceeds in conventional manner by providing an account of the state of nature and the social contract. But there are clear differences between Rousseau and earlier theorists of the state. Despite the title that Rousseau gave his work on political theory, it is the examination of the ultimate source of political authority which is Rousseau’s great and original contribution to political thought. In a sense, Rousseau made use of the traditional idea of the ‘social contract’ in order to present a theory that transcended contractarianism. In distinguishing the state of nature from the social state, Rousseau was inevitably brought into conflict with the views of Hobbes. Hobbes had portrayed the state of nature as a war of all against all in which individuals vigorously pursue private self-interest against other individuals of the same character. The constant quest for power and resources makes Hobbes’ state of nature a sphere of universal egoism. It is a state that cannot last long in this condition. Hobbes thus justifies the existence of an all powerful state.

The fact is, however, that Hobbes had projected backwards from how individuals were and acted in his own society to the state of nature in the past. Rousseau gave a very different account of the state of nature. In the primitive state, according to Rousseau, individuals were so natural that the social bond did not exist. Individuals existed all alone in the world and had only infrequent and accidental meeting with each other. In this condition, Hobbes’ war of all against all could hardly exist. For one, these human beings were hardly in contact with each other. For another, there was precious little which would involve human beings in conflict. Individuals lived under the impulsions of sense and instinct, stimulated only by purely natural needs not by the unlimited desires of artificial needs as in the social state. What Hobbes castigated as the state of nature corresponded to contemporary bourgeois society as a sphere of universal antagonism and egoism requiring a strong state to impose and maintain the civil peace.

The state of nature is amoral. The individual in the primitive state is not a moral being. There can be no egoism or altruism in the primitive state. Nevertheless, the attributes of essential human nature which, in the social state, would permit the development of a moral sense are already present in the primitive state. Thus the individual would be moved by self-interest, personal gratification of narrow, immediate desires, and pity, making it painful for anyone to see the suffering of another.

Rousseau’s state of nature, then, has none of Hobbes’ war of all against all. Indeed, human beings are so happy in the state of nature that the forces compelling them to escape from it into the social state are absent. There would appear to be no good reason for human beings to give up their natural liberty for Hobbesian absolutism. Thus Rousseau could not, unlike Hobbes, make the case for the social state on utilitarian grounds. Rather, Rousseau could explain and justify society only on account of its enabling human beings to realise the higher potentialities in their nature.

The substantial transformation of the economy that Rousseau had envisaged in his early writings asserted restrictions on economic liberty as a condition of the economic independence of all. What needed to be restricted was the ‘freedom’ of all individuals to compete for wealth and power, a freedom which Rousseau showed to be a compulsion denying individuality and autonomy. Restricting economic freedom of this character would achieve a greater freedom for all. Rousseau was concerned to uproot the basis of competition in contemporary society. Rousseau understood how competition generated a dynamic of its own, one which soon became all-encompassing. Once one individual engages in competition, all others are compelled in time to engage in competitive behaviour, whether they want to or not, simply to protect themselves against the encroachment of others (Inequality, 164 ff). Rousseau thus understood how the free economy and the market society went hand in hand, sustained by a social system in which all were subject to an impersonal dependence and compulsion, having to dominate, exploit and accumulate in order to avoid being dominated, exploited and accumulated. It is in this way that society degenerates into the Hobbesian war of all against all, a society of mutual mistrust and antagonism in which competition escalated beyond the control of the competitors. It was to bring this state of war to and end that Rousseau theorised the principles of the democratic social contract, ensuring the complementarity of autonomy and authority, individuality and communality. The competitive structure would be replaced by a cooperative structure enabling the autonomy of each and all. Rousseau’s supposedly paradoxical notion of forcing people to be free is anything but paradoxical: ‘In order that the social compact should not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the agreement, which alone gives force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free…’ (Contract I,7 364) (212).

Rousseau presents the social contract as an agreement in which individuals create a collective body through which they avail themselves of a system of law designed to regulate their relations with each other. Human beings thus agree to a contract through their own volition and hence create the code by which they agree to govern and to be governed in their lives. The contract is made between themselves, voluntarily, without them having to transfer natural liberty to any agency other than themselves as a collectivity. In agreeing to the contract, therefore, human beings associate with each other but are able ‘to remain as free as before’. Human beings have thus created a collectivity which allows them to acquire moral and civil liberty and enables them to come forward as moral agents.

There is an important point to be made here with regard to Rousseau’s terminology. The moral significance that human beings acquire is depicted as taking human beings out of the state of nature into the artificial social state. But since the social bond enables human beings to realise the higher potentialities in their nature and since this social bond is necessary in the realisation of these potentialities, then surely one is entitled to depict it as natural rather than artificial. For the social bond is the natural condition for human beings. Rousseau’s argument is Aristotelian in origin and meaning but its formulation of the natural and the artificial is quite different and shows his close relation to seventeenth and eighteenth century contract theory. Yet the undercurrent of Rousseau’s Aristotelianism subverts the contractarian form.

Rousseau was not concerned to give an historical account of the state of nature. He was not writing history. Rousseau pursued a moral purpose concerning the good life for human beings. The transition from the state of nature to the social state, then, is used to delineate the moral development of human beings.

Contract theory did not, of course, originate with Rousseau. Indeed, it could be argued that Rousseau was the last of the great contract theorists, modifying the problematic with which the contract deals in such a way as to expose its limits and require its transcendence. At every point, Rousseau proceeds from the idea of the contract but, ultimately, goes beyond it. Rousseau’s social contract, then, made a powerful argument for an ideal political society which transcends contract theory. The tensions that exist in Rousseau’s theory derive in large part from his working within but also against contract theory.

Contract theory has its origins in ancient Greece and is dealt with by Plato in the Republic (Book II). It persists in medieval times and is invoked by Renaissance writers. The ubiquitous nature of the contract is easily explained. Government of any form, except that based upon pure, naked, force, must be based upon some form of agreement between individuals. This leads to the idea that government rests upon the consent of the governed. Indeed, one could go further and argue that in bourgeois society, where ‘society’ appears as external to the individual, as something artificial and unnatural, the idea of a contract between individuals becomes compelling. Nevertheless, the notion that society is founded upon the contract between individuals and government derives from medieval times. The idea is found in such theorists as Buchanan and James I and finds an even more sophisticated expression in Grotius and Pufendorf in the seventeenth century. The modern version of contract theory begins with the emergence of bourgeois society. This view conceives society as originating in the agreement between the individuals constituting it. This view can be found in Hooker, Hobbes and Locke.

The idea that sovereignty derives from the people and that authority is based upon the people also predates Rousseau. But whereas Rousseau came to argue that sovereignty derives from the people and should remain with the people, Hobbes had used the same premises to justify a different conclusion. The original contract, Hobbes argues, is between the individuals constituting the state. But these individuals agree not only to form a state but also to assign a person or persons with the government of the state. Thus whilst Hobbes agreed that the people were the ultimate source of authority, he also argued that the people come to alienate its sovereignty through the contract. The people transfers its powers, in whole and irrevocably, to the government that it has agreed to form. Thus, with the formation of the state, the government becomes the sovereign. For Hobbes, popular sovereignty exists only in the alienation of this sovereignty by the people. After this alienation, the people have no role in political life other than in passive obedience to the ruler. Through the contract, the people is bound to obey the ruler, regardless of how this ruler governs. For the people has agreed to alienate all its powers to the sovereign. It is the sovereign, therefore, who is the absolute power. The doctrine of popular sovereignty in Hobbes, then, leads to an all powerful state possessing unlimited rights over against the individual and the capacity as absolute authority to enforce these rights (Hobbes 1983:203 245 288 296 299).

John Locke, at first glance, would appear to represent an advance over Hobbes. By resting government upon the consent of the governed, Locke leaves open the possibility that the people could replace all rulers who governed tyrannically. The problem is that Locke fails to supply the institutional mechanism through which consent could be continuously given by the people. The consent of the people is tacit and passive in Locke.

Only with Rousseau is contract theory developed into a thoroughly democratic conception in which consent is something active, continuous and revocable. For Rousseau perceived in a way that Locke did not that if consent were to be a genuine expression of popular sovereignty, then it requires some kind of institutional mechanism in order to be actively given. Against Locke’s passive or tacit consent, Rousseau introduced an active consent, a consent that is capable of renewal. Locke reserved a right of revolution for the people but allowed no means for popular expression short of it; Rousseau made this right an active principle inherent in the institutional mechanism of government.

Rousseau’s argument in The Social Contract is that human beings were happy in the state of nature but were forced to leave this original state through the obstacles that arose to their original liberty. Human beings thus entered the social state. In the social state, human beings came to appreciate that the development of their nature, the realisation of their higher capacities, for morality and reason, the embodiment of liberty, could be secured only through a social contract which establishes a system of cooperation under law. Rousseau’s contract is one that preserves liberty. Sovereignty can never be alienated as it is in Hobbes. Rousseau’s social contract is one that affirms the permanent possibility for self-government. The legitimacy of political authority rests upon a principle of self-legislation; human beings attain freedom through coming to place themselves under laws that are of their own making.

In contrast, in both Hobbes and Locke, sovereignty is transferred from the people to the state through the social contract, irrevocably in the case of Hobbes, conditionally in the case of Locke (although Locke’s right to rebellion is so qualified as to be rendered virtually inoperative). Rousseau, however, would allow no such transfer of sovereignty. “Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated” (SC III.XV). Sovereignty rests in and remains with the people, it can neither be alienated nor represented. Rousseau is thus taking a position that is opposed to Hobbes and Locke and the liberal individualist tradition that they inspired and is also against the notion of representative government that developed in the nineteenth century; in short, Rousseau’s position is opposed to liberal democracy.

In the ideal political society envisaged by Rousseau, individuals would participate in the making of the laws which obligate them in their practical lives. The sovereign authority upon which the legitimate political society is based is the people participating directly in the making of the laws under which they live. This principle of self-legislation sustains a conception of an active citizenship underpinning participative government. Rousseau’s theory, ultimately, leads to radical democracy. All individual citizens must meet together to decide upon affairs of common concern and legislate according to the common interest. Those subject to the laws must also make the laws. Rousseau removes the gap between government and governed. As with Aristotle, citizens are both the rulers and the ruled. Unlike Aristotle, Rousseau extended the category of citizenship to all members of the body politic. The end of self-government is thus established as the ideal and legitimate political society. This political society based upon citizen participation in the determination of common affairs is not simply a just state but is something akin to what Gramsci called the ‘regulated society’. It is a society in which political and social activities are integrated within the actual lives of the citizens (SC III). In overcoming the classical liberal separation of the state from civil society, government from the governed, rulers from the ruled, Rousseau puts himself in the camp of radical democracy.

For Rousseau, citizenship is the highest identity which the individual can achieve. The reasoned exercise of sovereignty by citizens is the only legitimate way in which the liberty of the individual can be expressed. The citizens both make and are obligated by ‘the supreme direction of the general will’, the public embodiment of the common good. Rousseau acknowledges varying conceptions of the common good and hence makes provision for majority votes: ‘the votes of the greatest number always bind the rest’. How far this practical arrangement adequately embodies Rousseau’s principle of sovereignty may be doubted. The people are sovereign only insofar as they participate directly in expressing the general will. This conception of active sovereignty, of popular power, suggests something more profound than an atomistic model of democracy based upon numbers.

Something that needs to be pointed out is that The Social Contract is not a history book. Rousseau nowhere argues his case from historical evidence. Rousseau rests no essential argument upon history. Rousseau’s historical contract is plainly a hypothetical and not an empirical account. Rousseau is concerned to theorise the transition from nature to society, the problems that this transition gives rise to, and the solutions which involve the realisation of human authenticity and autonomy. Rousseau does not propose to explain how this change came about.







The Social Contract consists of four books, the first concerning the basis of the legitimate political society; the second, sovereignty and the law; the third, government and forms of government; the fourth, the relation between the sovereign and the government. The theme which unites all these books is made clear in the preamble in Book I:





Rousseau is thus concerned to resolve what appears as a dichotomy between the ideal and the real, bringing justice and utility together in a rule or administration that is both legitimate and effective. Rousseau’s search for this political society carries on from his condemnation of Despotism as not only illegitimate but also as unstable and prone to rebellion. Despotism, in short, is deficient on the grounds of both right and expediency. 

What is important to note is Rousseau’s stated intention to integrate a potential, future legality with human beings as real beings. Rousseau is not proposing a utopian ideal but is concerned to realise the future society in relation to real human beings.

That Rousseau’s main political treatise should be called The Social Contract indicates the extent to which Rousseau bases his argument upon the political theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Though, as will be made clear, Rousseau represents the culmination of the tradition of contract theory, his thought is expressed in terms of concepts which assume that political society is based upon a compact between free individuals. The idea of the contract displayed the increasing sense of the moral primacy of the individual citizen of the state as opposed merely to the state itself that rules over them. With the emergence of modern society and bourgeois relations a new value came to be assigned to the individual human being as a human being, i.e. as a being possessing a significance that could not be reduced to the social position into which he or she has been born. Contract theory thus allowed expression to the view that the happiness and good of individuals are the ends to which government is merely the means.

Certainly, contract theory could be employed to argue contrary conclusions. Hobbes, for one, forcefully inverted this relation between means and ends. Nevertheless, the radical implication of contractarian thought lies in the view that each individual possesses certain absolute, moral rights. It is the view that the existence of the government is conditional upon the extent to which it embodies these rights.

The actual, historical event of a contract between individuals is not the point at issue. The real point concerns the definition of the right kind of political society embodying the right relation between the government and the governed.

These kind of concerns form the starting point of Rousseau’s theory. More precisely, Rousseau would appear to be most influenced by the contract theory of Locke. This influence is apparent even when Rousseau is proceeding to draw conclusions different to Locke. Rousseau attempts to deal with problems that Locke was either not aware of or had failed to resolve. Thus the restatement of Locke’s political philosophy is denied to Rousseau. Rousseau’s position is more complex than Locke; he is grappling with the problems of the modern world at a much deeper, philosophical and moral, level than Locke. Rousseau not only has to resolve some of the problems bequeathed by Locke’s theory; he also has to deal with problems generated by the much more complex society that had developed since Locke.

Of the things that Rousseau took from Locke, by far the most important is the concept of consent. That government should rest upon the consent of the governed is a view shared by political theorists of diverse opinion. It is not consent as such that distinguishes Rousseau, however, but how Rousseau came to argue for a stronger, more active, conception of consent than had been seen before. In Rousseau, consent took an active form and became will.

Locke’s view is simple compared to Rousseau – it is the consent of the governed which makes the state legitimate, moral and just. Without the consent of the governed, the ruler becomes merely a tyrant. The emergence of the modern world in the sixteenth century issued in the problem of how the authority of the central national sovereign could be secured against lesser forces within the state. This problem resolved, and the centralised nation state secured against feudal forces, the problem came to be of a central authority possessing power that was not necessarily legitimate. The sovereign authority had to be legitimate. In the successful attempt to destroy overmighty feudal subjects, the sovereign had come to possess power removed from and wielded over the subjects; the sovereign came to appear as a separate and distinct entity possessing an existential significance and end all of its own, to which subjects were subordinated.

Locke thus came to address the problem of consent as pertaining to the relation between the sovereign and the subjects. Locke’s theory contains certain blind spots. Locke does not appreciate the insufficiency of a one off consent given in the initial, formal contract. For the acts of the sovereign are moral and legitimate only to the extent that the consent of the governed is something that may be and actually is continuously given. Consent for Rousseau, therefore, is something active and continuous rather than, as for Locke, something tacit and assumed.

There is another problem which Locke did not see but which Rousseau attempted to deal with. This point is not without some significance given that Rousseau has been continually accused by liberal theorists of constructing a model of totalitarian democracy. What Locke did not see and what Rousseau did see is that a majority is as capable of ruling a minority by force as a tyrant is of exercising force against the people. Thus consent is a problem that cannot be assumed resolved through the emergence of a majority. Consent remains an issue to be adequately treated in the democratic as in the undemocratic state. And Rousseau argues the point clearly in The Social Contract that the rule of the majority is not necessarily moral, legitimate and just; that majority rule is a tyranny resting upon force unless it is enlightened and educated by the general will. The majority, then, must serve the public good.

Rousseau saw the deficiencies and dangers of Locke’s position, even as he accepted Locke’s way of formulating the problem. It could be argued that Rousseau is too influenced by Locke, since Rousseau was really attempting to elaborate a political theory that was beyond contract theory. Certainly, Rousseau soon begins to depart from Locke’s conclusions and takes his leave of contractarian liberalism. For Rousseau’s critics there seems to be a fairly direct degeneration into totalitarianism from this point onwards. Such a conclusion can be contested. Far from constructing the theory of the totalitarian state, Rousseau was keenly aware of the dangers of totalitarianism inherent in political authority and attempted to secure the principles to check its emergence. Indeed, Rousseau’s argument concerning the general will and sovereignty make little sense if it is not assumed that Rousseau was searching to base the state upon morality and reason as distinct from force and fraud.

Far from attempting to theorise the totalitarian state, Rousseau’s objective was to ensure that the state embodied the genuine will of the people. Rousseau did not believe that his theory possessed totalitarian implication precisely because he constructed it with a view to resting the state and political obligation upon reason as opposed to coercion, the will of the people as opposed to the force of institutions. Nevertheless, it is certainly true to argue that Rousseau did break with Locke to such an extent as to bring contract theory to its culmination.

It is upon The Social Contract that Rousseau’s claim to be a political philosopher rests. The character of this work is different to his other works, the discourses, Émile, and Julie. The Rousseau of The Social Contract is not simply a critic of contemporary society or an advocate naturalist education. In The Social Contract, Rousseau is a political philosopher attempting to delineate essential principles in the construction of a just political order. Rousseau has to identify the principles which secure and justify the existence of the state and political obligation. Rousseau had, therefore, to come to terms with the social state. In justifying a political order, Rousseau had to reject the assumption that living in the social state as such is degenerate and corrupt. Rousseau could no longer assume a ruined humanity. He had to look further towards a future of human self-fulfilment.

Thus Rousseau could return to Locke’s problem of consent. Rousseau thought Locke’s solution to be inadequate. Locke’s consent appeared to be something tacit and assumed, something that is given once and for all. But for Rousseau the acts of the sovereign can be legitimate, moral and just only if they are continually consented to by the subjects. Rousseau was for this reason led to develop Locke’s consent into a theory of the general will. This theory is much more than one of active consent; it embraces a view of sovereignty itself which redefines the relations between individuals and between government and governed. Rousseau therefore proposes reconciliation in the social state which contradicts the mutual isolation and radical individualism which is asserted in the first works, characteristics which are inimical to any kind of political and social order.

In accommodating himself to the social state, Rousseau actually rediscovered a tradition much older than contract theory. Effectively, Rousseau reappropriated the conceptions of the ancient Greeks on the modern terrain. This generates a little confusion. For in the Greek conception the social appears not as artificial but as the natural condition of human beings. Rousseau affirmed the argument that the social is artificial and is based upon the contract between free individuals and yet his argument is compatible with the Greek conception of society as the natural state.

For Rousseau, there is a common good in which all individuals must enter and participate as a condition for achieving the best good for themselves as individuals. Insofar as individuals live apart from one another, in moral and physical isolation, pursuing private ends in disregard of the public good, they are incomplete and imperfect as human beings. In such a state, the natural state of separateness and isolation, human beings must fail to achieve the best good for themselves; the common good requires that individuals live in common in a social life. Rousseau thus corrects the misleading implications of his earlier view concerning the natural state in which individuals were happy and free. It had seemed as though Rousseau was arguing that the natural state was a lost ideal. This is not strictly true. Rousseau’s ideal lay in the future, with human beings being propelled forwards by their instinct for perfectibility. But Rousseau left the suggestion in his early writings that the natural state was the ideal state. There is no ambiguity at all on this point in The Social Contract. Clearly, in this work, the state of nature has been left well behind and can never be recovered. Rousseau makes it plain that the happiness and the freedom that individuals may attain in the state of nature is limited. Individuals are cut off from one another, leading separate lives independent of each other. Human beings thus fail to relate to each other in an attempt to achieve the best good for each and all.

Rousseau, in effect, restates the organic conception of society as natural to human beings which had been the basic view of the ancient Greek philosophers. From this perspective, Rousseau, whilst employing the conceptual framework of contract theory, was making an argument that is quite contrary to, and eventually led beyond, contract theory.

For Aristotle, the relation between individuals is not artificial but is organic and natural. Thus, in the same way that the organs of the human body function with each other in harmonious relation, so the life and activity of the individual human being is happy and good only when brought into functioning relation with other human beings through association. The state is the supreme association of all the smaller associations in which individuals participate. The organic relations between individuals ensure that individuals are enabled to participate in the functioning of the whole which structures the lives of all the constituent parts so as to ensure individual well-being and happiness.

The organicist view of politics presented by the ancient Greeks is quite contrary to the individualism of the Christian and liberal view. The starting point of the Greek view is not the individual in solitary communion with God so as to achieve the good; nor is it the egoistic individual pursuing private gain and, unintentionally, achieving the public interest. On the contrary, the organic conception upholds the view that the good is something that can be achieved only in the relationships between individuals. In the organic conception, the end of life is the full development of the personality of each individual in all its diversity. The conclusion that the Greeks reached is that the individual can realise this full development only in association with other individuals. The highest good, then, is something that human beings can achieve only by establishing an appropriate relation between each other, not in isolation from each other. Thus, human beings may achieve together what they cannot achieve alone. Thus, association, with the state as the supreme association, is a cooperative arrangement undertaken by human beings so as to achieve their self-realisation. In this respect, Aristotle referred to the individual human being as a zoon politikon, meaning that human beings are social animals that can only individuate themselves in relation to each other and in association with each other. Association thus enables individuals to achieve the highest good.

Aristotle’s claims are strong. When he argues that the state is a natural association he is arguing much more than that human beings must live in association with each other in society. A social life is not merely necessary in a simple sense but necessary if human beings are to achieve their highest good; it is good for human beings to live in society since human beings are political-social animals who can achieve their highest good only in such an environment.

Rousseau’s view in The Social Contract is, to all intents and purposes, in accordance with Aristotle’s. There are differences, of course, in that Rousseau is consciously modern in his argument. The confusion arises from the fact that Rousseau also situates himself within the tradition of contract theory. Thus Rousseau persists in portraying the state of nature as a state in which individuals were free and independent. The problem is that Rousseau’s recovery of the Aristotelian conception makes it plain that the state of nature as he conceives it is something unnatural for human beings as Aristotle conceives them. Rousseau’s argument, if not his terminology, follows Aristotle in conceiving association in society as natural.

It has, in fine, to be kept in mind that Rousseau has recovered Aristotle’s meaning  whilst using the terms of the contract theorists. Thus Rousseau continues to apply the term ‘natural’ to mean what Aristotle had depicted as unnatural, and refers to ‘artificial’ when dealing with things that would have appeared as natural to Aristotle, even though Rousseau’s meanings follow Aristotle much more closely than the contract theorists. Rousseau’s conception is clearly organic as opposed to contractarian.

The words with which Rousseau opens Book I are justly famous:





Rousseau’s perspective has shifted. He had initially argued that in the natural state individuals were free and independent and that individuals ought to be free and independent. The conventions and laws of the social state, however, bring enslavement and dependence. The chains to which Rousseau refers, then, are the chains of living in the social state, which individuals cannot throw off. Stated thus, Rousseau’s view is in accord with the extreme individualism he asserted in the discourses and would thus contradict the attempt to construct a political order in The Social Contract. Rousseau may thus appear to be yearning for a lost simplicity, an ideal that lies in the past and from which human beings are separated by the complexity and artificiality of the modern world.

However, Rousseau is attempting to secure the principles that make political order legitimate, moral and just. And this alters the perspective entirely. Thus, Rousseau’s opening statement becomes less a yearning for a lost ideal than an argument that human beings ought to be free, whereas in contemporary society they are enslaved. But this freedom is not the freedom of the individual separate from other individuals, freedom as licence and lawlessness, but refers to the individual as the participator in and as subject to the general will. Rousseau is thus led to argue that since modern states are founded upon force and not will, individuals are not free. The freedom in which Rousseau is referring is not lawlessness and licence but is lawful and rational. Freedom is not the unrestrained individual doing just as he or she pleases. Rather, freedom now entails the participation of the individual in the wider community of individuals, in organic relation to each other.

Rousseau’s opening passage continues:





Rousseau’s rational freedom is quite distinct, then, from the liberal freedom defined by Hobbes and Locke. For Hobbes, freedom could be understood as the freedom of the individual to do whatever he or she wants to do. With Locke, freedom applies to the moral autonomy of the individual to decide for himself or herself. Both these definitions of freedom make no reference at all to restraint in the interest of freedom. Any kind of restraint could not but appear as an interference in the freedom of the individual, a violation of individual liberty. From the perspective of ‘rational freedom’, going back to Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes’ natural freedom and Locke’s moral freedom may be criticised as licence. Hobbes’ licence refers to the physical freedom of the individual to do whatever he or she has the power to do; Locke’s licence refers to the moral freedom of the individual to make decisions and adopt courses of action as an individual. Rousseau’s freedom, however, is rational and lawful in that it involves restraints which human beings impose upon themselves, in their own interests. Rousseau, therefore, does not simply substitute restraint for licence. Rather, he proposes certain kinds of restraint which human beings subject themselves to in the cause of freedom. Thus freedom embodies a principle of the will as subject to a law that human beings legislate to themselves. Rousseau thus firmly places himself in the tradition of political theory which assumes that freedom involves some kind of restraint.

The liberal freedom, the freedom of the individual to do as he or she pleases, may well involve the individual becoming enslaved to desire or passion, to false needs in the later criticism of consumer culture. Rousseau’s rational conception of freedom refers to the ability of human beings to superimpose their moral inclinations over their immediate or natural inclinations.

Thus, in the rational conception of freedom, the behaviour of the individual will not be passively determined by immediate impulsions and desires but will, rather, correspond to a moral code that he or she has determined to live by. This code will be institutionalised. In Rousseau’s argument, the moral law according to which human beings live takes the form of the general will. This general will is not an external imposition; it is not an alien will at all. The general will is the higher will of real individuals. The individual can identify naturally and spontaneously with this general will precisely because it is his or her will as a moral and rational being. The particular will of individuals is an organic part of the greater will.

8 FORCE AND LEGALITY

The social contract brings human beings together and subjects them to the general will. Rousseau’s idea of the general will, however, would actually seem inconsistent with contract theory in the sense that the idea of a general will seems to deny that human beings are discrete beings independent of each other as individuals. Rousseau’s general will is an organic conception affirming the idea that individuals are in relation to and are dependent upon each other. This places Rousseau at the centre of the ‘rational’ tradition of freedom, the idea deriving from Plato and Aristotle that freedom is a collective project, no matter how much this project enhances the freedom of actual individuals. Freedom is not, in the rational conception, a case of individuals agreeing as separate beings to come together, to contract together. It is, rather, a case of putting actually existing relationships on a rational basis, i.e. as representing the continuous, voluntary, active assent of individuals. Rousseau thus introduces into contract theory the notion of the general will which is superior to Locke’s version of consent. This generates a certain tension when Rousseau starts to write of majority votes. For Rousseau is proposing not the counting of individual votes at all but the common and continuous share of all in the general will.

Rousseau retains from contract theory the need to justify the existence of the state morally. The restraint that Rousseau offers in his conception of freedom, then, will have a moral foundation. The moral justification that Rousseau offers for the state, then, will involve the will of human beings.

Rousseau’s position here is quite distinct from Locke. Locke proceeds from the assumption of the individual as morally autonomous and independent and hence comes to propose the restraint exercised by the state as something that individuals have consented to. Locke’s view, then, entails the exercise of force through the consent of the majority. Not so Rousseau. Rousseau proceeded from much the same assumption as Locke, but the difficulties that he perceived in Locke’s version of consent led him to develop the conception of the general will. Rousseau sought a moral justification that went deeper than majority consent, beyond the tacit consent of Locke. This moral justification is obtained only by redefining consent as the active and continuous participation in political society, recreating political society as an organism resting upon popular sovereignty.

Rousseau denies that political authority is based on force. Since physical power and morality are two entirely different concepts, force can never constitute a ‘right’. Force in itself possesses no moral significance. With this insistence upon the principle of freedom, Rousseau comes to affirm the indissoluble connection between politics and morality. As the embodiment of human freedom, political society necessarily expresses the moral attributes essential to all valid forms of freedom. ‘It is necessary to study society through men and men through society’, he argues, ‘those who wish to separate politics and morality will never understand anything of either’ (iv.524). The point is that whilst the individual must still assume the responsibility of realising virtue and moral freedom in the realm of personal life, this cannot be achieved in isolation from other individuals. The individual comes to comprehend the full significance of moral questions through participating in the complex relationships fundamental to social and political life. The existence of society is crucial since it is only in relation to others that the individual ceases to be a ‘stupid and limited animal’ and becomes instead a ‘free intelligent being’, thus escaping ‘the bondage of appetite’ in order to enjoy the reality of justice and right.

Since might does not entail right, the question of moral justification remains; people have no reason to obey political authority based upon force other than that they are coerced into obedience, which is no reason at all. Without coercion, this political authority lacks justification of its existence.

By establishing the connection between morality and society, Rousseau opens up a new set of problems. Locating individuals within their relations to each other means that the individual is no longer autonomous, free to determine this relationship with others in an unrestricted way. Whilst the individual is concerned to protect his freedom, he must come to recognise the need to relate this freedom to a conception of order which enables other individuals to secure their freedom. Thus the resolution of the problem of political order involves the creation of conditions which enable all members of society to participate on equal terms in a civil association which is founded on the principle of freedom.

Concerning legality, Rousseau argues in the first place that since human beings have acquiesced in the new fetters that political organisation has imposed upon them, on the grounds of escaping the destructive anarchy of the state of war, the problem arises of just who is to decide upon and impose the constraint to be placed upon human beings, in their best interest.

This constraint is both ‘enlightened’ and moral in the sense that it is in the interests of human beings to have such a constraint. This constraint enables human beings to escape the self-destructive tendency of the state of war. But this constraint must also be legitimate; it must rest upon morality as opposed to coercion.

For Rousseau, force does not make right. Contrary to Thrasymachus, justice is not the interests of the strongest.





To rest right upon might is to engage in a purely circular, tautological form of reasoning. It is not a moral position at all; it is merely the law of the strongest; and the strongest may not always be the strongest. When it is force that counts, the principle of right is neglected.





Rousseau thus makes the point that obedience to the powers that be is superfluous as a principle if it means yielding to force. The very nature of force is that subjects must yield; no principle is involved. Moral principle is always something other than force. Rousseau thus searches for a principle that is capable of justifying political authority.





Rousseau thus distinguishes right and might from each other. To base an argument upon right is to offer reasons why something ought to be; it is to make a moral argument. To base an argument upon force, on the other hand, is to make no argument at all. Force is not an argument but an assertion of what physically is and may be imposed. The physical reality of force proves nothing as to whether this reality is based upon right and hence ought to be.

Grotius denies that all human authority should be exercised in the interests of those who are governed; and he cites the fact of slavery as an example. His constant method of reasoning is to establish a right by citing a fact. It would be possible to employ a more logical method, but none could be more favourable to tyrants.

It is then, according to Grotius, doubtful whether the human race belongs to a hundred men, or that hundred men to the human race: and, throughout his book, he seems to incline to the former alternative, which is also the view of Hobbes. On this showing, the human species is divided into as many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devouring them.
As a shepherd is of nature superior to that of his flock, the shepherds of men, i.e. their rulers, are of a nature superior to that of the peoples under them. Thus, Philo tells us, the Emperor Caligula reasoned, concluding equally well either that kings were gods, or that men were beasts.
The reasoning of Caligula agrees with that of Hobbes and Grotius. Aristotle, before any of them, had said that men are by no means equal naturally, but that some are born for slavery, and others for dominion.




The phrase ‘against nature’ is important. Inequality is not ‘natural’ but contrary to nature. The differentiated conception of human nature upheld by Plato and Aristotle, which fitted some to certain tasks, others to other tasks, which excluded large sections of the people from citizenship, is a social and hence an alterable condition.

As a result of the unity of politics and morality, politics concerns principles rather than facts. Further, this does not mean examining the actual political attitudes of individuals but instead requires the examination of the basis of all legitimate government and the nature of political obligation. Rousseau is concerned to identify the criteria and norms of government as opposed to the actual arrangements of any particular government. 

The examination of political right proceeds from the elucidation of general principles above and beyond the particular facts of existing institutions. At the same time, however, Rousseau insists, at beginning of the Social Contract, that it is imperative to reconcile the ideal with the nature of ‘men as they are’ rather than with men as they ought to be. Rousseau is thus concerned to affirm the interpenetration of the ideal and the real, the moral and the psychological. Rousseau purports to take ‘men as they are’ and ‘the laws as they may be’ and to combine what ‘right permits’ with what ‘interest prescribes’. In such a way are principles of justice and right made effective in terms of the requirements of interest and utility. Rousseau thus premises his argument upon human nature as against ideal principles which abstract from this nature. The ‘men as they are’ to which Rousseau refers pertains not to the corrupt beings of contemporary artificial civilisation but to the ‘original’ being of individual. Rousseau’s conception of politics is thus in accordance with his conception of the moral development of the individual. Rousseau affirms the unity of the ethical and the political in affirming that human beings are capable of moral effort and rational choice whilst also insisting on the fundamental concern of the individual with self-preservation and happiness.

Rousseau is sustaining his argument that there is a difference between might and right and, by extension, that what ‘is’ in not necessarily what ‘ought to be’. The mere fact of slavery, indeed the fact that some are slaves by nature and desire to be slaves, entails no justification at all of slavery. Thus, some may be slaves not only in fact, confirmed by law, but also in nature, i.e. in that the conditions of servility may come to create a servile character. This may indeed be the case, Rousseau acknowledges, but this is not the relevant point. The condition of those slaves ought to be other than it is.

Rousseau, therefore, rejects the law of the strongest. Force entails no principle of right. Rousseau comes to make a distinction between power and authority. Rousseau argues that no person possesses a natural authority over another, thus affirming that all legitimate political authority must rest upon convention. Force can never make right and, therefore, the exercise of restraint necessary to freedom cannot be justified by force. Rousseau has, therefore, to deal with the moral justification of the state in terms of an argument as to what ought to be. How ought political obligation and restraint be imposed? Rousseau’s argument is that what is required is not merely consent as given once and for all in an initial act but consent that is direct, active and continuous in being embodied in and expressed by the general will.









If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king? .. let us confine ourselves to the word alienate. To alienate is to give or to sell. Now, a man who becomes the slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at least for his subsistence: but for what does a people sell itself? A king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from them; and, according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also? I fail to see what they have left to preserve.
It will be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquillity. Granted; but what do they gain if the wars his ambition brings down upon them, his insatiable avidity, and the vexatious conduct of his ministers press harder on them than their own dissensions would have done? What do they gain, if the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquility is found also in dungeons; but is that enough to make them desirable places to live in? ..




Individuals will only enter a society that that will bring positive advantages. Rousseau is well aware that since the citizen is always concerned in the first instance to satisfy the principle of self-preservation, any principle of the common good that may be presented must also assure citizens of their security and material well-being. Rousseau is, of course, concerned with the common good. For Rousseau, increasing moral and rational maturity on the part of individuals will make it possible for them to transcend a selfish conception of self-preservation in favour of its richer and more authentic and integral expression as a form of self-fulfilment. Human beings thus come to attain a higher appreciation of their true interest and, in so doing, become authentic and integral personalities.

The unfolding of the personal throughout the social thus entails a transformation of the character of interest and the ‘nature’ of which it forms part. Through moral development human beings learn to turn selfish interest into an enlightened self-interest. Once human beings enter the society of others listening to the voice of nature and following the impulse of natural goodness no longer suffices; the happiness and well-being of the individual are now bound up with the happiness and well-being of the community as a whole. The relationships and contacts upon which society is founded requires the exercise of reason and will on the part of individuals. Further, the social dimension of virtue is highly significant. These interpersonal relations also require that individuals acquire the virtue which encourages them to subordinate immediate impulse and desire in the interests of the higher common good of all. This higher interest is not the interest of ‘all’ as some abstraction but of each individual too; it is the realisation of the individual as a rational and moral being through the complete fulfilment and active exercise of the higher possibilities immanent in human nature. By exchanging impulse for order, the individual attains an expansion, elevation, and plenitude in his existence that is beyond the reach of primitive man in the state of nature. From being a ‘stupid, limited animal’, the individual becomes ‘an intelligent being and a man’. ‘His ideas are extended, his feelings ennobled and his whole soul elevated’ (SC I.8). 

For Rousseau, then, there is a close connection between the creation of political society, the emergence of society and the moral development of human beings. To bring all of these strands together requires that the problem at the core of political philosophy be addressed – the origin, control and exercise of supreme power. The problem is that principles of equality are contradicted by the fact that individuals are born with different capacities and aptitudes. This being the case, the force underlying political order entails inequality in one form or another. The failure to check this physical inequality in society, where individuals exist in close contact and relationship to each other, results in the emergence of a distinction between strong and weak which comes to be elevated to the status of necessary principle in a state of tyranny and oppression. In such a political society the majority of individuals are subject to the domination of a small but powerful minority. Emphasising this point in his critique of contemporary society, Rousseau sets about discovering some way of extinguishing the deleterious effects of inequality.





Rousseau is arguing that a political society which rests upon human beings alienating their liberty cannot be authentic or legitimate. The true political society could only rest upon the true social contract. The legitimacy of any political authority depends upon individuals preserving their liberty even as they join with others in an association. Rousseau’s argument is that at this stage in history human beings can no longer retain their liberty in isolation an individuals. In moving from the primitive state to the social state, human beings have come to be confronted by forces which are supra-individual and which, for this reason, cannot be controlled individually. In this situation, human beings must associate so as to organise their forces through some arrangement which secures not only the self-interest but also the freedom of each individual. Rousseau is clear that although human beings must associate, and hence as individuals become members of a collectivity, they must also associate in such a way as to preserve their freedom, as individuals, so that as human beings they remain in touch with their human essence. Thus human beings can recover their human nature in the social state.

Rousseau states his task.

I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. 

The obstacles facing human beings, then, are such as to evade individual solution. Human beings must unite and organise their forces.

But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.

Rousseau thus recognises that human beings are confronted by, indeed generate, forces which are supra-individual in character and hence which can be controlled only by a form of association which facilitates a collective control.





Thus Rousseau is concerned that the association which he calls for in the social compact should respect the force and liberty of each individual. It is quite incorrect, therefore, to claim that Rousseau subsumed the individual in the collectivity. Self-preservation in terms of the force and liberty of each individual is the fundamental principle that Rousseau incorporates into his legitimate political society, the basis of its legitimacy.

Thus Rousseau states the problem and proceeds to develop the solution. Rousseau proposes to give collective expression to the various individual powers so as to transform them into a ‘common force’ that ensures self-preservation and well-being of each and all together, both the community and the individuals composing it. Rather than a condition in which the power of each individual competes with the power of all others, a condition of self-cancellation, Rousseau seeks ‘to find a form of association that defends and protects with all the common force the person and goods of each associate’ (SC I.6). 





With each individual protected by the whole common force, no-one will have a reason to fear oppression and injustice. No citizen or group of citizens will enjoy privileges which are given to some but denied to others. The individual will therefore be willing to exchange the limitations of the autonomous use of his powers for the security and protection achieved by the common force of the community acting as a single body.

The common force is thus justified as being in the interests of the individual. This force is revocable. The ‘slightest modification’ in the ‘clauses of this contract’ render them ‘vain and ineffective’. On the ‘violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it’ (SC I.VI). Rousseau is thus attempting to reconcile the freedom of each and the freedom of all. The common force is thus justified as being in the interests of the individual. It is revocable.

The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
SC I.VI

The social contract is the solution to this fundamental problem. Rousseau thus proceeds to delineate the state established by the social contract as the moral order.





This common force requires the involvement of all the citizens without exception or exemption to be effective. The individual must be willing to make a complete surrender of power if s/he wishes to be protected by the united power of the whole community. ‘Each of us puts his person and his entire power under the supreme direction of the general will; as a body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole’ (CS I.6). This unconditional ‘alienation’ of power is an indispensable condition for the creation and maintenance of a valid political community. This alienation creates a new form of civil equality with which to check the deleterious effects of natural inequality. Rousseau makes this civil or conventional equality the condition of political freedom; without it, citizens are continuously threatened by oppression.

Rousseau’s concern that individuals be bound indissolubly to the community is motivated in part by his distrust of powerful individuals and groups who, he considers, will always attempt to manipulate society and usurp political power for their own advantage. Rousseau is therefore concerned to protect the State against the encroachment of the powerful. He argues this point clearly in a note to Émile: ‘The universal spirit of the laws of every country is always to favour the strong against the weak, and the one who has against the one who has nothing: this drawback is inevitable and is without exception’ (iv.524n). 

Human freedom, therefore, is something attainable only within the legitimate political society constituted by the social contract. Once this society has been constituted, human beings no longer can have rights independent of and hence possibly hold against the association of each and all. For this would merely reproduce the anarchy of the state they have sought to leave and which has put obstacles in the way of human freedom.

Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.




Rousseau is thus arguing that the freedom of each and all can be made consistent through the conventional surrender of all to all. This, being total and equal, guarantees justice and removes all causes for which the individual would seek to hold rights independent of and against the political community. Liberty is preserved since the individual surrender to all is also a surrender to no-one. In associating with others, the individual obtains the same rights over other individuals. This association is an increase in force which serves to strengthen the liberty of all.

Rousseau states the principle upon which this compact rests.





The result of this reciprocal act of surrender by each to all is to create a true political society that may be called legitimate in that it is oriented toward securing the good of all. In creating the state, human beings are not giving up their liberty but are transferring it to a new moral personality in whose being they all share: they are not surrendering their liberty but conjoining it. This society is a corporate and collective entity which possesses a moral significance. This moral personality rests upon the individual personality of each contracting party.





Rousseau thus delineates the political society that ought to exist, i.e. that is moral, legitimate and just. The relationship between individuals in the association they constitute is not something that is concluded once and for all. Rather, this relationship entails the continuous, active and expansive participation of each individual associate in a body that is conceived of as embodying the good of all the associates. Thus, the association to which Rousseau is referring is no mere legal body created by contracting parties for mutual protection and benefit. Rousseau’s organic conception asserts itself. This association is a corporate and collective body that incorporates a communality, a sense of the common life as something organic and growing. The individual is part of an organism and hence can achieve the free and full development of moral personality, which is the human potential, only by participating in the common good in association with other individuals.

The state would ensure that all its members would be sufficiently empowered as to be able to resist any encroachment upon their liberties and rights. The state would prevent individuals from becoming so powerless or so powerful as to ensure that the old asymmetries associated with competition would be reintroduced into social life. Such a state would be designed to promote authenticity and autonomy. It would be thoroughly democratic, egalitarian in principle, participatory in its operation, authoritarian in its absolutism, totalitarian in its all-encompassing nature and founded in individual choice. Whilst that composite may seem paradoxical, this thesis has argued for the fundamental consistency of Rousseau’s reasoning. The end of the state is to ‘secure each citizen against all personal dependence’ but also to ‘give him to his country’; (Contract I 7 364) however, ‘each, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody’ (I 6, 361). ‘Each citizen would be perfectly independent of all the rest, yet excessively dependent on the Cité (II 12, 394). This would ‘subjugate men in order to make them free’; it would ‘confine their will by their own consent’; things would be arranged so that ‘all men obey, yet none commands, and all men serve, yet they have no master’ (Economy 248) (283).

The government, the constitution of the state, and the whole structure of society, the ‘fundamental compact’ upon which all other obligations rested, was to be put to the citizens, every year at least, to be chosen and undertaken as new or dissolved for good. Rousseau supported this proposal by arguing that ‘each man can renounce his membership in his own state, and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leaving the country’. Since this was so, ‘it would be absurd if all the citizens together could not do what each can do by himself’. From this it followed that ‘there is in the state no fundamental law that cannot be revoked, including the social contract itself’ (III 18.436). One can therefore see how wrong those such as Shklar are when arguing that ‘there is not much room for choice in [Rousseau’s] system..’ (Shklar Two Models 36). Rousseau’s entire system is based on choice and the whole ‘system’ itself remains subject to the choice of the people in an active and continuous sense. Hommes were citoyens only if they chose to be such; they could dissolve the state if it failed to meet their demands in any way. Rousseau’s concern with autonomy and authenticity thus led him to the conclusion that political obligations and the laws must be based upon an active consent that is exercised in person as a free choice. For individuals to be members of a community that embodies their authenticity rather than denies it requires that that community be permanently subject to the personal choice of its individual members. The community is therefore a permanently open question for its members to answer personally. The community of authentic and autonomous individuals is subject to a perpetual dissolution and recreation; Rousseau’s social contract is an actively democratic construction which its participating members continuously negotiate and affirm anew.

The purpose of the state was the self-dissolving one that would create a society that was capable of functioning from within. The state could withdraw once the self-regulating social system had been achieved. The authentic community would therefore be self-governing. Rousseau wanted the ruler to ‘arrange things so that all citizens did what they were supposed to do, then there would be nothing left for him to do; and the crowning achievement of all his labour would be able to remain unemployed’ (Economy 250).

Rousseau had laid the foundation for the presentation of the general will as this moral personality of the collective and corporate body. All are required to submit to this general will as members of society. But the general will is their will, not an alien will imposed upon them. It is in this general will that the legitimacy of political authority resides. Will, not force, is the basis of legitimate political authority. The whole community is sovereign and this sovereignty derives from the people.

Rousseau has thus theorised his legitimate political society as resting upon the sovereignty of the people. The social contract rests upon the reciprocal relation of each and all constituting the sovereign. The sovereign is the subject of chapter VII of The Social Contract.

This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double relation; as a member of the sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the state to the sovereign.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.
Again, the sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We shall also see … that it cannot hurt any in particular. The sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it should be.

This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security that they would fulfil their undertakings, unless it found means to secure itself to their fidelity.












Rousseau thus provides a solution to the problem of how human beings can identify with their country, their state, how human beings are to find a home in the world as citizens. Rousseau, moreover, is clear that the lawful freedom he theorises rests upon a general will that derives from individual human beings. The general will is not supra-individual in the sense of being external to and imposed upon human beings. It is the connection of real individuals with the general will, as their own will, which alone legitimises the political society that Rousseau presents.





In order to understand Rousseau’s political philosophy it is necessary not only to keep in mind the distinction between the will of all and the general will but to do so in terms of Rousseau’s earlier distinction between an unenlightened selfish interest and an enlightened self-interest. This enables Rousseau to distinguish between licence and liberty, independence and freedom. 

Rousseau’s achievement is to have shown the unity of individuality and communality via a democratic constitution of authority. Rousseau’s state frees individuals from personal dependence and guarantees their protection from personal dependence. This is achieved by making all individuals totally and equally dependent on an abstract, impersonal system. The state would have to redirect the energies of its citizens by providing spaces and rewards for their amour-propre, ensuring that amour-propre flows through channels which serve the common good. In such a way could citizens be allowed fullest participation in the decision-making process, with freedom and power being canalised towards the public good. In the process, private interest would coincide with public power, human beings having a social identity which implies a direct relation between individual action and public good. ‘Out of the effervescence excited by this mutual emulation will arise that patriotic drunkenness which alone can raise men above themselves, and without which liberty is but an empty word and laws a chimera’ (Poland XII 1019) (283).

Citizens are only obligated by laws reached through public deliberation and agreement, for human beings are legitimately obligated by laws that they have prescribed for themselves with the public good in mind. Thus Rousseau’s freedom is a rational freedom in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle.

Many have been the attempts to confound independence and liberty: two things so essentially different, that they reciprocally exclude each other. When every one does what he pleases, he will, of course, often do things displeasing to others; and this is not properly called a free state. Liberty consists less in acting according to one’s own pleasure than in not being subject to the will and pleasure than in not being subject to the will and pleasure of other people. It consists also in our not subjecting the wills of other people to our own. Whoever is the master over others is not himself free, and even to reign is to obey.

Rousseau, From Letter 8, Oeuvres Completes de J.J. Rousseau, quoted in J Keane, Public Life and Late Capitalism 1984:255

Rousseau makes clear what he means by this when he writes of ‘the civil state’. Individual freedom as licence is replaced by a lawful freedom in which human beings obtain a legal recognition that is also a moral recognition subject to the general will. Human beings are subject to the restraints authorised by the general will, but, in being so subject, cease to be animals, living under instinct, and become human beings, living according to reason. The moral significance of the social contract, then, lies in this transformation of the animal into the human being, of licence into freedom. Human beings exchange their natural independence without restraints for a moral liberty subject to restraints that ensure happiness and well-being. Human beings become free and rational beings. The impulsions of nature and the universal, self-destructive, external restraint of egoism, competition and licence come to be replaced by moral liberty as reason is put in control.





Thus the individual ceases to be an animal and becomes a human being, an intelligent being capable of rising above natural inclinations and of thinking rationally upon ends.





Thus Rousseau distinguishes moral/civil liberty, as something communal and subject to the general will, from natural liberty as something immediate and individualistic.





Thus Rousseau presents a conception of rational freedom under the civil state. This is a lawful freedom.





This definition is repeated by Kant in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: ‘What else can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself? .. A free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same’.

For Rousseau, liberty and equality, far from being contradictory values, are essential to each other. The social contract ‘establishes equality among the citizens in that they .. must all enjoy the same rights’. For Rousseau, equal political rights cannot be upheld in conditions of substantial economic inequalities. Rousseau nevertheless defended the right to private property appropriate to the security and independence of the individual. Rousseau is thus not an egalitarian in a material sense but, rather, argues for that freedom from dependence and necessity that would enable citizens to think and act as autonomous moral and rational beings. This is a question not of material resources but of power enabling independence. Thus Rousseau demands a situation in which ‘no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself’. Such a principle may well imply the abolition of the wages system and the monopolisation of the means of production by the propertied class. Rousseau did not pursue this line. Instead, Rousseau was content to argue that a broad equalisation of wealth and power could ensure that major conflicts of interest could not arise and develop into organised factional struggle, undermining the state and preventing the emergence of the general will. Rousseau’s case for equality is not egalitarian. Rousseau does not argue for equality in any absolute sense. Equality ‘must not be taken to imply that degrees of power and wealth should be absolutely the same for all, but rather that power shall stop short of violence and never be exercised except by virtue of authority and law’.

Rousseau concludes Book I, then, with the definition of the principle upon which the civil state rests.





9 ALIENATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

In Book I of The Social Contract, Rousseau theorised sovereignty and shown where sovereignty must reside. His task in Book II is to analyse sovereignty through the concept of the general will, going on to discuss law.

The general will expresses the philosophical basis of Rousseau’s democratic conception of the social contract. The main question concerns alienation. Rousseau argues for the principle of popular sovereignty as entailing the right of the people to control their destiny, regardless of the particular question of whether the people can alienate this right.

Rousseau distinguishes himself from Hobbes on this point. For Hobbes regards the sovereignty of the people as alienable whereas Rousseau considers it inalienable. Hobbes accepts popular sovereignty in principle only to destroy it in practice. Rousseau looks to translate the principle into practice. Rousseau effectively integrates the absolute sovereignty of Hobbes with Locke’s assertion of the consent of the people. Rousseau thus produces a novel theory of popular sovereignty.

Rousseau distinguishes himself from Hobbes on another point. Hobbes identifies the sovereign with the government. Rousseau, however, makes the distinction between the two. Indeed, so radical is the distinction that Rousseau draws that even the most democratic form of government is not the same time the sovereign. The members composing this democratic government are sovereign but only in another capacity.

Rousseau’s point in chapter I is that ‘sovereignty is inalienable’.





Rousseau makes explicit the communality that is the basis of the principle of rational freedom. It is by achieving this communality that the coincidence of the good of each individual and all individuals is ensured. Thus





Sovereignty, as the exercise of the general will, is inalienable, and the sovereign, as collective being, cannot be represented by anything other than the sovereign.





Thus, sovereignty cannot be alienated and the sovereign cannot be represented. Power may be ‘transmitted’ to a body like the government, but the will, in which legitimate authority resides, cannot. Rousseau here creates the principled basis of a political theory that is not merely inimical to monarchical and absolutist government but which is ultimately incompatible with liberal representative government. Rousseau’s democratic conception of the social contract leads to a conception of a radical democracy based upon the active and continuous exercise of sovereignty on the part of all individuals as citizens.

The conception is of an active sovereignty which overcomes political alienation and representation. Thus, whilst one part of Rousseau may lead off in the direction of liberal democracy, his theory of sovereignty, what it is, where it resides, and how it is exercised, leads beyond liberal democracy.

Rousseau’s second point in chapter II is that sovereignty is indivisible. This point allows Rousseau to distinguish between the decree of an executive body and a genuine law, which must come from the people as a whole.





But there is a split between the ideal and the real in Rousseau’s thought. Democracy in its ideal form, i.e. the government of the state by all the people in an active sense, is not for Rousseau practicable. In an empirical reality, all governments will be mixed in character. Thus, government can be more or less democratic but never wholly democratic, i.e. in the purest form.
However, whilst Rousseau acknowledges that government on account of its character must come to be concentrated in the hands of selected persons, sovereignty not only originates in the people, it stays with the people. Sovereignty must be absolute, inalienable and indivisible. Sovereignty cannot be limited, surrendered or shared, except amongst equals. Thus, what makes a political society legitimate is that it upholds the principle that the right to control the destiny of society belongs, ultimately, to the people.

There will, in the political society, be an ultimate authority to which conflicts may be referred, and this will be made up of citizens. However, sovereignty is distinguished from government. If this distinction is not made, then government will continually attempt to usurp the name of the sovereign. As in Hobbes, the government will come to claim to be absolute.

Rousseau thus determines to maintain a strict distinction between government and sovereignty. He does this by proposing two, not three, powers, and by making the executive dependent upon the legislative. Thus the legislative power, the sovereign, is supreme, whilst the executive, comprising the judicial, is subordinate. The power of the government is thus derivative. Rousseau makes this distinction in terms of will and power. Thus the function of government is to execute the will of the sovereign people. The people, as an act of will, transfers its binding authority over all members of the body politic to an authority which gives force to the will of the people. But in transferring this power to an authoritative body, the people loses none of its sovereign power. What it has done is to create an authority for the execution of the popular will. The people remains sovereign and can, at any time recover the power it has transferred.

The power of government, therefore, in executing the popular will is secondary and derivative and can never escape the conscious control of the sovereign people. Government depends upon the sovereign and is subject to the sovereign will of the people; the power of government is always revocable.

But how can the people retain this legislative capacity in modern conditions? For Rousseau, laws can be made, and hence governments can be authorised, only by the direct and active decision of the people. Government is subject to this law no less than individuals. But Rousseau’s way of formulating this legislative power makes it possible in practice for government to usurp the sovereign. For law, concerning the general will of the whole community, must be general. Thus, as soon as the individual, group, or class is introduced, the matter in hand ceases to be general and becomes particular. It thus ceases to be the subject matter appropriate to an act of the sovereign.

Rousseau’s distinction is theoretically consistent. However, it effectively concedes the legislative power to the government. Law in the modern world does concern the particular as much as the general. Thus, Rousseau’s theoretical distinction could quite easily undermine his attempt to make the executive dependent upon the legislative and to make government dependent upon the sovereign. Rousseau’s theory is thus transformed into a theory of modern democratic government in which the power of the people is firmly restricted to that of having the opportunity to remove their governors at periodic elections. That Rousseau’s own theory runs in a direction completely contrary to such representative government indicates how serious the point concerning law is. Indeed, far from government possessing the power assigned to it by modern democratic theory, ‘government’ for Rousseau is always subject to a system of law made directly by the people as the sovereign power. One needs also to remember that Rousseau was not theorising the modern nation state. Indeed, his political theory could easily be employed as a critique of the modern state.

What matters is that the sovereign people possesses the institutional mechanisms capable of actualising the legislative authority of the people as superior to government. And putting the question in these terms enables the crucial distinction between particular and the general to be upheld without thereby undermining Rousseau’s theory of government as derivative from sovereignty. For Rousseau is thinking of the small or city-state, not the large nation state; and the small city-state is able to appreciate the general whereas the large state can come to appear as a mere congeries of particular interest.

Thus it is understandable why Rousseau could evaluate forms of government as he did. Rousseau’s political philosophy is democratic; but Rousseau is ready to acknowledge that his principle of democracy is applicable only in small states. Thus, in medium sized states, aristocratic government is most appropriate whilst in large states only monarchical government can impose unity (SC III.iii). The implication is clear. If you want democracy you will have to restructure institutional power in such a way as to replace the large state with the city-state/s. The notion of a large state with democratic government cannot but be incongruous on Rousseau’s terms. Indeed, sovereignty for Rousseau can neither be alienated nor represented. The large state may rest upon representative institutions but it is not appropriate to describe these institutions as democratic. The idea of representative sovereignty, like limited sovereignty, is a contradiction in terms. The popular will is inalienable. Since general acts of legislation are acts of sovereignty for Rousseau each citizen must participate directly in making the laws which bind all. No representative body is competent to perform this legislative function.

Rousseau expresses his criticism of those theorists like Hobbes and Pufendorf – and the criticism could also be extended to Montesquieu – who ‘unable to divide sovereignty in its principle, divide it according to its object’. Rousseau thus rejects the doctrine of the separation of powers for the way that it turns the sovereign into a ‘fantastic being’ composed of several connected pieces (SC II.ii).

But our political theorists, unable to divide Sovereignty in its principle, divide it according to its object; into force and will; into legislative power and executive power; into rights of taxation, justice and war; into internal administration and power of foreign treaty. Sometimes they confuse all these sections, and sometimes they distinguish them; they turn the Sovereign into a fantastic being composed of several connected pieces..
 This error is due to a lack of exact notions concerning the Sovereign authority, and to taking for parts of it what are only emanating from it. Thus, for example, the acts of declaring war and making peace have been regarded as acts of Sovereignty; but this is not the case, as those acts do not constitute law, but merely the application of a law, a particular act which decides how the law applies..




The social contract makes law necessary but also makes it plain that law is only legitimate if it proceeds from the citizens constituting the state:

Doubtless there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual. Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men.

Rousseau’s key concept in defending this position is the general will. Though complex, its meaning is fairly clear. Rousseau argues that the social contract issues in the creation of a new individual: ‘at once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a corporate and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from the act its unity, its common identity, its life and its “will”’ (SC I.vi).

In the Political Economy Rousseau writes:

The body politic, therefore, is also a moral being, possessed of a will; and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all the members of the state, in their relations to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust.

Perhaps Rousseau’s most controversial statement is that the general will is infallible. This is his third point, that the general will is always right. Rousseau’s point is that the general will, unlike the will of empirical individuals, tends always to the public good, the good of all. Rousseau thus contrasts the general will with the will of all.





The general will is infallible, Rousseau argues, and this would seem to carry the corollary of popular infallibility. Rousseau would thus seem to be arguing that the people are always right. This is a dangerous doctrine and one that would be difficult to institutionalise at the level of practical politics. Not only is Rousseau aware of the sham nature of representation in modern institutions, as in England where an oligarchy concentrated power in its hands, he was also aware of how power can be centralised in the modern nation state, as in France. Rousseau’s democratic principles could function only through the decentralisation and devolution of power so as to enable citizens to participate directly in law making. Thus, for Rousseau, government resting upon popular sovereignty requires a federal system in which power flows upwards from the smallest unit.

Jennings notes the criticism that the absence of limits in Rousseau’s argument poses the gravest threat to liberty. There is a part of human existence which ‘by necessity remains individual and independent’ and which therefore is properly beyond social control. Rousseau ‘overlooked this truth’ and thus provided theoretical support for despotism. Whatever Rousseau’s claims, individuals are not giving themselves to nobody but to those who acted in the name of all (Jennings 1994:126).

In discussing the question of limits to sovereignty, Rousseau is not contradicting himself. The general will is always right by definition and hence will justify intervention only in the interests of securing the common good (On the ambiguity of Rousseau’s conception of the general will see Korner, for whom Rousseau fails to supply a satisfactory method for discovering the content of the general will (Korner 1969:146).

One should make the fine distinctions that Rousseau makes in order to present his doctrine in its true light. In the first place, Rousseau is restating his view that sovereignty derives from the people. In the second place, he is reaffirming his belief in the innate goodness of human beings. Rousseau is concerned to repudiate the notion of inherent sinfulness and corruption so as to avoid authoritarian implications. His optimistic assumptions carry the corollary that human beings do tend to the good, the true and the right. But Rousseau does make an important distinction here. If he rejects corruption, Rousseau does admit deception. If the people is never corrupted, it can be deceived. Indeed, Rousseau’s justification of the general will forcing people to be free is predicated upon this assumption that, failing to recognise the common interest, human beings are prone to error.

Rousseau argues that the common will, embodied in the state, will ‘tend always to the welfare of the whole’. But is it not the case that the common will is infallible? What basis is there for claiming that this common will is not as fallible as the will of the individuals who compose it? In making the distinction between the general will and the will of all, Rousseau does allow for error.





Rousseau thus distinguishes between a situation in which the citizen votes for what is believed to be for the good of the community as a whole and a situation in which the citizen votes for an individual or sectional good. Where the citizen votes for the private over the public good, it does not follow at all that the general will is corrupted (SC IV.i).

Again, one needs to remember that Rousseau is writing of a small state and not of the large nation state. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to understand more adequately the distinction between the general will and the will of all. In the small state resting upon popular sovereignty, it is possible to transcend particular interests so that votes made according to self-interest cancel each other out. In this situation, the general will may emerge through majority votes. It is argued against Rousseau that this is not necessarily the case. But Rousseau himself did not argue that popular expression through majority votes is infallible. What Rousseau does argue is that, ideally, the majority ‘would be subject only to errors of judgment about means, and not to perversion by particular or sectional interests’.

Rousseau thus makes the important distinction between the general will as the will of the community and the will of all as the sum of the particular wills of the members of the community.





Rousseau thus has a sceptical attitude towards all partial associations as a threat to the general will. Rousseau is vulnerable here to the criticism that his attitude could, as in the French Revolution of 1789, lead to the suppression of partial associations as enemies of the common interest. Rousseau fails to incorporate these associations within an integral political community and ethical life. The later achievement of Hegel was to have envisaged a multi-layered social fabric organising social associations within the state according to an ascending theme of power. In contrast to Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, Rousseau could leave the unregulated individual isolated in front of the central state.

Rousseau’s point, however, that the general will is, by definition, concerned with the common good remains valid. It does not refer to particular interests organised in such a way as to be presented as the general interest and it is certainly not a mere majority. Rousseau makes it clear that the general will is not a generalised particularism or a collective sectionalism, a will that is merely the sum of individual or group interests.





The general will tends always to the common good but it may nevertheless be divided into a number of smaller general wills. These wills are wrong in relation to the general will. Thus the supremacy of the general will is ‘the first principle of public economy and the fundamental rule of government’.

In The Social Contract, Rousseau argues:

If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with another, the grand total of the small differences would always give the general will, and the decision would always be good. But when intrigues arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the state: it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular.




This is the reason for Rousseau’s sceptical attitude to partial societies. The political theory that Rousseau presents in the social contract, then, may be expressed thus: through a contract based upon the voluntary surrender of all to all, a true political society is created as one which possesses a general will which is distinct from the will of all. This general will is embodied in the law, which is therefore distinguished from the arbitrary inclinations of the individual. Lawful freedom is superior to individual freedom and creates a condition of civil and moral liberty which facilitates the transition of the individual from an animal to a human being, i.e. a moral and a rational being. Sovereignty, as the exercise of the general will, is inalienable, indivisible and infallible. The ethico-rational political society is thus created to enable human beings to attain happiness and well-being.

Rousseau’s argument is an original and complex conflation of the ideal and the real and it is not altogether easy and maybe not even desirable or legitimate to differentiate the one from the other in his thought. Rousseau argues that the general will tends always to the public good. Superficially, this would appear to be no more than an assertion that is contradicted by historical evidence. It is not difficult to cite examples drawn from history which show human beings joining together to participate in and practise injustice. But this is besides the point. Rousseau is not so witless as to miss the obvious in history. Rousseau takes this question to a more profound level when making the distinction between corruption and deception. Rousseau is quite prepared to acknowledge that the people may often be deceived about what they ought to do (SC I.vii). What Rousseau does argue is that the people and its general will are never corrupt. Rousseau thus affirms the human capacity for goodness even though it is quite possible for the people to be deceived and hence to do injustice. Rousseau does not, therefore, argue that the people, at all times, always act justly.

One can still question the argument that ‘the general will is always just and always aims at the public good’. If this statement is true, how, then, can one explain the fact that individuals in their partial societies aim at a partial good? Does one suppress such partial societies as inimical to the public good? Does this not have totalitarian implications in that it leaves individuals powerless before the all-pervasive state? And has not Rousseau, in pointing to the partiality of the will of all, not contradicted his argument that the people always aims at the public good?

Rousseau points out that there is often a considerable difference between the general will and the will of all. Clearly, for Rousseau, the general will possesses a moral significance that is denied the will of all. The danger here is that Rousseau’s position risks rendering quite legitimate partial wills illegitimate. 

Rousseau does have an answer to the charges of totalitarianism, it is just that his argument is difficult to follow. There is a significant alteration of terms in these criticisms so that what critics mean by a particular term is not actually what Rousseau meant. Rousseau does not argue that ‘the people’ aim always at the public good but that the general will, to which the people are subject but do not always respect, does. This may appear a slight modification but it actually changes the meaning radically. The people may indeed aim at private good as distinct from public good. Rousseau’s point is that, for their own good, the people ought to aim at the general will, which does always tend to the public good. That this is Rousseau’s meaning is finally clarified in Book IV (SC IV.i).

Where there is a controversy to be had is in Rousseau’s optimistic view of human nature as opposed to the pessimism of the Christian and Hobbesian liberal view. Individuals can identify with the general will and can, therefore, realise their highest potentialities. Rousseau thus argues that human beings are capable of doing good and, indeed, tend to do so. This is not to deny that human beings may well act in a manner contrary to the good; Rousseau is not claiming that human beings always act to achieve the good. The crucial point that tends to be missed in Rousseau’s argument is the distinction between corruption and deception. Rousseau acknowledges that human beings can be deceived. This allows him to account for the obvious examples of the people committing acts of injustice. But this evidence does not, as in the Hobbesian account, lead to the pessimistic assessment of human capacities for good. For Rousseau can argue that whilst human beings can be deceived, they are never corrupt. Hence the tendency for human beings to do good, a tendency which would certainly express itself most strongly when free of deception.


10 THE LIMITS TO SOVEREIGNTY

Having laid the theoretical basis, Rousseau proceeds to consider how such principles could translate into political practice. Rousseau is first of all led to consider the limits of the sovereign power. Quite consistent with his premises, Rousseau notes the difficult and contradictory nature of putting limits onto sovereignty. Like the notion of represented sovereignty, limited sovereignty is a contradiction in terms. Rousseau argues that in transferring authority to the state, citizens accept their incorporation within a state. The citizens thus avail themselves collectively, through the state, with the unlimited power to control affairs of common concern with a view to securing the general interest.

Thus, the notion of a limited sovereignty contradicts the very idea of sovereignty. For what Rousseau is writing of when referring to the surrender of all to all, and hence to no-one, is the unlimited moral sovereignty of all over all. Only such a sovereignty can form the basis of a political society that can be considered legitimate. Popular sovereignty means that the people possesses the right to enforce by collective sanction whatever is in the general interest, i.e. enforcement must itself be subject to and must correspond to the general will. This right of the sovereign people is over the right of the individual. For what right could the individual hold against the legitimately constituted political society? To reserve such an individual right would be to reintroduce natural liberty against moral/civil liberty, defeating the whole object of the exercise.

Nevertheless, Rousseau does discuss the question of limits to the sovereign power (SC II.iv). Rousseau is not however contradicting himself here. For what Rousseau is arguing is that where the state, as the collective authority of the sovereign power, needs to intervene to secure the good of all in the whole community, its right to do so is unlimited. In Rousseau’s ethico-rational state, the general will is sovereign. The common good is the fundamental principle determining the legitimacy of intervention. The general will is always right by definition and hence will justify intervention only in the interests of securing the common good.

The sovereign … cannot impose upon the subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so.

Rousseau thus reconciles the claims of the whole community and the claims of the individuals who compose it.





But Rousseau recognises also the claims of the individuals.





Rousseau establishes the conditions connecting the citizen to the sovereign.

Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part of his powers, goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is important.
Every service a citizen can render the state he ought to render as soon as the Sovereign demands it; but the Sovereign, for its part, cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause.
SC II.iv

Rousseau thus justifies political obligation through the reciprocal act and relation upon which political society is based. Rousseau returns to the relation between each individual and all individuals.





But political obligation is not imposed upon human beings, as something external. Rousseau is attempting an anti-authoritarian justification of collective authority. This authority is legitimate given that it is individuals who constitute it and hence choose to obligate themselves whilst keeping the terms of obedience under continuous scrutiny and check.

Rousseau is attempting an anti-authoritarian justification of collective authority, notwithstanding the tendency of critics to highlight the totalitarian and homogenising potential of a politics of THE common good based upon the universal identity of citizens (Gutmann Introduction to Taylor 1992:6). Admittedly, the character of equal citizenship in the public sphere is more problematic than Rousseau’s association implies. The attempt to achieve universality on the part of all citizens possesses totalitarian and homogenising implications in so far as this universality is imposed in opposition to social differentiation. There is a potentiality for real individuals to be socially and politically disciplined so as to exist as abstract citizens. What is required is an approach that integrates the claims of both universality and particularity, an approach that recognises that human identity is created reciprocally or dialogically through the relations that each has with others (Taylor 1992:7). The antithesis between atomistic and socially constructed character of the individual, upon which the liberal-communitarian debate has been based, is rejected. Rousseau makes decisive progress beyond this antithesis in the way that he attempts to justify collective authority through the emancipatory interaction and reciprocity of individuals. He thus unites each with all and all with each.





Rousseau’s sovereign, then, possesses the supreme power as it did for Hobbes. There is this difference, however. For Rousseau, this supreme power does not stem from an original contract in which individuals alienate their sovereignty. Rather, it is based upon the consent of individuals to the exercise of supreme power by the whole community, of which the individual is one part, for the preservation and good of the whole community, in which the individual has a part to play. Rousseau’s contract, then, is based upon the active and continuously renewed consent of individuals composing the union of the state.

For this reason, there can be no restrictions upon the sovereign, as there could be if the sovereign were the product of an instrumental agreement concluded by individuals for the mutual protection of their private interests. Rousseau’s sovereign, then, cannot be reduced to this instrumental or protective device. The sovereign, for Rousseau, is the supreme power that the sovereign people, as citizens, actively and continuously consent to. Thus, far from this sovereign power being equated with the totalitarian state, what Rousseau is attempting to do is to root the supreme power of the political society in the power of the individuals composing it. It follows that this power is conditional upon serving the common good, is revocable by the citizens, and is an organic, evolving and dynamic power that establishes a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the supreme power, between the governed and the government.

Rousseau reasons that sovereignty, as the ultimate source of authority, must be absolute. This does not imply that sovereignty is arbitrary, only that it is incapable of being limited by anything other than itself. ‘It is against the nature of the body politic that the sovereign should impose upon itself a law which it cannot infringe’ (SC I.7); ‘the very moment there is a master, there is no longer a sovereign and the body politic is destroyed’. Rousseau’s point is that the control of supreme power is the sole responsibility of the community as a whole. The basis of the political association is the fact that absolute authority lies in the hands of the citizens. It follows from this that sovereignty cannot be bound by past decisions or promises for the future. It would be absurd for the sovereign to ‘give itself chains in the future’ (SC II.1). 

Whilst individualist liberalism, upholding a negative conception of liberty, asserts the absolute character of sovereignty to be inimical to individual freedom, this criticism does not apply to Rousseau’s presentation of absolute sovereignty. By definition, absolute sovereignty cannot be harmful since amour de soi, whether collective or particular, can never deliberately harm itself. ‘The supreme power needs no guarantee towards its subjects’, affirms Rousseau, ‘because it is impossible for the sovereign body to want to harm all its members’ (I.7). Rousseau makes it clear that there can be no exception to this rule: it is simply illogical for the State founded on these principles to act against its own true interest. Moreover, as the authentic foundation of all human existence, amour de soi is necessarily good in its essence. As soon as the propitious conditions have been created, the natural goodness of human beings will be expressed at every level, from the individual to the social. Resting upon the reciprocal obligation instituted between the citizen and the political body ensures that the sovereign is necessarily right: ‘the sovereign, by the very fact that it is, is always all that it should be’ (I.7). ‘Each one appropriates to himself this word “each”’; as a part of the sovereign power, the citizen understands that ‘he cannot work for others without working for himself’. Rousseau’s conception of sovereignty is founded upon the genuine reciprocity connecting each citizen with all other citizens: ‘the preference which each gives himself and, consequently, in the nature of man’ (II.4). There is no need, therefore, to limit sovereignty by any external authority. It is impossible to conceive of an external authority outside of sovereignty as an absolute power. Sovereignty observes a principle of self-limitation, obeying the laws of its own being and remaining true to the purpose for which it has been instituted. It is in this sense that Rousseau can argue that the supreme power recognises ‘limits’; the interest at the heart of sovereignty ensures that it conforms to its own intrinsic nature.

As the supreme power or common force invested in the whole body of citizens, sovereignty must be indivisible as well as absolute. In being bound up with the community as a whole, sovereignty cannot be less than the whole body of the citizens. Sovereignty loses its essential character if any part of it is split from the rest. Since it belongs to all citizens with exception, sovereignty is indivisible. Liberal fears of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ do not apply here. Any splitting of the citizen body into majorities and minorities means that sovereignty loses its essential character. 

But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.




Thus, it is against the nature of the sovereign power for it to impose upon itself a law which this power cannot alter, i.e. which is not subject to alteration should the sovereign people wish it to be altered. The sovereign is no more than the totality of the individuals composing it. The sovereign, therefore, cannot come to have an interest that is distinct from or opposed to these individuals, and there is, therefore, no need for the sovereign to give guarantees for the protection of the subjects. For, by definition, the sovereign cannot have an interest contrary to the individuals composing it. ‘The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is always what it should be’. Were this not the case, the Sovereign could no longer be defined as the Sovereign.

The Sovereign is morally justified in having this supreme and unlimited power precisely because the people have actively given their consent to it and are able to continuously renew this consent. Thus, what would merely be the exercise of force comes to acquire moral significance, precisely because the supreme power is freely agreed and consented, as their own power, by those upon whom it is placed. Thus Rousseau’s state takes its ethico-rational character from the fact that it is the people who are both the subjects over whom the supreme power is exercised and the sovereign who exercises this supreme power at the same time.

The question to be asked here is that if the sovereign power is thus morally justified by the consent of the people, why, then, must the people be obliged to give consent to what is in truth their own power? The answer is that the individuals composing the state agree to constitute a common force which is above each individual; it is the common force of the individuals which is nevertheless above the individual.
There is no real ambiguity in this justification of the ethico-rational state. The only ambiguity is that in so far as this ethico-rational state is successful in creating citizens as moral and rational agents, creating a social identity that connects public and private good, the state itself would become unnecessary. If individual citizens come to act in an enlightened manner, then the state would not be necessary since each would spontaneously identify their private good with the general good and would not therefore require the institutional framework canalising their actions to that end. Individuals would live in peace with each other, managing their mutual interaction according to reason; harmony would prevail in human affairs and hence force would not be required to keep order. Rousseau’s ideal is to substitute reason and morality for force in human affairs.

Force is physical power; I do not see that its effects can ever be moral. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will .. In what sense can that be a duty? .. Let us agree that might never makes right, and that we have a duty to obey only legitimate power.

The point is that the ethico-rational state that transcends force in human affairs also transcends the state. However, in the meantime, Rousseau can argue that not all individuals are so rational in the present as to be able to identify what is in their own good; they need to be ‘educated’ to see that their best good requires them to subordinate their immediate private interests to the common interest. Since these individuals are not sufficiently enlightened to spontaneously choose the greater, but more abstract, good over the more immediate but limited good, they need to be compelled to make this choice. This is the meaning of Rousseau’s most misunderstood argument that the individual is to be forced to be free.

In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the corporate person which constitutes the State as a persona ficta, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic.




Rousseau thus takes contract theory far beyond Locke. And, in doing so, Rousseau has made explicit and developed further that which had been merely implicit in Locke. Thus Rousseau argues that the restraint to which the individual is subjected is not only designed to secure the good of the whole community but the private good of the individual also.

Further, since sovereignty is indivisible, it is for that reason inalienable. Citizens cannot alienate their sovereignty without thereby destroying the basis of the political association. Whereas Hobbes had citizens surrender their sovereignty once and for all to an all-powerful ruler, for Rousseau, citizens retain their supreme power or authority. Sovereignty emerges upon the foundation of the civil association and continues to exist so that as that association exists. With the dissolution of the civil association, sovereignty dissolves as the individuals who constitute it return to the ‘state of nature’.

Rousseau affirms a close interdependence between the parts and the whole in the constitution of the political association. Rousseau makes frequent reference to the unity of ‘each’ and ‘all’ when discussing sovereignty in the Social Contract. This unity is central to Rousseau’s problematic of political association: ‘to find a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate and by means of which each one while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before’ (I.6). This principle of rational unity between each and all recurs throughout Rousseau’s political writings, e.g. when Rousseau affirms that ‘each giving himself to all gives himself to nobody’.

By resting his conception of sovereignty upon complete reciprocity and the equality of commitment, Rousseau grounds his principle of rational unity between ‘each’ and ‘all’. The social contract is based on a unanimous consent and absolute sovereignty, ‘establishes among citizens such equality that they all commit themselves on the same conditions and must enjoy the same rights’. To allow any individual to be exempt from the obligations and benefits integral to the civil association would render genuine political freedom impossible, since it opens the path to inequality, the greatest threat to political justice through the subjection of some to the arbitrary will of others.

Rousseau argues that it is not dependence as such that individuals fear or resent, but only their irrational and accidental dependence upon other people. He made this distinction clearly in Émile:





By locating supreme political authority in all the members of the community, Rousseau’s intention is to replace the irksome dependence on people with the acceptable dependence on things. This impersonal dependence is achieved as a result of the absolute, indivisible, and inalienable nature of sovereignty. In establishing a common authority by their will and in freely submitting to this authority, the citizens are obeying a collective form of their will in conditions which apply equally to all. Each citizen accepts this condition knowing that it is also accepted by all other citizens; each citizen knows that what is demanded of one may be demanded of all others. Sovereignty defined thus presupposes equality of right and obligation and does not exist without that genuine equality; for this reason sovereignty is the guarantee of freedom.





Rousseau moves on to consider the law. The Sovereign, he emphasises, is the source of all law. The laws are created by a deliberate act of will and derive their meaning from the activity and situation which bring them into being’. Without the laws, the state would be ‘like a body without a soul’. Rousseau describes the laws as the ‘driving force’ of the body politic; the body politic is given ‘activity and feeling only through them’. Only through the laws can the state achieve the ‘prodigious feat’ of persuading individuals to subordinate their private interest to the common good.

Rousseau does not discuss the laws in some narrow legalistic sense but instead approaches them in terms of their moral significance. Indeed, the power of the laws lies neither in their numbers nor their subtlety and complexity, but in their fewness and simplicity. The more laws there are, the worse the nation is. Rousseau explains that the existence of numerous laws indicates that citizens lack the capacity to rely on their own strength but must instead depend upon external constraints. Rousseau is concerned to emphasise that the power of the laws lies not in written rules and institutions but in human hearts: ‘the only laws which will benefit the Poles are those which they accept in the depth of their own being. The true sanctuary of the State is in the hearts of the Poles’ (iii.1013, 1019). Rousseau repeats the view that the ‘citizens’ heart is the State’s best protection’ (iii.486). The fewness of the laws indicates that citizens understand that good behaviour leading to the common good is the product of their own determination and loyalty rather than the external constraints of a legal code.

By the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life, we have now by legislation to give it movement and will.

But what, after all, is a law?

But when the whole people decrees for the whole people, it is considering only itself; and if a relation is then formed, it is between two aspects of the entire object, without there being any division of the whole. In that case the matter about which the decree is made is, like the decreeing will, general. This act is what I call a law.




Rousseau comes to define the republic along these lines.

On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business it is to make laws, since they are above the law, since he is a member of the State; nor whether the law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself; nor how we can be both free and subject to the laws, since they are but registers of our will.
We see further that, as the law unites universality of object, what a man, whoever he be, commands of his own motion cannot be a law; and even what the sovereign command with regard to a particular matter is no nearer being a law, but is a decree, an act, not of sovereignty, but of magistracy.
I therefore give the name ‘Republic’ to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a case does the public interest govern, and the res publica rank as a reality. Every legitimate government is republican .. 




The republic, then, as the state that is governed by laws, is so organised that the people is always sovereign. This is so whatever the specific form this republic takes. The republic is a government in which the people consent to its actions given that these are what the people as a whole want. The republic, in short, is so organised as to translate the popular will into public action so as to attain the ends that the people would have achieve. In other words, the republic is that government which is based upon the sovereignty of the people and embodies and articulates the general will of the people.

Rousseau’s republic is an ideal political society. There is, therefore, the suggestion that it is merely an ideal and that Rousseau, therefore, is not arguing that such republics exist or, even, could exist. There is, therefore, a controversy here to be cleared up. Rousseau is making a moral statement of what ought to be. The state ought to rest upon reason rather than force and ought to embody the principle of the general will as sovereign. Is Rousseau’s work, then, simply a work of moral philosophy without practical implications? If so, Rousseau’s social contract would be a normative argument as opposed to a factual account.

The problem with interpreting Rousseau as a normative philosopher only is that one risks ending up with an impotent ‘ought to be’ that lacks critical purchase in relation to the ‘is’. There can be no doubt, however, that Rousseau does attempt to bring the ideal into the real. Rousseau is not simply arguing that sovereignty ought to rest with the people but that it actually does derive from the people and hence can be recovered and exercised by the people. Of course, Rousseau is aware that in existing states this popular sovereignty has been alienated. He is aware that the general will is not sovereign in those empirical states of his day. Rousseau’s political theory thus becomes a theory critical of the empirical political order. For what Rousseau’s argument shows is that whilst the general will exists it is not necessarily sovereign. Rousseau’s moral argument that the general will ought to be sovereign translates therefore into a critical and transformative approach to the empirical political order.

One of the main tasks of The Social Contract is to show how the general will can be made sovereign through the creation of the institutional mechanisms enabling its embodiment and expression; thus the general will is translated into a public form.

Thus, the general will exists and, whatever the existing political form, will always tend to be sovereign. The more general the will that governs the state, the more sovereign it is. No existing government, whatever its specific form, can hold out against a general will that is opposed to that government. In political reality, the policies of the government are subject to the pressure of individuals and groups, from partial wills. What Rousseau is seeking to achieve is that form of state in which the citizens, having formed themselves into a coherent body, are able to give expression to a will that is greater than their partial wills and is thus able to make the general will sovereign in the state. Thus Rousseau deals with the eminently practical problems of finding that form of government in which the executive, whatever the specific form that it takes, is subject to the sovereign general will of the citizens.

In conclusion, therefore, Rousseau’s argument is a mixture of the normative and the factual, the ideal and the real. In arguing that the general will ought to be sovereign, Rousseau is presenting a vision of an ideal political society. The question is whether this ideal can be realised and whether Rousseau offers the conditions of its realisation. If this political society is ‘merely’ an ideal, then realisation will never be achieved; the best that is possible is an approximation in which the executive of the state corresponds to the general will only so far as it possibly can.

The institutional mechanisms through which the general will is expressed are always imperfect. The problem with making these concessions to the empirical political order is that it effectively vitiates the critical impact of Rousseau’s argument, weakening his ‘ought to be’ as a mere idealism that can be safely rejected as utopian. One therefore returns to the view which acknowledges that no state can ever completely conform to the general will, even if one could argue that such a will can be identified as existing. This vitiates Rousseau’s criticism precisely because it acknowledges that any political society that could be possibly realised must share the same imperfections for which the existing political society is criticised, in however lesser an extent.

Rousseau, then, has problems reconciling the ideal and the real. For those who would interpret Rousseau as a democratic philosopher, the reference to the Legislator at the end of SC II.vi is most controversial. For it introduces an authoritarian and elitist figure that Rousseau goes on to assign an important place to.

The introduction of the Legislator seems such an abstract, purely artificial solution to what Rousseau has identified as a real problem. Is the Legislator merely an expedient device? It seems as though Rousseau, as soon as he confronts the practical problem of formulating a body of law to express the will of the sovereign people, is forced to have recourse to this fictional device of ‘the Legislator’. The people might well be ‘incorruptible’ but it nevertheless can be mistaken as regards its true common interest. Rousseau, in chapter vi, has raised the danger of the people as a ‘blind multitude’ failing to recognise and realise its common interest. Indeed, in this chapter, Rousseau is so impressed by the danger of the people failing to recognise the good that it wills that he is forced to invoke ‘the Legislator’ as a theoretical necessity. The Legislator is a device to which Rousseau has recourse. However, it not only appears to be an illusory solution to a real problem but actually appears to be inconsistent with the actively democratic impulse of Rousseau’s theory.

Rousseau introduces the Legislator when making the argument that the aim in view is government subject to law. The aim is a government, of whatever form, in which the people rule themselves. For the people who are subject to the law are themselves the author of this law (II.vi). The law that is obeyed by the people is the expression of their own will and is freely consented to by the people. Thus, the specific form of government is a secondary consideration to ensuring that government is actually of, for and by the people as sovereign.

Rousseau, however, has to introduce the figure of the Legislator precisely because he recognises that the individual, unaided, will not necessarily create that form of government enabling the people to rule itself. It is not difficult to conceive of those forms of government based upon the people abandoning its claim to rule itself. Such government persists by the exercise of force rather than through the expression of the general will. In this case the people will indeed require the expertise of the Legislator as someone who is able to find that form of government which conforms to the needs of the people.

Put this way, one appreciates how Rousseau has come to confront the age old problem of the radical thinker: how to find an agency that is able to move beyond the present society as corrupt and unenlightened, recognising that in such a society the people themselves must also be corrupt and unenlightened. Rousseau argues that ‘The general will is always right, but the judgement guiding it is not always enlightened’ (II.6). Individuals may therefore require guidance in order to bring them to the awareness of the interdependence of their own well-being and that of the community as a whole. The need for such guidance lies behind the figure of the Lawgiver which inhabits Rousseau’s political writings. Not until Marx did radical politics have an adequate solution to this paradox of emancipation. The age old ‘solution’ to this age old problem had been the figure of the lawgiver, a Lycurgus or a Utopos. Rousseau presents his argument thus:

In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a superior intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of them would be needed. This intelligence would have to be wholly unrelated to our nature, while knowing it through and through; its happiness would have to be independent of us, and yet ready to occupy itself with ours; and lastly, it would have, in the march of time, to look forward to a distant glory, and, working in one century, to be able to enjoy in the next. It would take gods to give men laws.
He who dares to undertake the making of a people’s institutions ought to feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his life and being; of altering man’s constitution for the purpose of strengthening it; and of substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all. He must, in a word, take away from man his own resources and give him instead new ones alien to him, and incapable of being made use of without the help of other men. The more completely these natural resources are annihilated, the greater and the more lasting are those which he acquires, and the more stable and perfect the new institutions; so that if each citizen is nothing and can do nothing without the rest, and the resources acquired by the whole are equal or superior to the aggregate of the resources of all the individuals, it may be said that legislation is at the highest possible point of perfection.
The Legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State. If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty. This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire; for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work.

Thus in the task of legislation we find together two things which appear to be incorruptible: an enterprise too difficult for human powers, and, for its execution, an authority that is no authority.
There is a further difficulty that deserves attention. Wise men, if they try to speak their language to the common herd instead of its own, cannot possibly make themselves understood. There are a thousand kinds of ideas which it is impossible to translate into popular language. Conceptions that are too general and objects that are too remote are equally out of its range: each individual, having no taste for any other plan of government than that which suits his particular interest, finds it difficult to realize the advantages he might hope to draw from the continual privations good laws impose. For a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law. The Legislator therefore, being unable to appeal to either force or reason, must have recourse to an authority of a different order, capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing.
 This is what has, in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with their own wisdom, in order that the peoples, submitting to the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognising the same power in the formation of the city as in that of man, might obey freely, and beat with docility the yoke of the public happiness.




The Legislator thus appears as a genius, a superior being who, by a higher insight or intelligence, is able to discern the conditions likely to mature in the future through the factors and forces unfolding in the present. The Legislator uses this insight into conditions to create the most appropriate laws and institutions and hence secure the efficient separation and preservation of the state.

The Lawgiver indicates a certain lack of faith on Rousseau’s part in the capacity of human beings to form themselves as a citizen body and administer the laws to themselves. For Rousseau conceives the Lawgiver to be the superior being who, in creating the principal laws of the State, is actually the creator of the State as such. The Lawgiver is responsible for facilitating the transition from selfish interest to enlightened self-interest through the individual’s entry into and participation in the civil association.

Empirically, there is no lack of evidence to support Rousseau’s assertions concerning the Legislator. Rousseau is clearly thinking of the practise in the Greek city-states to invite distinguished citizens of aliens to construct constitutions for them. Indeed, Rousseau himself came to be asked to write constitutions for Poland and for Corsica. The figure Lycurgus, then, was far from dead in constitution making. Rousseau, indeed, took his invitations seriously and took care to study the conditions of Poland and Corsica in order to determine which kind of constitution would be most appropriate for each.

The Lawgiver reveals a certain ambiguity in Rousseau’s conception of authority. The role of the Lawgiver is akin to the role of Émile’s tutor: Émile ought to follow ‘nature’ and yet requires a guide to show him the path to follow. Rousseau’s political principles clearly affirm a self-assumed political obligation implying a self-governing society. Founded upon popular consent and active sovereignty, Rousseau’s political principles are inherently democratic. Yet the recourse to the superior being of the Lawgiver betrays a certain scepticism on Rousseau’s part with regard to the capacity of human beings to translate principle into practice. 

The interesting question to pose is the extent to which human beings, as rational beings, are capable of composing themselves as some form of collective Legislator, educating themselves and attaining enlightenment by changing the corrupted circumstances in which they find themselves. One should guard against identifying the figure of the Legislator too easily with a single individual, a modern Lycurgus. There is no reason to deny that the Legislator could be a body of individuals. If this possibility is allowed, then Rousseau’s Legislator appears a lot less anachronistic. For the American Constitution itself could be argued to have been delivered to the people by a ‘Legislator’; and there is nothing in Rousseau’s argument to rule out a constitutional convention acting as the Legislator. Moreover, since the Legislator has an extra-constitutional position and function it thus forms no part of the constitution produced nor its operation. Thus the Legislator possesses the authority to construct a constitution and to present it to the people for their acceptance. But the Legislator does not have the power to impose or enforce this acceptance.

Whether Rousseau’s Legislator can be reconciled with democratic principles is questionable. The Legislator appears to be a fundamentally undemocratic device. Rousseau, confronted with the problem of how the theory of popular sovereignty may be translated into practical arrangements, retreats from concrete realities back, not to his own democratic principles but to an abstraction which violates those principles. Lawful freedom as the basis of the legitimate political society remains a valid principle. So, too, does popular sovereignty. But Book II concludes with the question begging device of the Legislator, throwing the whole theory into doubt. It is difficult to see how such an ‘extraordinary’ character, office or position can be anything but an extra-popular, extra-political device. The Legislator is a figure that is a supreme ideal raised above the people.

There is no doubt that, for those presenting Rousseau as a democratic theorist, the figure of the Legislator causes immense difficulty. Rousseau is arguing that the Legislator is necessary to every state. But how can this be so if the people are sovereign? This apparent contradiction can be explained only if one considers the Legislator as personifying the ‘spirit’ of the laws and the institutions. In the fully developed political society, the position of the Legislator is assumed by the ‘spirit’ i.e. the custom, the tradition and organisation, associated with the state. Rousseau makes this clear when he argues that the Legislator is not to exercise legislative power but, rather, may only propose certain courses of action pending popular approval. This is perfectly consistent with Rousseau’s basic theme of the will as opposed to force as forming the basis of the state.

Thus, whilst the privileging of the Legislator would appear inconsistent with the democratic interpretation of Rousseau’s theory, there are qualifications to be made upon the function and the character of the Legislator which make it perfectly compatible with a democratic interpretation. It could nevertheless still be argued that Rousseau’s way of expressing himself is misleading and invites dangerous interpretation. It is dangerous, for instance, to identify the Legislator as holy and religious, as Rousseau does. The Legislator is not supra-human and it is merely to invite distortion to suggest otherwise. The Legislator, whether an individual or group of individuals in a constitutional convention, has to be related to the individuals to whom a constitution is to be proposed for their approval. Rousseau’s motives, seeming to both propose and deny divine intervention, cannot be grasped. What is true is that the argument is phrased in a misleading way and detracts from what is defensible and sober in Rousseau’s presentation of the Legislator.

For, beneath the claim to divine inspiration and sanction, Rousseau is actually making a serious argument concerning the construction of a political order. The constitution by which any political order is to be governed has to be provided by someone, some group, from somewhere. And Rousseau’s objective is that such a constitution should embody and express the sovereignty of the general will. And Rousseau acknowledges that constitution making is itself a complex task. The study of conditions and the framing of its points require expertise. Rousseau is thus attempting to avoid the extremes of having the constitution determined by the people’s will as it presently exists on the one hand and the arbitrary and authoritarian imposition of the Legislator on the other. Neither of these are able to offer viable and lasting solutions to the problem of providing an appropriate constitution. Rousseau himself assumes a fairly high degree of political maturity on the part of the people; the people are mature enough to appreciate the need for a constitution and invite the Legislator to frame and propose a constitution. The people, therefore, are already thinking politically and are already constituting themselves into a political order. The people, then, are receptive to constitution making and will be inclined to accept the constitution it deems most appropriate to its needs.

But Rousseau does recognise a paradox in this position. The people are mature politically but not mature enough to already have a constitution. The highest degree of maturity would be achieved only under a suitable constitution. It follows that without this constitution, the people are relatively immature and hence require a constitution, but given this immaturity, cannot supply it to themselves. This is the paradox of emancipation again. And this paradox justifies the intervention of this supra-constitutional and, indeed, supra-popular figure of the Legislator.

But the Legislator is not the product of divine intervention, however much its ‘superhuman’ character may make this appear so. The Legislator simply cannot appear from nowhere, from the heavens, with a ready made constitution to impose. Rousseau recognises that any constitution must be appropriate to the needs of the people and the conditions of the place.

Rousseau’s position is therefore organic rather than abstractly rational. The constitution has to be framed so as to correspond to the conditions in which it is applied. And in application the constitution develops and grows and adapts. Thus the people develop and grow and become politically mature enough to modify the constitution themselves according to their needs.

In time, the people themselves are capable of assuming the position and the function of the Legislator, are capable of supplying the constitution to themselves. Only thus is it possible, on Rousseau’s terms, to escape the paradox of emancipation and hence avoid invoking the Legislator as a divinely intervening superhuman.

The Lawgiver therefore has something of a self-abolishing character. The Lawgiver’s role is to make people aware of the possibilities which are immanent in the community but which can only be fulfilled if people act upon them. The Lawgiver enables individuals to identify the moral and political possibilities that exist in their own character, but Rousseau is clear that it is the citizens and the citizens alone who have the responsibility of determining their own future.
Thus it is the political maturity of the people themselves and the form of constitutionally based government which develop and grow together so as to issue in an ever more effective, self-regulating and democratic form.

12 FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
Book III

The principles upon which Rousseau founds the political association – the social contract, general will, sovereignty, and law – form the basis of all valid constitutions, regardless of their particular form.

In contrast to other contract theorists, Rousseau did not admit the legitimacy of any kind of contractual relationship between sovereign and government. On the contrary, the only true contract for Rousseau is the one through which the citizens, of their own free will, create the civil association. Since the citizens retain rather surrender their legislative power, the rulers are merely ‘officers’ or ‘commissioners’ who the people empower to perform certain tasks and functions. Government members are permanently responsible to the people and must always be accountable for their actions; the people can remove the rulers from office at any time. The power of the government is therefore secondary and derivative; real power originates and permanently resides in the people. The role of the government is to carry out the orders of the general will; lacking the power to initiate laws, the government is simply the executive instrument of the sovereign will. As Rousseau states, the government is the force or physical component of the State, the sovereign is its heart and will. In fine, the executive body an ‘emanation’ of and hence is dependent upon the general will and sovereignty. The people can autonomize itself from government but the government cannot autonomize itself from the people. The government has no independent existence and can never exist in its own right; it has only ‘a borrowed or subordinate life’ (III.1).

Whilst Rousseau argues against the separation of powers, he places especial emphasis on the point that the government must have its own distinctive function. Superficially, one might expect Rousseau to affirm the unity of the sovereign and government, in the sense of the ‘body’ directly carrying out the wishes of the ‘soul’. Rousseau, however, rules this out. He reasons that in assuming the executive in addition to the legislative function, thus being engaged in carrying out its own laws, there would be a real danger of the sovereign coming to neglect its overriding concern with the common good.

There is a need to understand precisely Rousseau’s terminology and meaning. Sovereignty and government are inextricably connected with the different functions exercised by the members of the political association. For Rousseau, the people as a whole can always be considered from two distinct points of view: as sovereign, the people have a clearly defined role in the initiating of legislation; as the ‘state’, the people are also ‘subjects’, obeying the laws which they create as sovereign. Rousseau’s statement that the government exists ‘between the whole and the whole’ points to the intermediary role of the government between these two functions; the government transmits the people’s orders as ‘sovereign’ to the people itself as ‘subjects’.

This conception is crucial to the understanding of the nature of ‘government’. Rousseau employs the term ‘democracy’ in the ancient sense of government by the people acting as a single body and exercising both legislative and executive functions. This is plainly a very different notion to the representative government that is central to the theory and practice of the modern state. Rousseau believes that such ‘democracy’ is impracticable in the large state and can be applied only within a small State; he also thinks that the only people who could make democracy function are ‘gods’ or beings capable of a superhuman subordination of their passions and feelings to rational control. Which begs the question of the possibility of real individuals being able to practise and sustain democratic government.

Book III passes from the theory of the ideal political society, via the Legislator, to the problem of government. This book concerns government and its forms. Rousseau thus addresses the problem of how government is to function.
Rousseau relates this to his previous discussion. In dealing with Rousseau’s argument here it needs to be remembered that government, for Rousseau, is an intermediary body between the people as sovereign and the people as subject. Thus government provides the means whereby the sovereign people gives expression to its will. Government is thus the organ through which the popular will is expressed.

We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the principles laid down above, that the executive power cannot belong to the generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws.
The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is.

What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and political.

The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say governors, and the whole body bears the name prince. Thus those who hold that the act, by which a people puts itself under a prince, is not a contract, are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify, or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body, and contrary to the aim of the association.




Government is, therefore, an intermediate agency between the sovereign and subject. The government assumes the legitimate exercise of exercise power. The government, whatever form that it takes, exists by virtue of the sovereign. This sovereignty is revocable and may be taken back by individuals if government acts contrary to the interests of the community.

For government to function effectively, however, it must be assigned a personality and an executive will of its own as distinct from the body politic upon which its legitimacy and legal authority rests. There is a possible tension here, as one moves from the ideal to the real, which, if it develops into an outright contradiction, can be resolved in a way that is consistent with Rousseau’s principles by subordinating the government to the people rather than vice versa. Rousseau comes to consider in turn the various forms of government – democratic, aristocratic, monarchical and mixed – with an eye on these tensions. Rousseau thus passes from an abstract and theoretical treatment of the subject to the more empirical problem of the forms of government.

The argument that Rousseau makes with regard to government is that it is the necessary organ of the general will. Without government, the general will is impotent. The corollary of Rousseau’s argument is that the various forms of government are to be evaluated according to their efficacy in expressing the general will. It is interesting that Rousseau is thus, by this criterion, able to argue that democracy is not necessarily the most appropriate form of government. Since the general will depends upon the size and character of the people, it is not possible to prioritise any one form of government as the absolute best.





The form of government which is appropriate to one kind of people may conceivably be a tyranny for another kind of people. Thus, a densely populated country will require a different form of government to a sparsely populated country; a maritime nation will require a different form of government to an agricultural nation, and so on. Thus, politics has to recognise the balance of principles and conditions which would provide the best form of government. This is a complex business and cannot be solved absolutely on paper. Expertise in this political task means something more than the knowledge of general theoretical principles; it requires an empirical appreciation of customs and conditions of a people so as to know how to translate principles into the political form of the constitution. Rousseau makes and develops these points in SC II.x. In Book III it is the different forms of government that are at the centre of the analysis. Thus Rousseau classifies government according to the number of individuals composing government.

In the first place, the Sovereign may commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the majority of the people, so that more citizens are magistrates than are mere private individuals. This form of government is called democracy.
Or it may restrict the government to a small number, so that there are more private citizens than magistrates; and that is named aristocracy.
Lastly, it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all others hold their power. This third form is the most usual, and is called monarchy, or royal government.




On this reasoning it is difficult to argue which is, absolutely, the best form of government. It all depends upon the conditions, the number of individuals composing the government. In weighing the relative merits of democracy and monarchy, therefore, Rousseau has to make reference to these qualifying points:

There has been at all times much dispute concerning the best form of government, without consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the best, and in others the worst.




Rousseau’s argument is tantamount to claiming that in large states democracy is inappropriate and inapplicable. Democratic government is possible only in small states. The democrat, therefore, must be committed to an extensive project of decentralisation in the large states if democratic government is ever to be realised. It is interesting that in criticising Hegel’s rejection of the democratic principle that all could participate in government, Marx argued for the decentralisation of political power through its investment in the social body from which it originated (Marx EW 1975).

Rousseau is not a relativist. He does believe that it is possible to establish certain principles according to which the government most appropriate to each state may be judged. Thus, large government is justified in some kinds of state on account of its advantages in certain areas; it does however make monarchy, the government by a single individual, necessary. Rousseau makes the point that:

the total force of the government, being always that of the State, is invariable; so that, the more of this force it expends on its own members, the less it has left to employ on the whole people.
The more numerous the magistrates, therefore, the weaker the government. This principle being fundamental, we must do our best to make it clear.




Thus, each individual has his or her own interests as an individual but also shares interests with other individuals in the group. These interests reinforce each other in so far as they interconnect. Where this is not the case, however, these interests have the effect of pulling the individual in separate ways at the same time. Thus, the magistrate has interests as an individual, interests as a magistrate and interests shared in common with other citizens. The different interests need to be reconciled and brought into harmony so as to become mutually reinforcing as opposed to pulling in different directions and hence becoming self-destructive. Thus the state secures the long term good of the whole community by managing to combine the various particular wills of the community so as to subordinate them to the general interest.

In a perfect act of legislation, the individual or particular will should be at zero; the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very subordinate position; and, consequently, the general or sovereign will should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest.
According to the natural order, on the other hand, these different wills become more active in proportion as they are concentrated. Thus, the general will is always the weakest, the corporate will the second, and the individual will the strongest of all: so that, in the government, each member is first of all himself, then a magistrate, and then a citizen – in an order exactly the reverse of what the social system requires.
This granted, if the whole government is in the hands of one man, the particular and the corporate will are wholly united, and consequently the latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity. But, as the use to which the force is put depends on the degree reached by the will, and as the absolute force of the government is invariable, it follows that the most active government is that of one man.
Suppose, on the other hand, we unite the government with the legislative authority, and make the Sovereign prince also, and all the citizens so many magistrates: then the corporate will, being confounded with the general will, can possess no greater activity than that will, and must leave the particular will as strong as it can possibly be. Thus, the government, having always the same absolute force, will be at the lowest point of its relative force of activity.
These relations are incontestable, and there are other considerations which still further confirm them. We can see, for instance, that each magistrate is more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to which he belongs, and that consequently the particular will has much more influence on the acts of the government than on those of the Sovereign; for each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental functions, while each citizen, taken singly, exercises no function of Sovereignty. Furthermore, the bigger the State grows, the more its real force increases, though not in direct proportion to its growth; but, the State remaining the same, the number of magistrates may increase to any extent, without the government gaining any real force; for its real force is that of the State, the dimension of which remains equal. Thus the relative force or activity of the government decreases, while its absolute or real force cannot increase.
Moreover, it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more people are put in charge of it: where prudence is made too much of, not enough is made of fortune; opportunity is let slip, and deliberation results in the loss of its object.
I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.








The first form of government that Rousseau examines is democracy.

He who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed or interpreted. It seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded, and the prince and the Sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak, no more than a government without government.




Rousseau finds the conditions of democracy as an ideal form lacking in real society. Rousseau is thus led to repudiate democracy as a practical possibility.

If we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. It is unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their time to public affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose without the form of administration being changed.

Rousseau even goes so far as to acknowledge a basic tenet of elitist theory, that power tends to concentrate in the smallest number of hands.





The conditions of democracy are too numerous and too difficult to obtain to make democracy a realistic form of government. Rousseau, on the level of practical philosophy, thus repudiates the democratic premises of his philosophy. There are, then, limits in practice to Rousseau’s democratic social contract.

Besides, how many conditions that are difficult to unite does such a government presuppose! First, a very small State, where the people can readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the rest; secondly, great simplicity of manners, to prevent business from multiplying and raising thorny problems; next, a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist; lastly, little or no luxury – for luxury either comes of riches or makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor, the rich by possession and the poor by covetousness; it sells the country to softness and vanity, and takes away from the State all its citizens, to make them slaves one to another, and one and all to public opinion.

The practical realisation of the democratic principle of active sovereignty would therefore require the creation of a political movement aiming to decentralise and diffuse power so that all may participate in decision making, social equality, the creation of a social identity so that the private good and the public good coincide. Rousseau’s principles justify such a project of democratisation. But Rousseau was not a member of such a project and could not envisage the social forces and agencies capable of initiating and sustaining such a project. Instead, Rousseau is a political philosopher concerned to determine the most realistic form of government. And his verdict here goes against democracy: ‘Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men’ (SC III.iv).

Rousseau turns his attention to aristocracy.

The first societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads of families took counsel together on public affairs. The young bowed without question to the authority of experience. Hence such names as priests, elders, senate, and gerontes. The savages of North America govern themselves in this way even now, and their government is admirable.
But, in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions because predominant over natural inequality, riches or power were put before age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father’s power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be senators of twenty.
There are then three sorts of aristocracy – natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.
Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular government, all the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy is confined to a few, who become such only by election. By this means uprightness, understanding, experience, and all other claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government.
Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is unknown or despised.




Rousseau’s positive evaluation of aristocracy is even more idealistic than the democratic premises he affirms on a philosophical basis, only to reject in practice. Rousseau asserts that it is best and natural when the few wise govern the – less wise – many. So long, that is, as it can be assured that the few will govern in the public interest. Rousseau’s argument here is weak since it presumes what is to be demonstrated – that a form of government does indeed serve the public interest. The mechanisms serving the public interest have to be shown. Rousseau must confront the old question of who guards the guardians. Instead, there is the question-begging assertion that government by the few wise is best and natural.

In groping towards the most realistic form of government, Rousseau comes to evaluate mixed government.

Simple government is better in itself, just because it is simple. But when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the legislative power, i.e. when the prince is more closely related to the Sovereign than the people to the prince, this lack of proportion must be cured by the division of the government; for all the parts have then no less authority over the subjects, while their division makes them all together less strong against the Sovereign.
The same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of intermediate magistrates, who leave the government entire, and have the effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective rights. Government is then not mixed, but moderated.




In terms of practical politics, Rousseau compromises and settles for mixed government as the best fit for people and places caught between the ideal and real.

13 HOW THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY MAINTAINS ITSELF

Since government is the intermediate body through which the people translates its will into political action, it can be argued that the role of the people is not exhausted when a specific form of government has been decided upon and posts have been allotted. The people remain sovereign and hence can, in the very least, subject the government to account in periodic election, but most importantly to recall. The power that the Sovereign invests in government is revocable. The people can always change government and find another government to express its popular will.









Rousseau re-affirms the sovereign power of the demos in making these points:

The moment the people is legitimately assembled as a sovereign body, the jurisdiction of the government wholly lapses, the executive power is suspended, and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate; for in the presence of the person represented, representatives no longer exist.

The health and strength of any body politic is conditional upon the public concern of the people, the extent to which the citizens constituting the demos are prepared to exercise their sovereign power.





Rousseau affirms that public officials are servants of the people, concerned with the public interest.

What we have just said .. makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience; and that in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.
When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.
It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.
It is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe, in such cases, all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate act from a seditious tumult, and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a faction. Here above all no more weight should be given to invidious cases than that which is demanded by the strictest interpretation of the law.
The periodic assemblies .. are designed to prevent or postpone this calamity, above all when they need no formal summoning; for in that case, the prince cannot stop them without openly declaring himself a law breaker and an enemy of the State.
The opening of these assemblies, whose sole object is the maintenance of the social treaty, should always take the form of putting two propositions that may not be suppressed, which should be voted on separately.




It is not essential that when the people vote on these and other questions that unanimity be achieved. For





Beyond this social contract it is the vote of the majority which ‘always obliges all the others’. However the existence of a simple majority is not always decisive.

A difference of one vote destroys equality; a single opponent destroys unanimity; but between equality and unanimity, there are several grades of unequal division, at each of which this proportion may be fixed in accordance with the condition and the needs of the body politic.






The argument in Book III which is of the greatest theoretical interest concerns representation. Rousseau’s argument here, indeed, applies to more than the principle of representation. Rousseau is highly critical of a society in which commerce has become more important than politics, in which citizens are more concerned with their private affairs than with their public capacity.

Rousseau is concerned with the health and preservation of the State. For Rousseau, this requires that the authority of the sovereign people must be continuously activated, which in practice means popular assemblies and the participation of the people. Rousseau presents a conception of active democracy that is quite distinct from liberal democracy. Power is not something external to Rousseau but is something internal, inhering in the demos. The liberal conception of democracy as method, as an institutional check upon power, is illegitimate in terms of Rousseau’s positive conception. This conception implies radical democracy.

For Rousseau, the general will could not be represented. This would be an act of ‘alienation’, the destruction of the essential character of human beings as inwardly governed moral beings. The only representation that Rousseau permitted was in what he called ‘government’, a provisional institution which is wholly subordinate to the ‘people’ and formed by the social contract. Ultimately, one must conclude that beyond politics and institutions, Rousseau sought nothing less than the reign of virtue (Forsyth 1994:40).

The health and purity of political society can be preserved only if the strength and the purity of the general will could be maintained. This requires the creation of political institutions adequate to the task. Rousseau is looking to create a citizenship infused with a sense of public responsibility. Citizens must be prepared to participate in public affairs, must vote and must, indeed, be ready to undertake public office. Rousseau thus affirms a conception of active sovereignty in which individuals would think, act and assume responsibility as citizens.

As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens, and they would rather serve with their money than with their persons, the State is not far from its fall … By reason of idleness and money, they end by having soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it.
It is through the hustle of commerce and the arts, through the greedy self-interest of profit, and through softness and love of amenities that personal services are replaced by money payments. Men surrender a part of their profits in order to have time to increase them at leisure. Make gifts of money, and you will not be long without chains. The word ‘finance’ is a slavish word, unknown in the city state.

Rousseau sought to canalise the energy expended in the private economy into the public realm, creating a citizenship which is infused with a sense of public responsibility. Rousseau saw the necessity of creating a public life which individuals as citizens would be willing to participate in. In the best state, the citizens are more concerned with the public interest, as ultimately in their own interest, than with their own private gain. These would enable individuals to assert and express themselves as citizens, ‘not with their purses, but with their persons’ (Contract III, 15 428).





Rousseau thus hoped to encourage individuals to channel their aspirations and energies toward the achievement of communal ends. Not only would they distinguish themselves in virtue in the process, they would also achieve individuality.

To serve the state ‘not with their purses but with their persons’ required active participation in the governmental process. Rousseau argued for the participatory conception of citizenship not for its efficiency in producing effective government but for the authenticity it achieved. Participation in public life implied the capacity to shape one’s future, to subject the forces that control the lives of all members of the community to conscious control, to bring thought and action together. For this reason, Rousseau criticised representation as slavery (Contract III 15 428-30). Rousseau left the institutional forms of this participation unclear. He distinguished the ultimate power of sovereignty, located in and retained by the people, from the actual operation of the government, which could be undertaken by an aristocracy (Shklar Two Models 38). Rousseau valued highly the practice of the ancient Greeks, who were ‘constantly assembled in the public square’ (Contract III 15 430). Whilst he recognised that such arrangements were impractical in modern society, Rousseau heavily circumscribed the area of governmental discretion and insisted that the government be subject to popular instruction on all matters. 
To engage and fulfil individuals in this sense, the state needed to provide extensive public spaces. Rousseau switches the emphasis towards popular sovereignty and the reign of virtue, underpinned by the contract (Jennings 1994:120). Rousseau defines a two step citizen deliberation through which the individual foregoes policies in their private interest in favour of policies which affect the individual equally with others (Barry in Quinton ed 1967:122).

There is a sense here in which democracy necessarily involves participation. ‘It is always a question of how much participation’ (Penncock 1978). It is the contention of participatory theorists (such as Pateman) against liberal democrats that voting is insufficient in itself. A participatory democracy is one in which the basic determining decisions within social life are made by the people actively participating in an extended political process.

In a large state which attempts to govern itself under a democratic form, the functions which are performed under a monarchy by royal ministries are assumed by representatives chosen by the people themselves. But Rousseau goes further than this. For it is clear that in such a large state representatives are necessary given that the tasks of administration are too complex to be assumed by the people themselves. Hence the need for representatives chosen by the people. But Rousseau’s critique of represented sovereignty entails the rejection of not only of attempting to run a large state by a democratic form of government but of large state’s themselves as a denial of popular sovereignty. In the large state the citizens are compelled to surrender their sovereignty as their fundamental right and duty.





In arguing that citizens must have ‘enough of a share in the public administration for them to feel at home’ (Economy 258), Rousseau makes it clear that his advocacy of participatory citizen democracy is concerned with achieving authenticity, bringing the human-made world under the control and comprehension of the people so that the people can recognise themselves in a world that they have created. In such a participatory public life, the citizen could ‘play his own role’, so that ‘the man and the role being the same, he is in his place’ (81). The good person and the good citizen, held apart since Aristotle, ‘could be united into one’, so that ‘we could resolve man’s self-contradictions, and remove the one great obstacle to his happiness’.

Rousseau sought to unite homme and citoyen into the one ideal on the grounds that the personal needs and aspirations of the individual could only be achieved through participation and activity in a public life. This was not a case of individuals having to sacrifice their private interest to the public realm; Rousseau is clear that the public life could only satisfy individuals if they already had a measure of private happiness.





The institutional separation of the state from civil society was associated with the dualism of ‘public’ versus ‘private’, bifurcating individual identity so that each and all end up leading a dual existence in society.

Rousseau’s argument here is of great significance with regard to the general will. The general will has attracted most attention in Rousseau’s political philosophy. Critics have found it either dangerous or redundant. There is a doubt as to whether the doctrine of the general will could be translated into practice in any form other than an artificial collectivity.

Yet, not only is the general will the central concept in Rousseau’s theory, it is also an original and stimulating contribution to the moral justification of the state and of political obligation. The general will is crucial in securing Rousseau’s argument that the state should rest upon reason and morality as opposed to force and fraud.

There have, of course, been serious reservations expressed as regards the general will. If these reservations are even partly justified then there is no doubt that the force of Rousseau’s political theory would be seriously weakened. Major question marks have been raised as to whether the general will could be applied to the large states of the modern world. This reservation can be dealt with theoretically. Rousseau, it can readily be submitted, was not attempting to theorise the modern nation state. Indeed, Rousseau’s work on sovereignty and representation could be developed into a critique of the modern state in favour of a diffusion of power sustaining something akin to a civil public sphere embodying an active conception of democracy.

More important here is the view that Rousseau’s view of the general will is a voluble but ultimately unstable mix of incompatible elements, something which ensures that a fundamentally democratic theory comes to resolve itself into the practice of the totalitarian state.

It is argued that in the modern state and, indeed, in modern pluralist society, the very notion of such a thing as the general will is dubious. The general will cannot but be a fictitious device through which to suppress particular interests in the name of some specious and non-existent common interest. In the modern state and society anything resembling a general will is the exception and of merely short duration. It is doubted whether the general will in the large state, given social and cultural plurality, can occur at all. Indeed, it is argued that since the emergence of a general will varies in inverse proportion with the size of the state, it is highly unlikely that such a will could emerge in the modern large nation state. Other than, that is, as a dangerous collectivist fiction that imposes a false unity upon the  plurality of social groups comprising modern society.

The general will, then, may emerge within a group of individuals and groups only if it can be established that there is a good that is common to all within the group. Rousseau made the claim that such a common good exists and can be identified and that, as a result, members of the group can be subordinated to the state for their own good. This forcing of individuals to be free is rejected by liberals as a denial of the moral autonomy and ontological primacy of the individual in the name of a common good of dubious status and validity. Only the thoroughgoing individualist would deny the possibility of certain goods existing which are common to a group of individuals. Nevertheless, the individualist liberal would argue that whilst this may be the case, it nevertheless seems to be the case that the greater the group, the greater the diversity of individual and group interests, the less likely the possibility that the general will exists or, even if it exists, of it being identified. Who or what is to identify, embody and enforce the general will and how is this to be done without turning compulsion into a totalitarian intervention into the life and liberty of the individual?

Rousseau may be defended by invoking the Aristotelian tradition against individualist liberalism. Notions of the general will and the common good need to be located in the organic conception of relations between the members of any group. The members of the group have a common life from which interests held in common arise. The individual as such, the individual as proposed by the liberal, is itself an abstraction from the organic relations pertaining in any society.

The atomistic liberal conception gains plausibility, however, in modern ‘bourgeois’ society. Such a society is not organic, its relations are instrumental, exchange based and external to individuals. Since modern society has become abstract to the individual, the individual can be abstracted from it. This being so, it becomes increasingly difficult to establish the organic relations which bring individuals together and hence which facilitate the emergence of a common interest. In such an ‘atomised’ society, in which social relations have become external to and independent of the individual, it does indeed seem implausible that the individual members of the group do possess goods, still less a single good, in common. Put another way, communality has been eliminated in bourgeois society; because this is so, the predication of any good which individuals hold in common, uniting them, becomes more abstract and external.

Which, in truth, should become a critique of the abstraction that rules modern society. For Rousseau’s argument proceeds from the Aristotelian premise that the individual develops his or her full and best self only when living in a community with other individuals. Life as an isolated being is bad given that the individual must relate to other individuals if his or her full and best self is to be realised. There must, in short, be an association of each with all for the good life to be realised and lived.

But Aristotle appreciated that such an association could not be possible once the state reached and passed beyond a certain size. Thus Aristotle argued that the size of the state had to be restricted if this principle of association is to be realised to ensure the full and best development of each individual. It is significant that Aristotle, the great realist of political philosophy, chose to write against the observable trend of his time by insisting that the size of the state be small and the polis be scaled to human dimensions.

There may seem to be an incongruity in the fact that Aristotle wrote of the city-state just as it was passing into history. Surely, Aristotle was aware of this trend and hence ought to have presented a more adequate treatment of the larger political units that were emerging. The truth is that, given the principle of humanly scaled association that he upheld, Aristotle could not but disapprove of the new, larger states that were emerging. For reasons which concerned the full and best development of the individual within organic relations, Aristotle could not approve of the existence of a state that was larger than the city-state. Aristotle, an alien and not a citizen of Athens, perhaps thought it prudent not to make his criticisms more explicit.

There are no grounds for unconditional obedience, not even active consent. Rousseau refused to allow individuals to give their government unconditional power. ‘To renounce one’s freedom is to renounce being a man, to surrender both the rights and the duties of humanity. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man’s nature, since, in removing all freedom from his will, it removes all morality from his actions’. For each individual to recognise a law as being his or her law requires that they prescribe it directly, not by proxy, through a representative. Rousseau thus condemned representation as ‘slavery’ on account of the fact that it denied citizens the opportunity to exercise choice themselves (III 15 428-31). It was this concern that law should embody personal choice that led Rousseau to abolish ‘partial societies within the state’. Whereas Hegel would value corporate bodies as intermediary associations giving members a form of public life and participation, Rousseau considered these corporate bodies as an obstacle to the principle that ‘each citizen should think only his own thoughts’ (II 3 372), mediating between individuals and the state and thus preventing individuals from coming to an independent judgement. The origin is the individualism that underlay Rousseau’s absolutism: the general will ensuring the transcendence of individuality was generated from the independent personal choices of individuals.

To those who would argue that Rousseau’s views are inappropriate in the age of large centralised nation states, it can be pointed out that for Rousseau these contemporary states and their institutions of representation did not, and possibly could never, function democratically. Rousseau himself was aware of the extent to which his own views were most appropriate to small states and doubted that his principle of active consent could function in the large nation state. Popular self-government could operate best in the small state in which it would be possible for citizens to actively participate in the common affairs. Ideally, Rousseau would have embarked upon the decentralisation of political power, making Europe a federation of small city states, as a condition of active consent. Arguably, Marx’s project of the practical reappropriation of power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation as social power within a civil society invested with governmental significance is of Rousseauan origin. It certainly resolves Rousseau’s central political problem.

Rousseau is not theorising the modern centralised nation state but popular sovereignty. If it is said that Rousseau’s theory is inappropriate to the modern state, one could, nevertheless, turn this round and argue that the modern state denies popular sovereignty as something other than nominal. Rousseau’s theory, then, becomes a critical tool for analysing empirical states. The state must be made to correspond to notions of the free, the democratic and the good as expressed in the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

Having made this point, one is in a position to better appreciate Rousseau’s points concerning sovereignty, representation and the general will. Rousseau’s argument is criticised for being inappropriate and dangerous in a large state. Rousseau may well have agreed with this criticism. Just as Aristotle preferred the city state to the growth of the imperial state, so Rousseau was not theorising the modern nation state but small city-states like his native Geneva. On account of his principles, then, Rousseau had, like Aristotle, to define his position in opposition to contemporary political developments with respect to the emergence of the modern nation state.

The realisation of Rousseau’s principles would entail the destruction of the modern nation state as inimical to the full and best development of the individual. For those who recognise the power of Rousseau’s moral justification of the scaled city-state but who would nevertheless argue that the modern state is an integral part of an irreversible and untranscendable modernity, there is a need for resolution of this issue. It could be argued that Hegel achieved the required resolution. Hegel’s state as ethical agency is the modern state as the embodiment of the general will. The problem is that once Rousseau’s strictures on the size of the state are removed, the general will becomes abstract and problematic, something of a collective and collectivising fiction. Marx would later criticise the hypostatisation of the state in Hegel, recognising that the hypostatisation lay not in Hegel’s concepts but in an inverted reality of which the state is an institutional expression (Marx EW 1975). Hegel’s state recognises the legitimacy of partial groups and intermediary bodies in their own sphere but justifies the state as an institution which transcends particularity to realise the general interest. Hegel’s political philosophy presupposes that this general interest exists in the first place, an assumption that Marx holds problematic in a class divided society. If the general interest really did exist, then it would not require the abstract body of the state to represent it. The flaw, Marx would come to argue, lies in the denial of real commonality and universality in real, civil, society, something for which the state cannot compensate for.

To those who would argue that Rousseau’s views are inappropriate in the age of large centralised nation states (Keane in McLellan and Sayers 1989; Bobbio 1988) it can be pointed out that for Rousseau these contemporary states and their representative institutions do not, and could never, function democratically. Popular self-government could operate best in the small state in which it would be possible for citizens to actively participate in the common affairs. Ideally, Rousseau would have embarked upon the decentralisation of political and institutional power, diffusing it amongst individual relations, making Europe a federation of small city states as a condition of active consent.

Carole Pateman describes Rousseau as a critic of the ‘fraudulent liberal social contract’ (Pateman 1985:142-62). Against the abstract egalitarian device of the liberal contract, Rousseau argues for a social contract in which obligated individuals are actively engaged in the making of the laws they subject themselves to. This is the contract which provides ‘an actual foundation for a participatory political order of the future’ (Pateman 1985:150). For Pateman, Rousseau’s democratic social contract offers a vision of association based on self-assumed obligation and of substantive equality between ‘active citizens who are political decision-makers’ (Pateman 1985).

The system of representation has been seen as the solution to the problem of scale which renders direct democracy impossible in modern, complex society. Participatory theory, however, is in part a reaction to the abstract character of representative democracy: ‘representation destroys participation and citizenship .. representative democracy is as paradoxical an oxymoron as our language has produced; its confused and failing practice makes this ever more obvious’ (Barber 1984).

When it is considered that Rousseau’s thought applies to the small state or community, his critique of representation comes to make greater sense than would otherwise be the case. The attempt to combine representative government with the general will must be problematic from Rousseau’s perspective. Indeed, it is much more likely that, on Rousseau’s premises, representative government will make the general will something abstract and opposed to democracy as identified with an active sovereignty.

Those who would argue that the modern state is a permanent institution would argue that representative government requires a more viable foundation than the concept of the general will. The problem with this position is that it must sacrifice principle to empirical reality rather than challenging and changing that reality via a principled and practical critique. What is at stake here is democracy as an active reality, not the second best, representative democracy that conforms to the anti-democratic modern state. For Rousseau, the viability of the general will formed the very basis of democracy; without the one there could not be the other. And Rousseau argued that sovereignty could neither be represented nor alienated. The general will could thus be embodied and expressed in states of or below a certain size. Rousseau thus rejected the large modern state as anti-democratic. In the small state alone would it be possible to practise a direct, participatory, active and non-representative democratic form of government.

The problem is, as Hegel appreciated, that the modern state is here to stay. Just as Aristotle’s city-state was passing into history at the moment Aristotle celebrated it in his Politics, so Rousseau’s small, autonomous state was rapidly giving way to the large nation state of the modern world. Such, at least, is the argument could be converted into a critique of the modern centralised and large state, Hegel took another direction, incorporating whatever could be salvaged from Rousseau’s case for the ethical state in his system of Sittlichkeit.

There is another view. It could be argued that Rousseau would have the world broken up into a federation of small states, each run on democratic principles. Such states would not necessarily be autonomous, in the sense of autarchic, but would instead be integrated in a greater whole. Such would be the most appropriate approach to the democratic organisation of common affairs in the modern world. Such an approach would make possible democratic forms of government.

The small state as something autonomous and apart from other states is a form of political organisation which appears somewhat reactionary in the modern context. It would not appear to be relevant to modern forms of political organisation. However, a federal political structure based upon principles of subsidiarity would seem perfectly applicable and would seem to offer a viable base for the exercise of sovereignty. The question of whether Rousseau’s conception of democracy is appropriate to the modern large state can, therefore, be broadened into the search for that form of political structure which would make Rousseau’s democratic principles relevant.

The main criticism of Rousseau has fallen upon his rejection of representation and his critical approach to partial societies. The implication is that Rousseau has failed to appreciate the need for institutional mechanisms and devices which would enable the application of the general will to proceed without destroying the freedom of citizens in their real lives. Without appropriate mechanisms and devices, the general will can tend to a totalitarian application. And the criticism is that Rousseau’s rejection of representative systems would seem to indicate that he has failed to provide the necessary mechanisms and devices for the exercise of sovereignty. In consequence, the practical application of Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will tends towards totalitarianism. Rousseau himself was well aware of the potential for the appropriation of the public name by a particular group or interest. The moral justification that Rousseau supplied for the state is here rendered null and void, but the appropriation does nevertheless lay claim to this moral significance.

The problem with the charge of totalitarianism as applied to Rousseau is that it proceeds only by rendering Rousseau’s arguments null and void. Remove the clauses that Rousseau made essential to his philosophy and what remains is not the philosophy of Rousseau. Thus, the conception of the general will is oriented towards totalitarianism only by making a number of distinctions that Rousseau himself ruled out. Thus, the state comes to be distinguished from the individuals composing it. The general will is distinguished from the empirical individuals to whom it is applied. This hypostatisation of the state and the general will which these distinctions invite is quite contrary to Rousseau. However, the hypostatisation of the modern state is not the product of Rousseau’s philosophy or of the misinterpretation of Rousseau’s philosophy. The hypostatisation of the state is the product of the fact that the modern state actually is an hypostatisation. This would be the point that Marx established in his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state as a rationalisation of the abstraction of the modern state. 

The tendency to hypostatisation clearly possesses implications as regards the attitudes displayed by individuals to the state. Thus there is a tendency to regard the state as an entity separate from the individuals composing it, possessing a will and logic of its own. The state comes to acquire an existential significance as though it were a real person itself; the state is larger than the real person itself; the state is larger than the real person and hence the state comes to be identified as the end towards which the individual life ought to be subordinated.

In considering this hypostatisation of the modern state, however, the thing to remember is Rousseau’s organic conception of the relations between the individuals composing the state. This conception is integral to Rousseau’s theory. Thus, the whole is dependent upon the relations between the individual members composing it and hence has no significance independent of these members. The hypostatisation of the modern state means that the value of the individuals composing the state is lost and hence the fundamental relation that Rousseau established between individuals composing the state is drastically altered from how Rousseau actually conceived it.

Rousseau’s philosophy can be given a totalitarian interpretation. However, since crucial points in Rousseau’s theory have been violated, such an interpretation would be far from Rousseau. For there is no doubt that for Rousseau the whole is not an entity separate from the individuals composing it but is rather based upon the organic relations of the individual members. Moreover, this whole has no greater significance than as integral to the happiness and well-being of the individuals who together compose it.

Thus, in Rousseau’s conception, the whole is composed by the individual members in their organic relation to each other. The state, therefore, is a constituent part of the good life, integral to the full development of the individuals who compose it. This conception is quite distinct from the view of the state as an instrument created by contract concluded by individuals as isolated and as separated from each other. Rousseau’s argument transcends contract theory. Rousseau’s organic conception upholds the view that the relations individuals develop between each other within the whole are to be placed on a moral basis so as to ensure the happiness and well-being of each and all.

It is thoroughly mistaken, therefore, to accuse Rousseau of setting up the state as a moral entity separate from and superior to the individuals composing it. Rousseau was far from arguing that the individual is to be sacrificed to the state in the interests of some higher morality; for there was no morality higher than the development of the full and best self of each individual. The state, therefore, is not for Rousseau a moral entity that is higher than the real individuals who, together, are the state.

The hypostatisation of the state makes it appear that the state is such a moral entity. As a result of this hypostatisation, the real relation between the individuals and the state is inverted. Thus, the individuals composing the state, whose happiness and well-being ought to be the end for which the state is constituted, actually become the mere means to the reason of state.

There is no doubt as to where Rousseau stands in this conflict between the view that each individual is an end whose full and best self can be realised in association with other individuals, and the view which subordinates individuals to hypostatised state as a moral entity in itself, of greater significance than the individuals composing it. Rousseau clearly affirms the former view. That Rousseau’s general will comes to be criticised as an appropriation of the general interest by an alien body is ironic given the extent to which Rousseau took care to define his position in contradistinction to any such usurpation of the public good.

Probably the most misunderstood of Rousseau’s arguments is the notion of law as forcing people to be free. To turn this into an argument for arbitrary force exercised over individuals fails to present Rousseau’s philosophy as he himself presented it. The law in Rousseau’s conception possesses a moral and educative purpose to which all individuals actively contribute. What Rousseau meant by this is that the individual will be constrained by the sovereign power of which he or she is an integral part.

Rousseau is attempting to define a lawful freedom which involves a rational constraint that takes account of the organic relations between individuals. Such a conception is defined in contrast to the liberal freedom which asserts the rights of individuals, isolated from each other, to do whatever they want, without constraint. Thus, if any individual along with all the other individual members of the sovereign will do whatever is in the interests of the common good, and if a majority comes to decide that any individual has acted contrary to the interests of the common good and hence has to be punished, then the idea of forcing the individual to be free becomes perfectly intelligible. Ideally, it is best if the individual can act as a moral agent and hence force himself or herself to be free. Failing this, the whole as constituted by individuals in the interests of their common good will force the individual to be free.


15 THE GENERAL WILL

Sovereignty transforms the character of power by associating it with right. In being a force constituted and organised for a specific purpose, as opposed to being a physical fact, sovereignty expresses the character of the act of will that has created it. It follows that since the citizens constitute a ‘moral body’, the collective force of the citizens contains a moral element. The point is that, far from being a static concept, sovereignty can only be considered in relation to the continuing activity of the citizens’ will.

The purpose of the general will is to subordinate the selfish inclinations of individuals to a general principle based on the common good. To become effective, sovereignty must be expressed as ‘general will’’ (103).

The general will has attracted the most attention in Rousseau’s political philosophy. The criticism that this general will translates into an artificial collectivity in practice needs to be confronted head on. For Rousseau was concerned to avoid defining the general will as a collectivity detached from the individuals constituting it. Thus the social contract is a generalisation of the moral characteristics possessed by individual human beings. 

And the general will, as Rousseau defines it, is not inimical to freedom. The defining characteristic of human beings, even in the state of nature, is freedom. Human beings associate in order to overcome obstacles to freedom, creating a social state that preserves freedom. It follows that the defining characteristic of any collectivity formed by human beings must be freedom. The general will must be based upon the free ‘will’ of individuals. Thus Rousseau’s general will has the aim of preserving in a political framework the basic source of human dignity.

The danger stems from the practical implications of the distinction between the general will and the will of all. For this distinction does invite the denigration of all partial associations along with the exaltation of a collective entity as something of greater significance than the individuals who compose it. Thus, it is argued, Rousseau’s general will lends itself naturally to perversion, authoritarianism and, indeed, mysticism in politics. If Rousseau is a theorist of democracy then, critics allege, it is of a collectivist or totalitarian democracy (Talmon).

Rousseau’s political philosophy is concerned to delineate a form of association in which human beings attain moral and civil liberty. Given that this philosophy marks also Rousseau’s attempt to repudiate forms of Despotism as inimical to human freedom, there is something incongruous about criticisms of Rousseau’s collective association itself as a Despotism. There is a failure to make the necessary distinctions and respecting the conditions and the clauses that Rousseau made the basis of his positive prescriptions.

And Rousseau does construct a political philosophy, i.e., does proceed rationally and logically from premises and principles, dealing critically with substantive points along the way. The liberal view of Rousseau as a mystic and a romantic conjuring up the general will as a metaphysical entity through some intuitive process is a mere caricature. It saves critics of the difficulty of engaging with Rousseau’s arguments seriously.

Rousseau’s distinction between the general will and the will of all may be clarified by considering Rousseau’s earlier distinction between amour de soi (or amour de soi meme) and amour proper. The assumption behind both distinctions is that reason should be in control. Rousseau, the great critic of the Enlightenment, is actually attempting to show that enlightenment is essential to human freedom, happiness and well-being. Enlightenment is in the interests of human beings. Rousseau thus distinguishes amour proper as enlightened self-interest from amour de soi meme as unenlightened selfish interest. Both apply to human beings and their interests. Rousseau’s point is that the human good is served only when individuals pursue their interests in common, as a common interest, rather than individually, as a private gain.

Similarly, both the general will and the will of all pertains to individual wills. The difference is not one of a collective, supra-individual entity versus individuals in any simple, liberal antithesis. The general will derives from the wills of individuals. The distinction is made in terms of enlightenment or reason as related to human freedom. Thus the general will can be argued as the sum of individual wills motivated by enlightened self-interest whereas the will of all is the sum of individual wills motivated by unenlightened selfish interest. The general will thus attempts to realise individual freedom in a social environment, exchanges civil/moral liberty for natural liberty, and pertains to the common, long term self-interest of human beings.

Thus Rousseau presents the general will as a potentiality which is permanent in the human condition; it is an ideal political society which has yet to be realised but which is nevertheless capable of realisation. It is the political society towards which the free, rational ‘will’ of human beings tends. The general will enables human beings to recover in history their human nature, projecting forwards to the realisation of the highest potentialities of human nature.

Rousseau is, therefore, arguing not that human beings should ‘go back to nature’. Rather, he has a sense of the historical process which has taken the human race beyond nature. This historical process points forward to a future in which human beings realise their highest potentialities through the rational rule of self-interest under the general will in the legitimate political society embodying moral/civil liberty.

In contrast to the ‘general will’, the ‘will of all’ describes the sum of the particular desires of individuals and, in their agreement, may be no more significant than the accidental expression of selfish desires which are not necessarily in the interest of the State, and may well be harmful to this interest. The simple coincidence of votes is no guarantee of truth or rectitude. Even a unanimous vote, let alone a mere majority vote, does not prove the truth or rectitude of the basic attitude as pertaining to the common good. This is precisely the attitude of mind expressed by the general will, indicating a commitment to seek the common good.

Rousseau’s fine distinctions are explained by his conception of the political association. Like the individual with a personality, the body politic is ‘a moral collective body’, with its own personality, with ‘its own unity, common ego, life and will’ (I.6). Also like the individual, the State is not a single homogeneous entity but an entity comprising different elements, not just the will. Just as the reason of the individual is confronted by feeling and passion, so the State is subject to particular influences which may be in contradiction with the general will. Since citizens are not just the moral and political beings entailed by citizenship but are also individuals, with specific desires and feelings, human beings are frequently tempted to pursue private advantage at the expense of the general good, asserting the will of the individual over the will of the citizen.

This distinction means that Rousseau can argue that whilst the citizen may will his true interest, s/he may not always see it. There is a need, then, for the citizen to be reminded of his/her true interest, even though this may conflict with his immediate wants and desires. Rousseau identifies this true interest with the principles of the civil association to which all have freely given their consent. These principles are the expression of the will of individuals as citizens. By membership of and participation in the civil association, the individual learns to respect the obligation s/he owes to the community and, in the process, comes to understand that in obeying the commands of this association s/he is obeying his/her better self. By giving up private advantage in order to pursue the common good, the individual comes to understand that this is his/her true interest, what, deep down, is in his/her best interest.

Rousseau agrees that since the vote is the practical form of giving expression to political opinion, the community must be dependent on the majority vote. However, Rousseau contends, the vote is a purely physical activity and, in itself, lacks moral value. On this reasoning, it is perfectly possible for a virtuous minority to be closer to the general will than a large majority who are concerned to gain a material advantage for itself at public expense. The actual interests of private individuals may well be contrary to the real interest of citizens and of the state as the citizen body. For Rousseau, the value of a decision is determined by its quality rather than its formal or institutional expression; for citizens to know that their decision is right requires something more valid than the mere counting of votes, even though, in practice, the vote is the only feasible way for citizens’ to give institutional expression to their decisions.

Rousseau makes other concessions to political practice. He understands that the general will in itself cannot ensure the effective expression of its deeper social purpose and will remain an abstract and empty principle without concrete and objective form. This is the function of the ‘law’.

There are real problems when Rousseau proceeds to write about infallibility and unanimity with respect to the general will. Ideally, the general will is infallible and unanimous. However, as Rousseau shows in relation to the ‘anti-social’ state of government, the ‘anti-social’ contract, it is possible for there to be a unanimous will that is in error as to its true interest. Between the ideal and the real, then, Rousseau is prepared to accept the votes of a majority as an expression, however imperfect, of the general will. Majority voting is an acceptable practical solution to a real problem and will serve as the practical expression of the general will prior to the final achievement of unanimity and enlightened self-interest upon which the general will rests. The general will, therefore, is an aspiration that human beings must achieve themselves if it is to be genuine; it is not something to be imposed by an external agency. It is the individuals comprising the people who constitute the legitimate political authority that forces individuals to be free.

For Rousseau, the general will can only be general if each individual can identify his or her individual good with the good of the other individuals forming the whole. Whether or not the general will exists depends upon whether the individual says ‘It is to the advantage of the State’ or ‘It is of advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should prevail’ (Rousseau SC IV.i).

Moreover, if the citizens use their votes even whilst disagreeing as to what is to the advantage of the state, the general will will still prevail. For:





Rousseau argues that when voting, individuals should think of promoting the good of the state as their own individual good. There is a totalitarian implication in part of Rousseau’s argument in that Rousseau would appear to be arguing that the true good of the state is determined by majority opinion. This implies a totalitarian democracy in which the majority always votes for the best interests of the state and hence of the individuals composing the state and can thus compel dissenting individuals to fall into line. To this one could argue that, plainly, if all citizens did vote according to the good of the state as the good of all, then the general will would exist and the whole community would be stronger for it. But this is not the controversial point.

Rousseau remains vulnerable to liberal criticism. For his criticism of the selfish interests of the will of all and his view that to be in a minority is to be mistaken as regards ones ‘true’ interests would imply a lack of enlightenment and a demand for education in one form or another. The will expressed by any minority cannot, it seems, be a genuine will, not even of the minority concerned. The implication, which is potentially repressive, is that the minority is blinded to its true interest and hence must receive the appropriate enlightenment.

It all depends upon who or what is to provide this enlightenment and how the process of enlightenment proceeds. The figure of ‘the Legislator’ is enough to have liberals and democrats suspicious of the despotic character of Rousseau’s theory. The idea that people do not know their true interests is anathema to liberals and democrats. In exploring the repressive potentials of Rousseau’s theory, however, there is a real sense in which Rousseau’s point has been lost. And it might well be more worthwhile to keep this point in view when treating the complicated arguments that Rousseau employs in justifying the general will. On Rousseau’s own premises, there is no inevitability that the majority will give expression to the general will. What Rousseau can show is that in a properly based democratic society there is a greater likelihood of egoistic or sectional interests cancelling each other out than would be the case in a society in which a sectional interest or interests monopolise the voting power over and against the body of the citizens.

Rousseau’s argument is not that the majority is necessarily right on all occasions but that no minority can be expected not to pursue its own advantage regardless of the good of the whole community.

As the chapter on voting in Book IV makes clear, Rousseau does not present majority-minority votes as the criterion of absolute right or error but as the most practicable way of assessing the health of the body politic. Majority votes enable the community to discern where the common interest, in all probability, lies and shows minorities themselves where the common interest is. Minority votes thus express temporary error rather than a corruption calling for corrective measures. Rousseau can, therefore, reconcile majority and minority in the political society.

The most important point of all is that Rousseau himself is quite well aware of the dangers to which liberal critics have drawn attention. Indeed, it is because of this awareness that Rousseau is at pains to argue that the general will embodies the free ‘wills’ of human individuals who constitute it. As much as the will of all is the general will, the product of the will of individuals.

Rousseau is aware of the danger of majority tyranny. Thus Rousseau makes the validity of majority votes conditional upon public spiritedness. This enlightenment is possible only on the basis of appropriate political institutions. It is, however, Rousseau’s recognition that it is possible to have a majority vote that runs in the contrary direction to the general will that gives liberals cause for most concern. For Rousseau comes to condemn partial associations as a threat to the general will. Any majority vote which is merely the organised expression of particular interests is contrary to the general will.

Rousseau’s general will is fundamentally the integration of the political and the ethical. Rousseau is presenting the legitimate political society as based upon the moral rationality of the citizens. Rousseau does not accept the distinction between moral and political philosophy. Rousseau makes this very clear when writing of the civil state in terms of moral as against natural liberty (SC I.viii).

Rousseau profoundly influences Kant with these points. Kant built upon the foundations established by Rousseau. This moral philosophy upholds the view that human actions are moral to the extent that they are made in conformity with the universal law. In contrast, actions which are directed under the impulsions of natural inclinations are not moral acts. Human beings can be free only when their whole being is unified in the achievement of a rational end, i.e. an end determined in according with the universal law. For Kant, the will is autonomous only to the extent that it is guided by the universal law. When it is guided by natural inclinations, i.e. selfish passion or appetite, the will is heteronomous. The conflict, therefore, is between an autonomous will prescribing the law to itself and the heteronomous will which receives its law from something external to itself.

Rousseau’s political philosophy and his conception of the legitimate political society is founded upon his view of human freedom as an end. Remove this philosophical anthropology and Rousseau’s argument loses much of its force. For human beings, Rousseau argues, are moral agents in that they are capable of acting in accordance with the universal law. This law is not an external imposition but is prescribed by human beings to themselves so that the state, as the legitimate political society, is capable of embodying and expressing the general will. The general will, then, is the realisation of human freedom through a political order.

Rousseau has to meet the liberal criticism here that what is realised by such a conception is not the freedom of real individuals but of the state as a supra-individual moral entity in itself. Rousseau, it may be argued, runs the risk of putting the freedom of the state before the freedom of the individuals who compose the state. But this is an objection that Rousseau has anticipated and dealt with. Hence his concern that association should secure, preserve and expand liberty (SC I.vi). Rousseau writes:





Liberal critics condemn Rousseau for his denigration of partial associations – corporate bodies, churches, parties, trade unions – and, indeed, such partial associations, intermediate bodies between the individual and the state, were suppressed during the French Revolution. It took Hegel to show how such bodies were integral to the expression of the general will in the ethical life. In Rousseau’s defence, however, it can be argued that what he was attempting to emphasise was the priority of public spirit and enlightenment transcending particular interests and thus putting individuals in touch with the highest potentialities as human beings. Rousseau, quite legitimately, is criticising a situation in which particular interests appropriate the ‘public interest’ and turn the state into a surrogate for its own sectional concerns.

Finally, when the State, on the eve of ruin, maintains only a vain, illusory, and formal existence, when in every heart the social bond is broken, and the meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of ‘public good’, the general will becomes mute: all men, guided by secret motives, no more give their views as citizens than if the State had never been; and iniquitous decrees directed solely to private interest get passed under the name of laws.




Rousseau here attacks partial associations on account of their becoming ends in themselves, acquiring a significance to rival and eventually to undermine the state. These particular interests, in becoming ends, seek to cloak themselves in the name of the public good.

A further point to be made regarding Rousseau’s attitude to partial societies is that his concern is very much with the ideal legitimate political society. In this society, based upon universal enlightenment and spontaneous identification with the general will, the importance of all partial societies will be consciously revealed as secondary. Indeed, the same view applies to government, which Rousseau depicts as an intermediate body between sovereign and subject and which also encroaches upon the sovereign. All such encroachments will end. When it is understood that Rousseau is making a philosophical point and is not demanding the suppression of partial associations and minority opinion his view appears more acceptable to liberal opinion, at least in terms of the corporate liberalism of the likes of Hegel.

The truth is that Rousseau’s political philosophy cannot be properly conceived in terms of liberalism or totalitarianism. Of course, it is possible to abstract some part from the whole of Rousseau’s philosophy so as to convict Rousseau of ‘totalitarian democracy’ but such abstraction proceeds by ignoring parts which contradict the general thesis presented. It is a simple enough task, for instance, to select certain arguments from Rousseau so as to present a collectivist democracy that tyrannizes minority opinion. But such a distortion exists not in Rousseau’s theory, only in a selective approach which removes the inbuilt protections against tyranny. If it is an easy task to portray Rousseau as a totalitarian, it is just as easy to point to Rousseau’s conditions for the general will and its exercise as inherently democratic in conception. Without the free ‘will’ of real individuals, Rousseau’s theory remains an ideal and an aspiration.

A final look at the general will is therefore justified:

There is but one law which, from its nature, needs unanimous consent. This is the social compact: for civil association is the most voluntary of all acts. Every man being born free and his own master, no-one, under any pretext whatsoever, can make any man subject without his consent.

But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?




Human beings must move from selfish interest to enlightened self-interest. Failure to make this transition will result in the anti-social contract which is the state of government. Indeed it is this failure that leads to despotism. Through the anti-social contract of government the partial wills of the people are invested in the despot. Rousseau’s general will, in contrast, embodied the principle of enlightened self-interest in the ethico-rational state. This ideal is always present, it is the permanent potentiality that must be realised in the consciousness of individuals if human freedom is to be achieved.

It is in the transition from the real to the ideal that controversy arises. Rousseau recognises, and criticises, despotism. But he has no way of breaking human acquiescence in despotism. He must, therefore, propose the Legislator.

Eventually, reason is in control and law rules over chance, enlightened self-interest over unenlightened selfish interest. At this point individuals become conscious of the public good and, what is more, this public good coincides with the good of individuals. At the point where the general will becomes an active reality in the consciousness of each and all particular interests must be subordinated to the common interest. It is for the good of each and all, with selfish interest subordinated to self-interest. The surrender of all to all is confirmed in the ideal, legitimate political society.
16 THE POLITICS OF AUTHENTICITY

Rousseau’s objective is the creation of an ideal public community which would enable the complete and integral development and expression of the authentic personality. For all the frequent references to Rousseau’s celebration of the primitive being in the state of nature, his vision is modern in presupposing a fluid, mobile, urban society sustained by a dynamic, expansive economy. But Rousseau’s modernity is expressed in terms of an examination of lines of development for their human potentialities.

Rousseau’s philosophy is inherently political in the classical sense of creative human self-realisation. ‘My ideas had been broadened by the study of the history of morals. I had come to believe that everything is rooted in politics’ (Rousseau Confessions). But this politics is not the politics of the ins and the outs, the amoral competition for power and position, but presupposes a philosophical anthropology which is concerned with the actualisation of the human ontology. The end of this politics is human authenticity.

Rousseau’s writings demonstrate a persistent and forceful concern with identity, autonomy, self-realisation, with authenticity as defined in terms of the individual being himself or herself. Rather than being a story of the progressive unfolding of emancipation and happiness in conformity with the realisation of essential powers, Rousseau considers that the historical process has up until now been the story of enslavement and misery. Since human history is the gradual degradation of human nature and the enslavement of human beings, an adequate knowledge of the true nature of human beings cannot be obtained from a simple study of the past. At best, the study of early history will identify the existence of innate human powers which, after a brief period of happy and spontaneous development, came to be diverted from their original and true purpose. However, even the misuse of these capacities shows that the expression of human nature lies on a line of development which leads from the primitive condition towards new and more complex modes of being. The fact that a study of existing civilisation will reveal that ‘men are wicked’ does not contradict the fact that ‘man is naturally good’ (iii.202). Rousseau distinguishes the essential and intrinsic potentialities of human nature from its historical and accidental characteristics to affirm his central principle that human nature is good (i.934).

Rousseau’s point is that it is inadmissible to identify human nature with any particular point in history; the fact that human beings have, at certain points in history, misused their powers does not alter the essential nature of human beings as beings capable of achieving harmonious development in favourable conditions.

Rousseau’s search for authenticity in the individual personality and in the culture and condition of society appeals to the latent potentiality for self-creation, self-expression, self-knowledge and self-direction immanent but as yet unactualised within the species. Rousseau’s concern is to create a public community in which each and every individual can give life a meaning in terms of the realisation of their common human nature. In Émile, Rousseau makes it clear that his purpose is to do more than produce a manual of education; his ‘true study is that of the human condition’. Rousseau is concerned to establish the point that ‘nature calls the child to human life’ (iv.252) before any particular profession. Thus Rousseau affirms his principle of education: ‘To live is the profession I wish to teach him’ (44). Émile is a ‘philosophical treatise on man’s natural goodness’ (i.934). 

Rousseau’s search for the authentic personality and order entails a radical critique of the artificiality and corruption of modern civilisation. Rousseau’s thought proceeds from the critical awareness that the social and political structures governing human existence are constraints which enchain individuals, stifling their potentialities. Human beings are everywhere in chains, locked up, physically and psychologically in a carceral civilisation; the very subjectivities of human beings are manacled, not just their bodies. It isn’t surprising that Michel Foucault was referred to as ‘our Jean-Jacques’ on his death.

Rousseau had set out the reasons for his optimistic assessment of human nature, despite the historical record, in the second Discours and in Émile: here Rousseau identifies the existence of ‘the only passion natural to man’: self-love or amour de soi (iv.322)(46).

This expansive impulse directed by reason and modified by pity can change relations between individuals and hence lead to humanity and virtue. Rousseau concludes that, in its most developed form, ‘self-love is good and always in conformity with order’ (iv.491). From being a rudimentary feeling, self-love becomes a moral principle. In contrast, amour-propre or ‘pride’ is a relative, artificial feeling which impels each individual to be concerned exclusively with his or her interests at the expense of others. Since it originates in ‘the first look which the individual casts upon his fellows’ (iv.523), from comparison and false reflection, amour-propre leads the individual to harm fellow members of society. Whereas self-love or amour de soi is a unifying element in social relations, amour-propre or pride is a disruptive influence.

The Moral Development of the Individual

Whilst a full description of moral experience demands a consideration of the whole personality, the argument proceeds from the recognition that, for Rousseau, morality is grounded in sensibility. In order to ascertain the affective source of morality it is necessary to go back to amour de soi as the most primordial characteristic of human beings.

For Rousseau, it is only when the individual is brought into contact with and becomes involved with the lives of others that ‘man begins to truly live’. Whilst the self-sufficient life of instinct and feeling has a certain appeal, it lacks the genuine moral quality that arises from human contact and intercourse.

In the Dialogues, Rousseau denies that sensibility is a simple innate impulse, arguing that it has two forms: physical and moral. Physical sensibility responds primarily to objects and is concerned only with physical self-preservation and the satisfaction of bodily appetites. Moral or active sensibility involves a capacity for satisfying emotional needs through a spontaneous attraction towards (or recoil from) other people; it enables us to ‘attach our affections’ to others.

Moral sensibility contains is a spontaneous element, a force of spiritual attraction similar to the attraction between physical objects, but of a much higher quality. Rousseau emphasises that when this force acts positively, it is ‘the simple work of nature which seeks to extend and fortify the feelings of our being’ and is the source of ‘all gentle and loving passions’. The moral sensibility is an active and positive force which derives directly form amour de soi and is a ‘pure matter of feeling in which reflection plays no part’ (i.805-6). It is also an expansive sensibility in that it fosters emotions within the individual which induce him to ‘transport himself outside himself’ (iv.505). The ‘expansive force of the heart’ is a ‘state of strength which extends him beyond himself’ and impels the individual to look to other people. This process of going beyond the primitive impulse is not a matter of creating something new over against original nature but of following the progress and order of nature.

Pity ceases to be instinctive and assumes a more complex form with the development of reflection and imagination. Whilst it is still derived from natural impulse, it entails psychological factors beyond mere feeling, involving a certain self-reflection. Given its roots in impulse or feeling, however, pity cannot be the sole basis of morality. To attain true moral significance requires the co-operation of other elements in the self.

Rousseau identifies reciprocity as an essential feature of true love which modern society has extinguished. In being based upon the active response of another, love is an expansive possibility of a far higher order to sexual impulse, which is purely selfish. And this reciprocity is based upon a reflection upon oneself and comparison with others. ‘To be loved it is necessary to make oneself lovable – at least to the loved person’ (iv.494).

Martin Heidegger felt that philosophers had spent so much time since Plato arguing about what it is ‘to be’ that they had forgotten the importance of Being. Rousseau’s concern with authenticity is a concern with Being in this active, continuous, living sense. Rousseau insists that upon the need of human beings to be themselves at every stage of their existence as the increasing complexity of moral development proceeds: ‘it is necessary to be oneself at all times and not struggle against nature’ (iv.685). Rousseau insists that individuals must give themselves ‘entirely to each hour’, with every moment of their existence being marked by a genuine plenitude. Rousseau firmly rejects opinion here; being based on external criteria, opinion is unnatural and prevents human beings from being themselves. Opinion ‘makes everything different and drives everything from us’ (iv.691).

Rousseau argues that the natural goodness of the individual needs to be supplemented by the will, the activity of which ensures that the individual becomes a truly moral being (iv.818). The individual cannot achieve a happy and stable relationship until he learns to ‘separate himself from his desires’ and place a certain distance between himself and the object of his striving. 

In order to attain a higher good, Émile is taught to resist nature. This may be unnatural in entailing a resistance to and an overcoming of spontaneous feeling, but is natural in that it belongs to the possibilities human beings have for becoming complete moral beings. Undoubtedly, human beings can be ‘happy and free in the depth of the woods’, but there human beings achieve only ‘good without merit’ rather than being truly virtuous (iv.858). In one respect, then, virtue ‘denatures’ human beings in impelling them to resist natural feelings and surrender immediate interest to a higher good. In another respect, however, this delineates human beings overthrowing the bondage of appetite, impulse and desire to achieve a mode of existence that is of an altogether higher quality but is no less natural for that. The strength and power which human beings exercise to achieve this higher order are entirely natural; human capacities are exercised to realise human possibilities. In La Nouvelle Héloise Rousseau portrays virtue as ‘a state of war’: ‘in order to live in it one has always to undertake some struggle against oneself’ (ii.682). What Rousseau means by this is that virtue, drawing upon inner power and strength, is achieved by combating and overcoming selfish impulses.

Without will, feeling is incapable of inspiring action. Hence the pity which is rooted in sensibility can only produce a moral result if it is connected with the will. It is possible to feel pity for one’s fellows but, without will, it is not possible to come to their aid. Pity obtains a genuinely moral quality only in being expressed as genuine beneficence. Certainly, this beneficence has its origins in a strong natural impulse. Nevertheless, it would remain latent without the active intervention of the will.

At the same time, will can only function in relation to the other human powers. Will needs to be animated by feeling. If reason cannot rely on its own resources but must depend on will, so will also needs to be enlightened by reason. Human beings gain insight into the meaning of actions and comprehend what is done only through reason. The individual comes to realize his existence as a truly human being endowed with freedom when will operates in conjunction with reason. In the transition from the ‘natural’ freedom of the unthinking primitive being to the ‘moral’ freedom of the mature being, the individual comes to fulfil the real possibilities of his human being.

Will and virtue form part of a genuinely personal experience and are therefore inseparable from feeling. Will cannot, therefore, simply be a formal, abstract principle or the means by which to attain an impersonal ideal valid for its own sake. Whilst virtue ‘denatures’ the human being in the sense of resisting or overcoming spontaneous innate impulses, it also enables the human beings to realise the higher aspects of their nature, achieving higher goals above and beyond immediate inclination. Virtue, then, does not involve separating individuals from their true interest. Rather, it enables human beings to transcend selfish interest for an enlightened self-interest. Rousseau argues (to d’Offreville) that moral interest excludes ‘selfish material interest’. He reasons that whilst the virtuous man is prepared to sacrifice personal advantage, and even his life, for the sake of others, this sacrifice is in conformity with the inner nature of the virtuous person and is an expression of the moral interest which enables the virtuous person to be himself/herself (64).

This shows the benefit of viewing personal behaviour from the perspective of the whole personality, being as a whole. The virtuous person exists not by will alone but also by other human powers, the feelings and reason that makes it possible to comprehend one’s place in the whole scheme of things. The virtuous person cannot disregard the effects of his sensibility and the rational person, whilst affirming the superiority of la raison intellectuelle, cannot neglect the importance of la raison sensitive. The human existence is a condition in which each individual is involved in a relationship with his/her own being, with the environment, with the being of others, and with the universal order; every aspect of the human personality is therefore integrated within and contributes to the harmony of the whole.

Pertaining to interest in the highest sense, virtue, which is essential to the moral fulfilment of human beings, must find support in a feeling which is far deeper than the immediate impulses of the primitive being. The innate reason enables human beings to know the good and the will enables them to choose the good, but human beings can only come to love the good through an inner feeling which is capable of resisting the sophisms of reason and the temptations of selfish passion. This primordial feeling is located in the depths of the very being of the individual as human and is called conscience.

Rousseau presents his most complete statement of conscience in his formal profession of religious faith. Here he describes it as a ‘divine instinct’. This term is significant in that it identifies conscience as a primordial impulse or feeling which is the spontaneous expression of the original and most intimate nature of human beings and owes little to habit. Rousseau conceives conscience to be ‘divine’ on account of belonging to the spiritual part of human being. Rousseau identifies conscience as the divine spark within each and all, the very essence of the nature of human beings as moral beings. It is not the quality of some individuals rather than others but of all, however much the corruption of contemporary civilisation may make it appear otherwise. Conscience is also natural. Since, for Rousseau, conscience is a feeling rather than a judgement, it has all of the directness and simplicity of nature itself. Defining this feeling as ‘the sacred voice of nature’, Rousseau unites nature and religion. Conscience ‘is to the soul what the instinct is to the body’. Just as instinct is ‘the voice of the body’, so conscience is ‘the voice of the soul’ (iv.595/8).

The historical record or evidence of human nature, the ‘manifest, universal agreement of every nation’ and the ‘remarkable uniformity of men’s judgement’, reveals that all people, regardless of time and place, possess the same basic sense of right and wrong as a result of their common nature. ‘Behind the prodigious variety of judgements and opinions there persist the same ideas of justice and honesty’. Objective, impartial analysis reveals the consistency of an inner conviction. The individual who lives or acts as his conscience tells him follows a principle which is ‘written in the depth of his heart in indelible characters’ (iv.594).

Despite being available to all, conscience appears to be an exceptional quality possessed only by a moral few. The reason for this is entirely due to the corruption of circumstances associated with the estrangement of individuals from their true selves. With reason and passion becoming the instruments of pride and self-interest and amour-propre everywhere usurping the authority of authentic amour de soi conscience is required for the negative purpose of protection. In a regenerated society, where human beings have come to realise their true nature, conscience is as natural and spontaneous as any other innate quality, working in unison with reason and freedom to ensure the complete realisation of the human being.

The feeling or instinct which moves us to love the good needs to be supplemented by an element which enables us to know the good. Conscience is rooted in feeling or instinct but stands in need of enlightenment by reason in order to be effective. ‘Reason alone teaches us to know good and evil. So conscience which makes us love the one and hate the other, although independent of reason, cannot develop without it’ (iv.288). ‘To know the good is not to love it; man has no innate knowledge of it; but as soon as reason makes it known to him, his conscience impels him to love it; it is this feeling which is innate’ (iv.600). Conscience and reason therefore exist in mutual relation, each equally necessary to the other. Conscience is the primordial urge, the impetus which stimulates the awareness and pursuit of the good. Conscience, however, does not operate alone but in conjunction with the other human powers, so that individuals can safely rely on their ‘eyes, conscience, and judgement’; individuals have ‘conscience to love the good, reason to know it and freedom to choose it’ (iv.605; ii.683). Conscience possesses a strongly personal and subjective emphasis in being the supreme expression of amour de soi.

As the personality develops, it becomes clear that spontaneous emotions, far from existing alone, need to be related to a higher principle of order. Since amour de soi is connected with the love of others, the individual ceases to be a separate being as personality develops. ‘The love of men derived from the love of self is the principle of human justice’ (iv.523 n). In the first instance, conscience seems to be a simple, direct impulse, an innate feeling which is prior to all cultural, social and educational influences, impelling the individual to action by its own intrinsic power; conscience is ‘an involuntary rule’ which impels individuals to judge all actions, their own or others, to be good or bad. However, even this innate impulse involves other individuals as well as ourselves. Whilst the individual is not born with a primitive instinct of sociability, he is ‘meant to be sociable’. ‘And it is from the moral system formed by this double relationship to oneself and to one’s fellow-men that the natural impulse of conscience is born’ (iv.600).

The presence of conscience within indicates the power of individuals to resist the urges and impulses of immediate instinct and passion and attain in full the active possibilities of his being. The individual as a moral being throws off passive subjection to bodily appetites by exercising the choice to exist in conformity with a higher principle. By refusing to obey impulse, the human being declares a willingness to relate personal existence to a higher order that transcends immediate needs but remains natural in realising the full potentialities of human nature. The human being ceases to be passively subjected to the senses. Animated by inner feeling, conscience is expressed externally in acts. Conscience as the ‘voice of the soul’ enables the individual to transcend ‘the voice of the body’ to realise the full potentialities of human being in an integral order that functions on the basis of the active co-operation of all the human powers. 

This reasoning reveals that ‘self-love’ is not a simple passion but consists of an active intelligent principle and a passive ‘sensitive’ principle. Conscience can therefore be ‘enlightened by reason, itself conducive to the acceptance of order’. ‘Conscience develops and acts only with man’s understanding; it is only because of his understanding that he comes to know order, and it is only when he knows this order that his conscience impels him to love it’ (iv.936). Justice and virtue form the moral aspect of the general principle involving ‘the ordered progress of our primitive affections’ (d’Alambert 99). In this ‘ordered progress’ the human being ceases to be an isolated individual and instead becomes conscious of being a part of the ‘universal system’ and ‘the great whole’. In comprehending this essential connection of the self with the universal order, the individual becomes capable of morality. Only in the comprehension of this link between the self and the whole does the individual come to truly comprehend the complexity of his own being. In sum, the complete moral development of the individual defines the freedom of the individual as the recognition of the necessity of establishing an ordered relationship with the inner being, with other individuals realising their beings, and with God. At this point, Rousseau identifies the spiritual dimension of self-love; this dimension raises the individual above the immediate appetites of the senses so as to make him conscious of the connection between the ‘love of the soul’ and the principle of order.

Rousseau makes a crucial distinction between two kinds of dependence which was to occupy a central place in his political theory. On the one hand, there is the false, frustrating dependence which follows the subordination of each to the will of others and to arbitrary authority. This dependence is the principal source of human discontent and antagonism as individuals resent and react against arbitrary rule and its basis in the ‘capricious will of men’ (Cf iii.157/8; iv.797/8). On the other hand, there is the dependence on objective, impersonal conditions which, since they embrace all individuals equally, all accept. In fine, the individual will reject as irrational and unnecessary the restrictions that other human beings will impose on them but will accept the constraints which derive from objects since ‘it is in man’s nature to endure patiently the necessity of things, but not the ill-will of other people’ (iv.320).

Rousseau was seeking the public grounds of authenticity. Reason and the way it is understood in the Enlightenment was crucial to this project. The work of the Enlightenment thinkers in science, art and politics cannot be separated from their scientific, aesthetic, and political theories. For these Enlightenment rationalists, reason is not a power enabling human beings to transcend the empirical world, but teaching them to feel at home in it (Cassirer n13).

By extending reason into every sphere of human existence, the thinkers of the Enlightenment produced an ideal of the rational being capable of apprehending the world with a fullness of being with a view to realising all the possibilities reason had identified. The possibilities for human activity, freedom and happiness, which the Enlightenment had shown to exist in the modern world that was emerging, were, however, being restricted and even suppressed by the traditional political and social systems that had evolved over centuries. Whilst the Enlightenment seemed to identify endless possibilities contained in the modern world, a frustrated and constricted humanity – even one ‘happy’ in its chains – would fail to develop its capacities to realise them. The more that Enlightenment thinkers illuminated the world that was emerging, the greater became the gap between what human beings had the potential to achieve in an ideal world and what human beings actually achieved in the real world.

The criticism of the violation of the rights of man from the natural law tradition could be rejected on account of imposing moral values arbitrarily from outside. Montesquieu’s criticism is very different in that it criticises a repressive system for its failure to respect its own immanent standard; such a system cannot satisfy its members, not even the most powerful and privileged; it is decomposing internally at the time it seems the most stable. In drawing the same conclusions as natural law theory from utilitarian premises, Montesquieu extends the idea of individual rights well beyond the position in which natural law theory had left it. Montesquieu establishes the point that the social system can only achieve human happiness if it posits, and the government guarantees, as the fundamental human right, the right of every individual to be herself or himself.

Montesquieu argues that the function of human institutions is to ensure individuals are fitted to social roles that are prescribed for them rather than being roles that they have chosen. Imposed social roles destroy the natural individuality of human beings and force them to be what they are not. This creates a radical new perspective which exposes how the ‘social’ self threatens to suppress the ‘natural’ self of human beings, suppressing the spontaneity of individuals through compelling them to perform the social roles that are given to them, crushing the variety which nature generates beneath the uniformity of character imposed by society. Here, Montesquieu introduces a new standard of evaluation – what is the level of freedom required to enable individuals to be truly human.

Rousseau is both within and against modernity, a radical critic of modernity’s practice in terms of its own ideals and aspirations. Rousseau felt the ideal and the real to be inseparable. For this reason he was concerned ‘take men as they are and laws as they might be’ (Social Contract, Intro 351): this was a commitment to identify and unfold the ideal within human nature with respect to the development of this nature as manifested in modern society.

To have to ‘take men as they are’ could be construed as subordinating ideals focused upon human possibilities to empirical conditions. The problem is that:

If men were alone responsible for inventing and maintaining their own social misery, they could scarcely be expected to overcome conditions that they themselves had chosen to create. One could hardly expect that those who had devised their own chains would either wish, or know how, to liberate themselves. If there was no need for cosmic fatalism, there was every reason to despair of mankind’s own social powers.

Shklar note 26 on page 154

Radicalism permanently faces the paradox of having to create the good society out of the bad. It is the paradox of emancipation. How can individuals whose whole lives are systematically corrupted escape the general corruption of circumstances to create the authentic society of authentic beings? Rousseau’s predilection for leaders and guides indicates that he, like other radicals before and after him, could see no option other than reform from above: through the actions of Legislators, enlightened despots. From Plato’s philosopher-ruler to the vanguard party of revolutionary socialism, radicals have struggled to address the paradox of emancipation. Rousseau shows the path forward here as beginning with the notion of reform from within, joining with others to proceed inexorably to reform from without. Rousseau argues ‘Let him see with his eyes and feel with his heart; let no authority govern him except the authority of his own reason’ (IV, 217). The problem is that Rousseau has demonstrated the extent to which modern individuals lack selves; since this is the case, how, then, can individuals be expected to create selves for themselves? Marx found the solution in praxis, the changing of circumstances as a self-change on the part of the agents. And this inherently democratic notion is implicit in Rousseau’s political principles of active sovereignty and self-assumed obligation, as well as in his concern for the recovery of the true self from behind the mask of modernity.

Only by retaining and realising their natural individuality can human beings take their active place in nature as a whole, thus coming to enjoy the forms of happiness that nature gave humanity as a possibility. The individual can be happy only by being able to be himself or herself. However, a society which deprives individuals of this primary source of happiness cannot satisfy its members and therefore must decay from within.

The notion of revolution emerges with the increasing gap between the social identities - the roles that the system forces individuals to play - and their authentic identities as given by nature. These social roles ‘de-nature’ individuals and prevent human beings from becoming what they potentially are; human beings can realise that potential only by throwing off their chains and bringing an end to the repressive system. Revolution is the only affirmation of authenticity allowed in a repressive society; and the repression of nature makes revolution inevitable. In restoring the balance of nature, the act of revolution is not a political act but an ontological necessity.
All human relationships – private and public, personal and political alike – are to be evaluated according to whether they enhance or inhibit the full and free realisation of the individuality of each and every person, both individually and collectively. To develop individuality to the full, all individuals must be involved in reciprocal relationships that are governed by the active consent of the individuals themselves.

The central theme of Rousseau’s version of the rational unity of each and all is that an individual obtains fulfilment only with other people, not from them; to achieve one’s freedom the individual must respect the freedom of all other individuals. The freedom and equality of the urban environment seemed to open up the possibility that the self’s potentialities are fulfilled by involving oneself in this world, not withdrawing from it.

Rousseau argued that the state and society were a unity: this being so, the repressive states which characterised modern civilisation were not arbitrary impositions from the outside but were organic growths out of a corrupted soil. The social system alienated human beings from each other but also from their own selves:





Rousseau thus highlighted the radical separation that existed between human beings as they are and as they have to be in empirical circumstances on the one hand and human beings as they could and should be on the other hand. This problem of self-estrangement was not just that human beings were ‘unlike themselves’ in appearance but also in actuality. From this perspective, Rousseau viewed the emerging modern society as the culmination of human self-estrangement, not the victory of reason over alienation. Rousseau set out to demonstrate not only the extent of human self-estrangement in the world but also the possibility of its overcoming so that human beings could at last become in the world what they had the potential to be.

Rousseau brought a richer, more rounded definition of reason to the Enlightenment, one which incorporated ontological, anthropological, emotional and psychological aspects of the human character. On these grounds Rousseau could establish the conditions for the authentic personality. By showing the extent of human possibilities, Rousseau also revealed the depth and extent of repression modern rational society was. Rousseau revealed how inherently alien to the self the modern world in the process of emerging really was. In his writings, Rousseau exposed the gap between the self and the world with a profundity, a clarity and an imagination that totally inverted progressive values. The rational world that was in the process of emerging was revealed to be anything but a world of reason from the perspective of essential human characteristics such as individuality, authenticity, personality, spontaneity, creativity. The triumph of Enlightenment reason, without its ontological dimension, would amount to the complete repression of human possibilities, the subordination of the human personality to the system.

The intensity with which Rousseau pursued authenticity is made clear on the first page of the Confessions where Rousseau declares: ‘I am forming an enterprise which has no precedent, and whose execution will have no imitator. I want to show my fellow-men a man in all the truth of nature; and that man is myself’ (I,7).

Rousseau identifies the problem of self-estrangement in a world where ‘the majority of men are quite unlike themselves, and often seems to transform themselves into different men’: only by penetrating the structure of this world is it possible to regain contact with the self. Rousseau is concerned to undermine the society that exists and continues only by burying the self deep below the surface. This requires more than the bringing of the self to the top; Rousseau recognises that the self can authentically live and grow only in connection with the ground of society.

Focusing upon the self and its conditions of realisation or derealisation in the world, Rousseau revealed the complexity and ambiguity of the rational world celebrated by the Enlightenment:

It is a great and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself from nothingness by his own efforts; dissipating, with the light of his reason, the shadows in which nature enveloped him; lifting himself above himself; soaring in spirit up to the celestial regions; like the sun, travelling with giant steps through the vast extent of the universe; and, what is still greater and more difficult, returning into himself, to study man and get to know his nature, his duties and his end.

Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, OC, III,6

This passage reveals Rousseau’s central concern – the human being and the nature of Being. In the first instance, human beings raise themselves from nothingness to being by their own efforts. In the second instance, the light of his reason enables human beings to see through the murk and gloom with which nature surrounds them, raising themselves up ‘audessus de soi-meme’. In the third instance, their spirit lifts them higher, into celestial regions. In fine, through will, reason and spirit, human beings advance from nothingness to being to self-transcendence.

Rousseau affirms the possibility of individuals coming to overthrow the domination of the external world by moving outside of themselves to make judgements about the world. ‘The distinctive faculty of the free and intelligent being is to be able to give a meaning to this word is’ (iv.571). This expansive movement to invest external objects with meaning contrasts with the way that the modern individual exists outside himself, living only in the opinion of others, deriving values from the opinion of others and imitating what is irrelevant to his inner life. In contrast, the outward movement is a natural unfolding that comes within and activates faculties which relate the individual to both internal emotional and mental needs and the demands of the immediate environment.

The human being reaches a decisive stage in life with the understanding that instinct and bodily appetites will no longer suffice for his existence. From being self-contained and governed by inner desires and impulses, the individual comes to develop other needs, to have feelings for other people. Where once the individual had treated other people as objects of personal use, now the individual starts to see others as persons in their own right. At this stage the individual is ready for morality.

Rousseau’s criticism of the self-estrangement of contemporary civilisation was motivated by a concern to achieve the authentic personality. In one sense, this concern was a logical part of the Enlightenment, taking the connection between reason, knowledge and freedom into anthropological and psychological dimensions to be crucial to truly human being. In many respects, though, Rousseau’s thinking was as much an indictment of Enlightenment thought as it was of the society from which the Enlightenment sought to distance itself.

Like reason, language is corrupted by the degeneration of modern civilisation and is employed to conceal and distort truth rather than to reveal and communicate truth. Language, however, remains a unique human activity. The main problem of the philosopher is to restore language to its true function.

The general perversion of human values has had a deleterious impact upon language, with linguistic refinement being expressed as a sterile ratiocination or the vernacular of an artificial and corrupt civilisation. To restore language to its proper function requires a close examination of its connection to its original elements and the way they influence the manifestation of  primordial needs.

Rousseau locates the beginning of language in the fact that ‘man’s first cry is the cry of nature’. From this Rousseau concludes that the primary function of language is to express feelings and emotions as against thoughts and ideas.

‘They talk about everything, because everyone has something to say’, Rousseau observed about the conversation in Paris. However, ‘no one says what he thinks, but only what he wants others to think’. As a result, despite the apparently endless for human interaction and intercourse in the crowded urban environment of the new towns and cities, Rousseau declared: ‘I am never more lonely than when I’m in the crowd’. Searching for the human being in such an environment proved to be fruitless; the ‘vaste espace du monde’ was empty, a ‘vaste desert du monde’ (II 14, 231-3). ‘The gravest fault of great cities is that men become different from what they are; society gives them a being different from their own’ (II.21,273). These urban dwellers may have been dynamic, thrusting, prosperous representatives of the emerging world but they were as estranged from their own true selves every bit as much as the aristocrats, peasants and artisans of the traditional, rural, feudal society were. This may have been the age of l’homme but, as far as Rousseau was concerned, the true man was nowhere in sight.

The endless activity and boundless energy of the Parisians on the surface only masked a profound passivity below. ‘You might think that these isolated people living independently would at least have minds of their own. Not at all; they are machines which don’t think for themselves, but are set in motion by springs’ (Julie, II. 14, 234). These incredibly active individuals of modern society seemed to be compulsively driven and, to Rousseau, they were – driven out of their selves and into roles which were prescribed, repetitive, cyclical, and ultimately static. The modern individual is continuously moving, not to go anywhere but to keep the system functioning in the same way. The functional imperatives of the system predominate; there is no question of progress as human self-realisation here. As automatons, individuals were driven from without, not from within. Ostensibly ‘free’, these modern individuals moved like ‘a regiment in battle’, rigid and mechanical; they had as much autonomy and authenticity as a company of ‘puppets nailed to the same board, or pulled by the same string’ (II 17, 250). But, like puppets, the urban automatons were not all programmed to act in the same way but to perform different roles and functions within a vast division of labour designed to ensure the efficient functioning of the state. ‘When a man speaks, it’s his costume, not he, that’s expressing a feeling.. Each coterie has its own rules, its own standards, its own principles, and will admit no others.. There’s one mode of reason for the robe, another for finance, another for the sword’ (II 14, 233-4).’ (116).

Rousseau, in other words, perceived that the problems of self-estrangement would continue and, indeed, even be extended in the rational civilisation prophesied by the Enlightenment thinkers. The reason for Rousseau’s critical stance towards both the old order and the emerging order lies in his insistence that true knowledge was self-knowledge and that to obtain this the human being had to ‘return to himself’. The old and the new separated human beings from their essential being.

Rousseau sought a new approach to knowledge; the observable behaviour in the corrupt and artificial empirical world was so clearly alien to the real character of human beings that the old methods could reveal only what human beings are not, not what they are in terms of their essential nature. Rousseau thus argued that to really understand and gain knowledge of human beings it was necessary to go beyond the empirical qualities observable at the surface level to grasp the essential or ideal qualities contained in human nature as both potentiality and actuality. This concern to penetrate to real essences beyond misleading empirical surfaces pervades Rousseau’s work. ‘How happy it would be to live among us, if only our outward faces were mirrors of our hearts..’ Rousseau regrets the fact that ‘a man doesn’t dare appear as he is; he is under a perpetual restraint’. In the old Aristotelian conception, the human being as a zoon politikon needs society in order to realise his or her essential humanity. Rousseau shows, however, that society can function more to conceal and repress the human character than express or reveal it. Rousseau makes continual critical reference to the veil: ‘that uniform and deceptive veil of politeness .. which we owe to the light of our century’ (Arts and Sciences). ‘I have seen many masks; when am I going to see the faces of men?’ (Julie II,14). In order “to know man’s nature, his duties and his end” it was necessary to tear men’s veils and costumes and masks away, to discover the faces and bodies and souls beneath them” (Confessions VIII,388). Rousseau was therefore concerned first and foremost with the natural (essential or ideal) qualities of human beings, proceeding from there to evaluate empirical society to the extent that they enhance or inhibit their complete actualisation.

Rousseau, of course, condemned the artificiality and corruption of society and its institutions. He was also clear that the estrangement from which human beings suffer in the modern world was a self-estrangement. Human beings were the authors of their own estrangement: they ‘transform themselves into totally different men’ (Confessions, IX, 408).

The full depth, power and originality of Rousseau’s concept of unmasking becomes clear only by relating the knowledge which the Enlightenment valued so highly to self-knowledge and in turn conceiving a project of self-examination and self-revelation as a critique of self-estrangement. Rousseau was going much further than demanding that human beings know themselves to demand that human beings become and be themselves.

Rousseau was in agreement with the Enlightenment thinkers concerning the moral and political bankruptcy of the Ancien Regime. But in taking their indictment much further, he came to understand that the rational alternative proposed by the philosophes rested upon a number of flaws which threatened to extend and entrench estrangement to an even greater extent. Rousseau thus criticised the old order that was passing and the modern social system that was in the process of emerging – and for the same reason. Rousseau was concerned to demonstrate that the dominant modes of personal identity – both old and new – functioned as modes of depersonalisation which served to prevent the full expression of the individual self.

According to Rousseau’s principle, no one is born stupid, aggressive, evil etc; rather, it is the environment that makes people thus. Rousseau applies this argument with reference to the accusation that peasants are dull by nature. Not so, declares Rousseau. What makes peasants dull is the static inertia of the social system which imposes passive, submissive roles upon them. The peasant ‘always does what he’s been told, what his father did before him, what he himself did in his youth. He exists entirely according to routine. He spends his life almost like an automaton, constantly occupied with the same tasks; with him habit and obedience have taken the place of reason’ (II, 82-3). The lowest ranks within a closed, stagnant hierarchy of rural life – the overwhelming majority – were socialised to submissively perform the roles prescribed for them and to act passively according to the routines of their station in life. Autonomy on the part of the individual, in thought, feeling, or action, would rupture such prescribed and traditional roles and routines. Traditional society therefore had a functional requirement to prevent the development of individuality.

Rousseau declared his own independence by discarding all the roles and identities with which he had been assigned by traditional society. Rousseau’s stance here set the goal for the modern person – to be free and authentic as one’s own master. This goal is blocked by a modern world which opened up possibilities in some areas only at the expense of stifling and repressing the ground for self in the process.

Rousseau’s view was that the unity of self with which human beings were born was fractured by conventional socialisation; its recovery and reinforcement was the task of radical education. If human beings were educated to feel at home in their own selves, then they would come to feel at home in the external world in that their self-interest would lead them spontaneously toward a lasting, harmonious community. Rousseau continued to affirm this ethical ideal to the end. He restated it in his final, unpublished work: ‘It is power and freedom that makes excellent men. Weakness and slavery have only made wicked men’ (Réveries VI, 1057). The individual who was concerned to take care of his own authenticity could also be expected to care for the authenticity of others. Authenticity is an inherently reciprocal notion; a concern with one’s own human nature is also a concern with that of others, since it is a concern with a nature that is common to all.

Rousseau gave expression to the all-pervasive discontent that ran through modern civilisation, but he struggled to translate its personal features into the political power that was sufficient to transform that civilisation. Rousseau gave modern individuals a vision of a society which could satisfy equally the individual and communal aspects of the human character; an ideal community in which all individuals could best ‘expand his being and multiply his happiness by sharing them with his fellowmen’ (Manuscrit, I.2, 288). But Rousseau could propose no collective agency which was powerful enough to actualise this ideal.

Whilst the modern individual considered himself/herself a ‘free’ and autonomous person, the fact remained that s/he was essentially ‘a slave’ (III, 158). This was an impersonal rather than a personal slavery; individuals were slaves not to other people but to things. Money created a new form of impersonal dependence. The commercial economy drew individuals into an endless spiral of competition, money and accumulation. Every individual ‘wants to be master everywhere and, indeed, has to since the only alternative within the system is to become a slave. The problem is that the individual ‘is never happy where he is’. As soon as individuals started to see things as commodities, it would be impossible to stop social existence and human life in all aspects being overtaken by commodification. ‘The demon of property infects everything it touches’. This demon is created by human practice but has escaped human control and has come to possess its creators. Property is not possessed by the individual, it possesses the individual: it ‘forced [him] to flee from himself’ (IV 319).

The education of Émile went so far. To be equipped to make the biggest decisions, however, required an understanding and experience of the political. Émile could only function as he had been taught to function in the just political community which would enable him to live autonomously. Rousseau thus came to delineate the precise character of political institutions which were essential to the just state pursuing the ends of autonomy and authenticity. This led to questions of rights and obligations, what the individual could claim from the state and what the state was entitled to claim in return. Rousseau had avoided politics in delineating his educational project. He understood, however, that a genuine autonomy and authenticity was impossible if he simply remained focused upon isolated individuals in their private lives. The individual could never settle within a private existence until, ‘after having considered himself in his physical relations with other beings, and in his moral relations with other men, he has learned to consider himself in his civil relations with his fellow-citizens’ (Émile, V 419-21). Regardless of the quality of education, no individual lives an authentic and autonomous life until the community is created which makes such a life possible for all individuals.

The educator attempts to raise pupils in conformity with the principles of ‘nature’ but must also enable them to establish a sound and healthy relationship with their surroundings. Émile’s early education is mainly negative in being concerned with protecting him from corrupting influences; nevertheless he is still required to establish an active relationship with objects. Only upon reaching maturity will it be possible for him to subject this environment to rational control and make it serve his needs as a moral being. This conscious control of the environment constitutes a decisive moment in the personal and civic life of the individual.

Rousseau sought to elaborate the principles which would enable the ‘animal economy’ to operate in harmony with the diverse physical forces that impacted upon it. Rousseau reasons that if the moral life of the individual was aided, rather than inhibited, by physical conditions (climate, seasons, colours, sounds etc), then the soul of the individual would be ‘in the state most favourable to virtue’. This consideration applies all the more when one considers the large extent to which the physical world influences the formation of feelings and emotions (Cf i.408/9).

Rousseau extends this principle operates to every level of the individual’s existence. Political freedom is conditional upon the creation of an environment which is conducive to the effective expression of freedom. As Rousseau writes in the Confessions, ‘I had seen that everything depended radically upon politics and that, however one set about it, no people would ever be anything but what the nature of its government made it be’ (i.404). ‘It is certain’, he argues in Économique Politique, ‘that men are in the long run what the government makes them to be’. The similarity with the education of the individual is clear: whilst the individual is to become a free and responsible being, a bad education can create bad conditions and hence serve to obstruct the development of the highest possibilities. If, as the historical record reveals, human happiness and goodness can be undermined and misery and evil can flourish through the influence of inept or evil institutions, then the converse must also be true – human beings can be made happy and virtuous through good institutions. Rousseau thus formulates the fundamental problem of politics thus: ‘What is the nature of the government suited to form the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the wisest – in a word, the best, taking this word in its greatest sense – people?’ (i.404/5).

The attempt to found a form of government which exerts a beneficial influence upon the action of the citizen whilst nevertheless preserving the citizen’s freedom faces the problem of the fundamental corruption of modern society entailing the corruption of all sound principles.

17 POLITICAL MASKS 

The laws of the modern state ratified and codified the social distance which the rich were concerned to place between themselves and the poor. In examining the relation between state and society, Rousseau challenged the view of the philosophes and the liberal reformers who asserted the capacity of modern civil society to set human beings free in order to be themselves – if only the state would leave civil society alone. Rousseau attacked this laissez faire conception of the state, civil society and the relation between them. Rousseau denied the institutional separation of the state and civil society central to the liberal conception. The notion that the government of laws was somehow external to individuals was absurd since all laws were human made. The state was not an external imposition upon society but, on the contrary, grew organically out of this society of individuals. The origins of any repression on the part of the state were to be sought in the fact that some power or class or interest within society was using the public power to serve its particular will. From this it followed that simply letting civil society go free of state interference would not in itself allow human beings to go free to become what they have the potential to be but, on the contrary, would subject human beings to the untrammelled power of the original source of repression within civil society.

Rousseau therefore switched the focus upon the social basis of political power. Any reference to the repressive character of the state needed to go beyond general assertions of the repressive character of the state itself to the social class or interest which the state was protecting and against whom. The real source of repression is inequality. Rousseau traces the emergence of inequality in the state of nature, with some coming to exploit others; however, since ‘every man [had been] his own master’, the bad effects were merely transient. The modern concepts of ‘domination’ and ‘servitude’ could not apply in the state of nature, where people were free to move from place to place if they felt put upon. ‘What if I should happen to meet a man so much stronger than I, so depraved, indolent and fierce that he could force me to work for his subsistence while he remained idle? He would have to take care not to let me out of his sight for even an instant, and to bind me fast before he went to sleep, or else I’d kill him, or simply run away. After all this, let him relax his vigilance for even a moment, let him turn his head at a sudden noise, and I’ll be twenty paces off in the forest; my chains will be broken and he’ll never see me again’. What this means is that the only constraint upon individuals in the state of nature was physical force. Individuals could not have been constrained to any social role s/he did not wish to fill. ‘One man might well seize the fruits that another had gathered, the game he had killed, or the cave he had used for shelter; but how could he exact obedience, how could there be chains of dependence among men who possessed?’ (Inequality, 161-2)’ (121).

Rousseau identified the winners and the losers in the instituting of government and law: ‘in the state of nature there is an actual and indestructible equality among men. In the civil state there is a vain and chimerical equality of rights’. Civil equality was the means by which ‘the power of the community [was] added to the power of the strong for the oppression of the weak’. Against the arguments of liberal constitutionaries, Rousseau declared that ‘The universal spirit of the laws of every country is always to take the part of the strong against the weak, and the part of him who has against him who has not’.

The rule of law was therefore a cover which served to conceal behind the general interest the dominance of the rich and powerful who made the laws in their own particular interest. ‘From this first contradiction spring all the other contradictions between the real and the apparent which are to be found in the civil order. The many will always be sacrificed to the few, the common weal to private interests; those specious words “justice” and “subordination” will always serve as the tools of violence and the weapons of injustice’ (Émile, IV 197-8). The state was, as liberal theorists alleged, built on force and fraud, but this was not the intrinsic character of the state. The state was not independent of the civil society from which it emerged; its particular character derives from the character of civil society. And here Rousseau exposed the particular interests of the rich and the powerful in a civil society governed by asymmetries in wealth and resources. The state, with its constitutions and laws, concealed particular interest behind the general good, translated private interests into public policy and duped the subaltern classes into believing that the social order in which they were oppressed was rightful and just.

Rousseau was vociferous in his indictment of the modern state. His ethical vision took his criticism much further than the philosophes and liberal thinkers who limited their notions of freedom to the emerging bourgeois society of the eighteenth century. Rousseau’s critical vision moved well beyond the Ancien Regime. Rousseau saw the shift in the nature of power in modern society from descent to money. As a result, society was divided according to class rather than status. Hence the repressiveness of the modern state to which liberals objected was due not to the character of the state as such but to its connection with a civil society now coming under the domination of the economic: the state ‘provides a powerful protection for the immense possessions of the rich, and hardly leaves the poor man in possession of the cottage he has built with his own hands. Are not all the advantages of society for the rich and powerful? Are not all the lucrative posts in their hands? Are not all privileges reserved for them alone? Is not the public authority entirely on their side?’ This is not the crude, mechanical argument that the rich bought preferment; Rousseau’s claim is that privileges came to the rich in an a priori sense, as ‘the rich man’s right’ (Political Economy, 271-2). Rousseau is as critical of the state as are liberals, but for reasons which expose liberal claims which identify freedom with leaving civil society alone. The civil society which the liberals sought to free was the domain of inequality, of private property, the source of repression in the first place. Thus Rousseau argues that the modern state ‘bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; destroyed irretrievably all natural liberty; fixed forever the law of property and inequality; converted clever usurpation into inalienable right; and, for the sake of a few ambitious men, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, servitude and misery’ (Inequality, 178). The ideas of law, right, justice, which the state had proclaimed for the common good, served to conceal the domination and exploitation of the weak by the powerful. The modern state entrenched and extended existing inequalities, solidifying the fluid, transient roles and identities of the modern economy into a functioning social system and giving it a blessing of ‘legitimacy’. Rousseau agreed with the liberals that the modern state was a powerful instrument of repression; but he pointed out against the liberals that the source of repression existed in civil society, not the state, in the particular interests and the general asymmetrical relations of class power. Setting civil society free from the state would not bring about the autonomy and individuality that the liberals claimed but its converse; laissez faire amounted to setting free the social forces of repression, ensuring that individuals would be as unfree and as determined by their social roles as before.

The developments of the age of Enlightenment encouraged human beings to ‘gain mastery over the world’ through reason and sensibility. At the same time, however, human beings were losing the sense of their own place within the world. Objective enrichment was accompanied by a subjective impoverishment. Human beings were better informed about the rules and codes which ordered existence, but were increasingly ignorant of their own needs and how these were being suppressed by modern society. 

Rousseau carefully delineated the emerging modes of self-estrangement which were in the process of constituting rational modernity. Rousseau identified the very forces and processes of modernity which operated to suppress individuality, spontaneity, creativity which Max Weber would well over a century later identify as rationalisation. However, Rousseau’s concern was not sociological but was grounded in an ethical concern with human personality in the modern age. Before both Hegel and Marx, Rousseau identified the connection between self-estrangement and self-emancipation through alienation as an instrument of progress.

Insincerity derived from the essence of modern society, a social system in which each was against all: a society in which ‘everyone thinks of his own interest, and no one of the common good’, and in which ‘the interests of individuals are always opposed to one another..’ (Julie, II, 14. 234). Fearful antagonisms and aggressions seethed just below the surface: ‘after long prosperity, after having swallowed up treasures and destroyed multitudes of men, our hero ends by cutting every throat, until, at last, he finds himself sole master of the world. Such is, in outline, the moral picture, if not of human life, at least of the secret pretensions in the heart of every civilised man’ (Inequality, 203). Rousseau notes the irony in the fact that these individualists were ‘cast in the same mold’ (Arts and Sciences, 8), their egoistic motives being ultimately just as uniform as the Spartan principles they despised.

This Hobbesian condition of the war of all against all was not, as Hobbes had argued, a natural and hence permanent feature of the human condition: it was fallacious, in ‘speaking of human wants, avidity, oppression, desire and pride, [to] transfer to the state of nature ideas which have been acquired from society…’ (Inequality, 132). Rousseau traced the historical roots of these impulses, and the insincerity they generated, principally in the Discourse on Inequality. So long as individuals ‘understood only tasks that one man could do alone, and confined themselves to arts which did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest and happy lives, to the extent that their nature permitted it and they could enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another, from the moment it appeared useful to even one single man to have provisions enough for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became necessary, vast forests were transformed into smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops’ (Inequality, 171). The decisive turning point in human history, therefore, was the moment when human needs began to expand, since this was the starting point of the self-development of human beings. The problem is that the self in self-development was understood in individual rather than collective terms, so that the development of each individual was set in indifferent and even in antagonistic relation to the development of all human beings. 





That first proprietor, the person who had enclosed a piece of ground and declared ‘This is mine’ had created an sphere of freedom and self-expression for himself in which he was able to freely fulfil his enlarged needs; in the process, however, he had denied this sphere and this ability to all others. It was the institution of private property which had introduced the dimension of competition to human life and which rendered society a sphere of universal egoism and antagonism which plunged individuals in society into a zero-sum game. What was given to one person was ipso facto taken from all others; whatever any individual enjoyed personally was, from this moment on, acquired at the expense of other individuals. Rousseau also emphasises the new social determination which private property implies. Once any individual chose to seek private property, all individuals were compelled to seek property. ‘According to this principle, anyone who wanted to consider himself as an isolated individual, self-sufficing and utterly independent of others, could only be utterly wretched. He could not even continue to exist, for, finding the whole earth appropriated by others while he had only himself, how could he ever get the means of subsistence?’ (Émile, III, 156). The individual that did not seek to acquire some sphere from which others could be excluded was constantly vulnerable to being excluded by others. There was no choice but to compete. The more individuals sought to develop, the more they were forced to act as competitors. Whatever quality or virtue an individual developed could not but be experienced as a threat to all other individuals; it could spark emulation or provoke retaliation, rendering the individual even more vulnerable and insecure than ever before as society escalated further into an already mortal state of war.

The whole ground of personal obligation and commitment dissolves in this warlike state of universal, inescapable competition. Personality ceased to be an end in itself, and instead became a means, an asset or ability in the endless competition to acquire more resources.

Rousseau had searched Paris, the heart of modernity, for ‘l’homme, the free individual, unfettered in body or mind. What he found was not society but a market place in which all things, including human beings, were defined as means subordinated to the narrow purpose of acquisition. Human relationships were as competitive as Hobbes had defined them in the state of nature.

Modern society had rendered identity complex and problematical. Rousseau could not identify the modern individuals; they could not even identify themselves. The ‘social man’ of the modern world, Rousseau argued, ‘knows only how to live outside himself, in the judgment of others: indeed, it is only from the judgement of others that he gains consciousness of his very existence’. The modern individual and his audience ‘always ask others who we are; we never dare to ask ourselves..’ Where once Rousseau had highlighted the gap between appearance and reality, he now considers that ‘everything is reduced to appearances, everything becomes factitious, just a game [joué]: honour, friendship, virtue, and even vice..’ (Inequality, 193). Modern individuals even lack the ability or even the need to be insincere since they no longer have any selves to conceal. Rousseau had once written of individuals wearing masks to perform their social roles and engage in social behaviour; he now argues that there are no faces behind the masks.

In traditional societies servitude was essentially personal, with each servant bound to a particular master. This meant that the dominant or submissive roles in any human relationship were clearly marked and more or less fixed for good. In modern society, however, the individual at the bottom appears to be as free as the individual at the top. Only fortune could frustrate the individual. The problem is that, experiencing an inexhaustible ‘multitude of new needs’, all modern individuals were ‘subject to all nature, and especially to his fellow-men’. With the distribution of power less stable than it had been in past society, with competition for power becoming increasingly intense, any individual could become dependent on any other individual – as ally, or enemy, as aid or obstruction. Modern individuals were masterless servants, bound to an impersonal system which compelled them to serve its purposes in thought and action. Without personal masters, such individuals could still see themselves as free and autonomous when their condition of dependence declared otherwise.

All human experience and existence was mediated by the categories of the market economy in modern society. ‘Man is the cheapest commodity on the market; and among all the important rights of property, the rights of the individual are considered least’ (Émile, IV, 211). In the market society the individual was in relative and continuously shifting terms, as a consequence of being involved in competitive relations with others. The idea of the human self – as a constant, underlying essence – was driven out.

18 THE IDEAL PUBLIC COMMUNITY

Rousseau is aware that idealism is always subject to contradiction by selfish interest. Rousseau realises that the law of the strongest, though contrary to ‘right’, has been an important feature of social existence. Rousseau is clear that the powerful will always seek to use the laws to in order to secure their private advantage at the expense of the weak and, indeed, at the expense of the common good. The existence of power and the asymmetries in its distribution display a permanent tendency to encroach on the province of right.

Rousseau’s awareness of the deleterious influence of power groups upon the good of the community lies behind many of the key principles of the Social Contract. In particular, Rousseau seeks to check the effects of power by establishing and strengthening the internal unity of the political association. This overriding concern with unity characterises Rousseau’s political writings and exercises a profound influence upon the way he conceives the ideal community. Rousseau is concerned to make all citizens equally dependent on the State in such a way that they are freed from any dependence on others, but are also prevented from associating with others in order to pursue some extra-political or extra-social purpose. Rousseau believes that his equality of impersonal dependence has removed the need for such associational activity.

Whilst Rousseau refuses to offer a single State as a model for all states, he does have clear preferences with respect to political societies. Although Rousseau is popularly known as the prophet of the French Revolution, his model public community has little in common with the large states and representative governments which grew from the nineteenth century onwards. On the contrary, Rousseau was highly critical of the large states and large cities emerging in the modern world. Rousseau’s political and moral principles are tailored for public communities modelled along the lines of the ancient city-states of Greece and the early Roman republic. The Social Contract was ‘written for Geneva and small states like it’ (i.935) (112). Far from looking to the emerging large nation state as the embodiment of his principles, Rousseau praised the Swiss for having retained the best features of ancient institutions against the ever-encroaching corruption of modern civilisation. His native city-republic of Geneva exercised a crucial influence upon Rousseau’s political ideas and explain his clear preference for the closely-knit community of the small city-state. It was not merely for their compactness and unity that Rousseau valued such city-states but even more for the way in which they articulated the truly human aspects of civic life. Rousseau continuously praises Sparta as the archetypal compact community exhibiting a strong civic sense. 

Hegel would later take Rousseau to task for being unable to ground his democratic conception of freedom in an era of large states. Rousseau’s failure to embed his principles in viable institutions led Hegel to develop his system of the ethical life, Sittlichkeit, the system of functional intermediation which broke the state down into a system of ascending purposes. Rousseau, however, was far from unaware of the problem of scale and quantity. He understood the incompatibility of his principles with the large state. When asked to write a constitution for Poland, a large state, Rousseau sought to make the form amenable to his principles by doing what Hegel would later do – by giving the state a federal form. The large state thus ceased to be this single unwieldy entity but became a federation of small units integrated according to a common purpose.

Rousseau is no idealist, imposing right and just principles on a recalcitrant reality from an external vantage point. On the contrary, Rousseau is clear that political socialisation and loyalty cannot be based on abstract principles, however valid they may be in themselves; these principles must correspond to something contained in the hearts of the citizens themselves. This leads Rousseau to address feelings and passions as much as reason in terms of imbuing citizens with a sense of national pride and fervour, inspiring a genuine patriotism. Rousseau here again looks back to the civic spirit and patriotism of ancient citizens’ and the theme is a consistent thread throughout Rousseau’s writings. In the first Discours Rousseau expresses regret for the way that the modern individual ‘smiles disdainfully at these old words ‘religion’ and ‘patriotism’’ (112/3).

Rousseau’s conception of patriotism is connected to civic spirit. It cannot be identified with modern nationalism and partakes of the character of ancient civic pride, the ‘patriotic intoxication’ and ‘heroic zeal’ of the ancient public community. There is a profound moral dimension to Rousseau’s patriotism which connects it to ancient virtue and freedom. In no way does Rousseau assert the validity of national feeling in itself, but values it for its human and civic content. Rousseau is also aware of the difficulty of extending feeling to embrace the whole human race. Since the ‘feeling of humanity evaporates and weakens as it is extended over the whole earth’ (iii.254) it is incapable of providing an adequate basis for civil loyalty. Whilst the love of humanity is a noble ideal, individuals will always respond more to the misfortunes of their fellow countrymen than to those of remote peoples. Rousseau therefore concludes that only the feeling of patriotism has the power and intensity required for a firm basis of national life.

That said, feeling alone is not enough to base national life upon; feeling needs to be strengthened by the addition of a more powerful and stable element. For Rousseau, the love of humanity was too vague, abstract a notion, too weak an emotion to express the wholehearted devotion to the country which was required of the citizen. At the same time, Rousseau believed that traditional religious beliefs, in being founded on ‘revelation’, had a tendency to produce bigotry, fanaticism, and internal discord. 

The central role which Rousseau assigned to ‘civil religion’ in his political theory represents an attempt to adapt the essential principles of natural religion to civil life. Civil religion provides the State with an ultimate sanction which is capable of putting the law above individuals. Its ‘few and simple’ doctrines are ‘enunciated with precision, without explanation or commentary’: ‘the existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foreseeing, and provident divinity, the future life, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sacredness of the social contract and the laws’ (iii.468). The one negative dogma was the exclusion of all intolerance.

Rousseau attaches an illiberal condition to this civil religion. Whilst individuals are not obliged to accept the civil religion, all those who do so will be banished from the State, not for being ‘impious’ but for being ‘anti-social’ (insociable), incapable of putting aside selfish desires for the call of duty.

In many respects, Rousseau’s contractarianism has the same shape and form as Locke’s. Rousseau and Locke are in agreement in insisting on the central importance of freedom. For both thinkers, the concept of political society is inseparable from the fact that individuals are, to use Locke’s term, ‘naturally free’. The political association cannot be created by force, only by deliberate decision, by a voluntary act on the part of its members. The only legitimate basis of the political association is a freely agreed contract. Rousseau and Locke therefore agree that the social contract is made between equals rather than between rulers and subjects. 

Rousseau parts company with Locke with reference to the ‘state of nature’. In line with the thinkers of the Natural Law School, Locke argues that individuals in the state of nature are ‘free and equal’. Such individuals are already familiar with certain rights, such as ‘life, health, liberty, and possession’, and with the moral obligation that ‘no one ought to harm another’ in the exercise of these rights. Since ‘the law of nature’ operates in both conditions, the transition from nature to society does not involve any radical alteration to human being.

For Locke, individuals enter society to place their natural rights under the protection of the community as a whole. In this conception, therefore, the State’s functions are carefully restricted to the protection of rights relevant to the social conduct of individuals. Locke’s conception of the state is therefore protective. Freedom, to Locke, is ‘freedom from external restraint’. This presupposes a society that treats all its members as equals and respects the inviolability of their private rights.

Rousseau’s conception of the state is far more creative than this Lockean conception. For Rousseau, participation in the political association has a transformative capacity in making individuals genuinely rational and moral. For Rousseau, the individual in the state of nature is essentially a creature of instinct, without moral sense or social feeling. In the state of nature, ‘natural right’ consists mainly of appetite and power. It is only by entering the civil state that the individual becomes a rational and social being, acquiring a moral outlook and a knowledge of right and wrong. 

Proceeding to a higher stage of development brings about a change in the human character. ‘The isolated man always remains the same; he makes progress only in society’; it is only ‘mutual frequentation’ that makes possible the development of ‘the most sublime faculties’ (iii.533,477). Rousseau therefore conceives Being in dynamic rather than static terms, with the individual acquiring capacities in the course of development which were either lacking in the initial stage or which exist as unactualised potential.

In emphasising the irrational nature of primitive man, Rousseau agrees with Hobbes; he nevertheless rejects Hobbes’ view of the state of nature as one of ‘continual fear and danger of violent death’. For Rousseau, the primitive condition was happy and peaceful. It was only the pressure of external circumstances which caused human beings to leave the state of nature, not free choice. Hobbes, in contrast, considers the establishment of society to be the rational attempt on the part of human beings to achieve the ‘peace, security, and happiness’ which is impossible in the natural state. It is the founding of the civil association that brings morality and right into existence. However, in contrast to Rousseau, Hobbes does not believe that the inner nature of human beings is capable of undergoing any substantial transformation. Human beings remain as selfish and as aggressive in society as they were in the state of nature.

Rousseau sharply distinguishes himself from Hobbes in other significant respects. Like Hobbes, Rousseau places great emphasis on sovereignty as the ultimate, indivisible source of power. Rousseau does not, however, draw Hobbes’s absolute conclusion. Hobbes’ pessimistic view of human nature causes him to follow the establishment of the civil association by the transfer of the citizens’ rights to a supreme ruler. Rousseau’s optimistic view of human nature involves an inherently democratic conception of sovereignty as the indivisible and inalienable right of the people. The assumption of the rectitude of the general will allows Rousseau to argue that ultimate political authority can be vested safely in the hands of the people. Indeed, it is inconceivable, on Rousseau’s premises, for it to be vested elsewhere. Justice, for Rousseau, is not an ideal, abstract principle which is imposed on the people by an external authority; justice is the authentic expression of the moral autonomy of the people. Here, Rousseau stands in the lineage of Spinoza, not Hobbes. Whilst Spinoza argued that right equated with power, this power was the immanent potentiality of the human being, not an external physical fact. Spinoza affirmed the view that human beings can become rational beings, capable of exercising a genuinely human freedom, only through society.

One can therefore question the role of ‘natural right’ as a political principle in Rousseau’s philosophy. Rousseau distinguishes himself from certain traditional views of natural right, most particularly the view that ‘natural right’ already exists in the state of nature. For Rousseau, ‘natural right’ is not an immutable, static principle but is progressively transformed and adapted to each stage of human growth and development; human beings achieve the full realisation of human being only in the course of a long development. 

There is an important distinction to be made here. Rousseau calls the primitive right of the state of nature ‘natural right properly speaking’. This is a spontaneous feeling or impulse lacking in moral significance. In contrast, the ‘reasoned natural right’ of the social state involves ‘nature, habit, reason, and our willingness to act with other men as we would wish them to act with us’. The sensibility of the former is supplanted by the reason and will of the latter. However, in both cases, it is a question of remaining faithful to the intrinsic qualities of human being. What Rousseau means by this is that whilst amour de soi and freedom are manifested at every stage of existence, they develop from being ‘natural’ and ‘independent’ at the primitive level to assume moral and rational form in society. Rousseau’s political theory is therefore of a piece with his general philosophy: the human being is a free and intelligent being whose needs transcend the instinct and appetite of primitive being. Whilst all forms of freedom are grounded in human existence, civil and moral freedom are distinct from and superior to natural freedom. In being an act of will, deliberately created by human action, political right is distinct from primitive right; however, it does not contradict true human nature, since its main purpose is to enable human beings to fulfil themselves completely, in all essential aspects of the human being. It is not a question of the one replacing the other but of completion; political right does not suppress basic human feelings, only integrates them within a higher level of human development.





Rousseau’s thought is premised upon the radical critique of the modern civilisation emerging in his day. Rousseau challenged many of the fundamental presuppositions and most cherished notions of the ‘philosophy’ which prided itself on its rational and enlightened view of the place of human beings in the world. Rousseau inverted the standards of the Enlightenment. Enlightenment thinkers considered modern society to be the culmination of a process that had seen humanity ascend from darkness to light; Rousseau castigated it as artificial and corrupt, its intellectual achievement being bought at the price of moral decadence.

Conceiving the foundations of political and social life to be unsound, Rousseau sought to expose the clear weakness of an outlook which was founded upon opinion and prejudice rather than on moral and rational principles. Thus, Rousseau criticised the way that the laws protected and promoted the interests of the strong and the rich against the poor and the weak; the way that religious institutions engendered intolerance and discord; the way that the artificial or distorted beings produced by the educational system fell far short of authentic human being.

Since Rousseau was concerned to establish fundamental principles, he premised his philosophy upon an examination of human nature and the place of human beings in the ‘order of things’. For this reason, Rousseau referred to himself as ‘the portrayer of nature’ and ‘the historian of the human heart’. He therefore affirmed the existence of a universal human nature, a definite human essence which has definite political and social implications.

Whilst Rousseau’s thought has a personal origin, his early attempt to build a ‘storehouse of ideas’ demonstrates his concern to set his principles within a wider cultural context. Rousseau was aware of the need to examine the ideas of other thinkers’ so as to identify and develop the universal implications of his own thought. There is a clear Platonizing element in Rousseau’s philosophy. Although he denied the possibility of ultimately knowing things by reason alone, Rousseau nevertheless did affirm the possibility of human beings gaining an insight into the workings of the creation by apprehending it with their whole being: such an approach would establish a close spiritual affinity between personal existence and the universal order. Even in pointing out the necessary limitations to reason, Rousseau acknowledged the value of giving systematic expression to the relationship between the personal and the universal. Rousseau nevertheless continued to insist that formal philosophising be subordinated to human need rather existing as merely an empty intellectual abstraction. The thinker should focus upon what ‘interested’ him and ‘what it was important for him to know’.

Rousseau’s main concern is always with human nature. This human nature must be considered in relation to its place in the universal order.

As free beings, human beings live in the realm of possibility as well as actuality. The miserable condition of contemporary civilisation follows the misuse of freedom. Human beings can still act to overcome these errors. The possibilities open to human beings are not, however, arbitrary, but are grounded in a universal ‘nature’ which guides human behaviour in certain directions. Rousseau thus attempts to achieve authentic human being by reconciling the legitimate exercise of freedom with the valid demands of order. The future for Rousseau, therefore, is no ideal abstracted from human nature but is grounded in the possibilities of that nature. Rousseau’s philosophy presents a vision of what human beings can become through the full and free realisation of their authentic potentialities. Rousseau’s ideal, then, is a vision of the society immanent in human nature, a society in which human beings become what they may become through the extension and expansion of original being. Rousseau’s ideal is derived from within the realm of the real, the bounds of the possible being given by immanent human potentiality. 

The real is transfigured by the ends to which its inner lines of development aspire whilst nevertheless remaining true to its intrinsic being; the actuality of immediate existence is a field of immanent possibilities leading in the direction of a higher being. Rousseau examines the reality of human existence in terms of its ideal possibilities for the truly rational and humane society; the significance of the ‘is’ is determined in relation to what it has the potential to become as revealed by the radical ‘ought-to-be.’ Rousseau conceives human beings to be evolving Being, realising immanent potentialities within a well-ordered nature in which everything has its own appointed place. Rousseau assigns human beings their own characteristic perfection and mode of complete fulfilment whilst recognising that every particular phase of existence must also be connected with an even higher mode of Being, and, ultimately, with the perfection of the universal system.

As the universal order, ‘nature’ is a reality that already exists, whereas the perfection of human beings, in the contemporary world, is a possibility of existence. At the same time, universal ‘nature’ also possesses an ideal aspect in being inadequately known at this point; to human beings, the members of an imperfect society, this pertains to the rational and spiritual goal of their efforts rather than the aims of their immediate existence. The human striving for fulfilment cannot be abstracted from the physical and psychological conditions upon which human beings depend. Rousseau’s ‘nature’, therefore, is both static and dynamic and fuses realistic and idealistic aspects.

The idea of ‘rational freedom’ is a vision of an ideal community in which authority and autonomy are combined so as to ensure the coincidence of the freedom of each individual and the freedom of all individuals. The rational idea recognises that freedom is a collective project given that individuals are always located within relationships to other individuals. For freedom, these relationships need to be put on an ethical basis. In this community, individuality is not subsumed to some collective purpose but is fully expressed and developed within this purpose.

In Rousseau, the idea is both a new and an old one. The idea that association is a constituent part of the good life is Aristotelian in origin. Rousseau appreciates, however, that the old society, lacking differentiation between public and private, has been replaced by a highly mobile, fluid ‘bourgeois’ society. Rousseau sees his task as that of reconciling the classical and the modern.

Rousseau’s moral indictment of existing society went further than that of the philosophes of the Enlightenment. Rousseau directed his critical attention beyond the ancien regime to the flaws in the emerging bourgeois society. For Rousseau, both regimes were autonomy-denying, both prevented the realisation of human freedom.

Rousseau projects a critical and emancipatory vision which culminates in human freedom in the socially developed modern state. This vision is premised upon the transition from the natural to the civil state. In the natural state, the individual had been in possession of himself/herself but not of the world. In the process of historical development, the individual had come to gain this wider world but had lost the sense of self in the process. The very process which had activated the slumbering powers of individuals also compelled individuals to subordinate themselves within externally imposed modes of operation. The modern individual was lost in a world which human activity had created but which had obtained an independence of its individual creators through a diremptive, antagonistic social system.

Rousseau was highly critical of this ‘bourgeois’ modernity but nevertheless sought to incorporate its achievements in going beyond it as opposed to rejecting it in favour of a return to some lost classical model. Rousseau’s task was to conceive a future political society which united each and all so as to realise the project of freedom. The ethical ideal of an enduring community which, recognising that the individual always exists within relationships with other individuals, combines autonomy and authority so as to ensure freedom for all is the central theme of Rousseau’s works. The individual who is concerned with his/her own freedom must necessarily be concerned with the freedom of all others. The task is to find the form of political association which embodied that idea.

‘We must illuminate his reason with new ideas, and warm his heart with new feelings so that he will learn that he can best expand his being and multiply his happiness by sharing them with his fellow men’ wrote Rousseau in the original version of The Social Contract. Rousseau’s writings on the state constitute an eloquent statement of ‘rational’ politics, ‘rational’ in recognising the location of freedom within relationships and seeking to put these relationships on a cooperative, harmonious, mutually enhancing basis. This need to establish the conditions of individual freedom in a supra-individual world leads Rousseau to develop a non-authoritarian, democratic conception of authority, a conception which regulates the mutual interaction and exchange of individuals in the interests of each and all. Rousseau thus manages to unite the ideal of autonomy and the ideal of communality as integral aspects of human happiness within the good life.

Rousseau thus sets out to discover a form of political association in which all individuals were able to become themselves. In uniting autonomy and authority, Rousseau demonstrates that the realisation of individuality could be a force for cohesion, constituting a genuine community of realised human beings. If such a true community could be realised, the socially damaging consequences of modern diremption could be overcome and the emancipatory potentials of modernity could start to unfold.

Rousseau recovered the classical ideals of citizenship and put them on a modern basis. His thought here leads in the direction of radical participatory democracy. Rousseau is not too specific about the institutional mechanisms of participation. His concern is more with the ends than with the means. Rousseau’s commitment to active citizen participation is crucial to his ideas concerning democracy but, even more importantly, human self-realisation. To be a citizen and participate in the government of one’s own life is to shape the future, control the forces which govern collective life. The precise institutional mechanisms of these values may not be too clear. What is clear is that, for Rousseau, the demand for authenticity that such ideas represent could not be expressed through representative modes. Rousseau equated representation with slavery, the alienation of sovereignty, power and responsibility.

Rousseau bequeathed a paradoxical legacy as far as democracy is concerned. In his discussion of the various forms of government, Rousseau rules out democracy as an impossibly high ideal for real human beings. Nevertheless, his thought suggests positive images of radical participatory democracy, radical in subverting existing relations and institutions of power in favour of human self-realisation. In the Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau argues that citizens must have ‘enough of a share in the public administration for them to feel at home’. Rousseau is not merely concerned to discover the most effective form of government but the most moral form of government, moral in terms of enabling all human beings to realise themselves in a world that they have created.

Rousseau gave the most radical and most eloquent statement of the positive conception of power that the world had ever seen. This conception identifies power as something that inheres in the demos. Such power is not an alien or external force but is crucial to creative human self-realisation. The empowerment that Rousseau’s radical vision of active citizenship envisages pertains not merely to ‘the demos’ as a collective entity but to every individual member of the demos.

Rousseau recognised that the alluring ideal of complete human self-realisation must respect the human need to live in an organised society. Freedom may be valued for making the fulfilment of personal existence possible; nevertheless, there is a need to acknowledge the practical implications of the involvement of free individuals in a society of others. Rousseau here presents his version of the thesis of freedom as the recognition of necessity in his mature political philosophy. Just as the primitive being must respect the laws of nature, so the citizen must recognize the interdependence of freedom and political order. True political freedom requires equality of right, which in turn requires the existence of the law.

The law, however, is not a physical fact like the laws of nature, but is the product of a deliberate decision on the part of human beings to live with each other in conditions of justice and equality. This makes it necessary to develop a strong sense of personal responsibility alongside the general acceptance of principles which are valid for all members of the community. The laws of a sound political constitution, guaranteeing the rights of each citizen and protecting each and all equally from oppression and exploitation, depend upon the moral integrity of the citizens and their willingness to subordinate their self-interest to virtue; only the individual who has learned to become the ‘master of himself’ is capable of being a worthy and responsible member of society.

The true ambiguity in Rousseau’s thought lies not so much at the level of principle as in Rousseau’s personal scepticism as to the strength of his own principles. Rousseau’s political principles are inherently democratic – absolute sovereignty of the people, active as well as consent, the inalienability of sovereignty – and reveal clearly enough the possibilities of human beings coming to constitute the self-governing social order. Yet Rousseau’s acknowledgement of the need for authority to prevent internal discord can lead him to violate his democratic principles, thus abandoning his conception of a self-constituting democratic authority, coming to imagine his ideal community in less than democratic terms. In La Nouvelle Heloise Rousseau portrays the ideal community in paternalistic terms as against the egalitarian terms of his stated principles. Ultimately, despite his optimistic conception of human nature, Rousseau is sceptical of the view that human beings will attain happiness unaided. The figures of Wolmar and the Lawgiver betray Rousseau’s deep suspicion that human beings will always require the help of guides and leaders. It needs to be emphasised, however, that Rousseau does not invest these rulers and guides with legal authority; they exist outside of his philosophical system. They are self-abolishing means rather than enduring ends in themselves. Once the guides and leaders have achieved their purpose, and shown human beings the path to self-government, they depart the scene. There is no conception of domination in Rousseau’s presentation of these leaders and guides.

In Rousseau’s democratic social contract, individuals would become citizens demanding a political life in which they could participate actively, something which in turn would realise politics as a mode of self-realisation and self-expression. Rousseau thus envisages a society of extensive public spaces, given that modes of participation would have to be enlarged to enable all to have a public life. Though Rousseau is accused of being the theorist of totalitarian democracy, the state that Rousseau envisages is not an external imposition from the top down, swallowing up civil society but, rather, is a public constituted organically out of the civil sphere as the true reality of individuality. Rousseau’s state is democratic in that its power rests upon the active consent and sovereignty of the demos. All individuals composing the demos participate freely, equally and fully in public affairs, ensuring that the policies and actions of the state are subject to a direct and continuous check.

Rousseau places a great deal of emphasis upon the extent to which human beings are in conflict within and between themselves in modern civilisation. These contradictions prevent human happiness and can be overcome only in the fulfilled society of fulfilled individuals; true freedom and happiness is realised when human beings can become the persons they are in relation to other fulfilled beings; this is to achieve an essential unity both within the individual and within the society of which s/he is a part. Human beings will not be at peace either with their own natures or with others until they are united by a common respect for the law, since only in this respect will they feel as though they are free from possible subjection to the will of others. This concern with unity comes out clearly in Rousseau’s preference for small, self-sufficient States, modelled on the old city-states as well recent and contemporary Italian and Swiss city-states. These appropriately scaled political units unite citizens in a common concern for the well-being of the community as a whole. Rousseau therefore succeeds in establishing the unity of the principles of freedom and order in the truly unified society of truly unified individuals.

Rousseau’s concern with unity demonstrates a consistency of purpose and principle. Whilst Rousseau tends to treat happiness as a free and spontaneous expression of the innate feelings of human beings, in Émile and the Social Contract Rousseau makes it clear that effective unity is achieved only as an effort of will. The principle of order expressed by the ideals of virtue and justice must gain recognition in personal and social life; nevertheless, true freedom and happiness issues from the joyous acquiescence in that order and not from the voluntary adaptation to it.

However radical the nature of Rousseau’s critique of the liberal state, his failure to fully discard liberal assumptions leads him to a continued justification of the state on account of a residual abstract individualism. Hoffman therefore emphasises the extent to which Rousseau has recourse to repressive measures in forcing people to be free. Even if it can be argued that Hoffman overstates this case, there is no doubt that Rousseau ultimately doubts that individuals will ever fully put reason in control, making an apparatus administering force necessary and permanent (Hoffman 1995:111). Rousseau’s abstract conception of the individual thus involves him in concrete support for the state (Hoffman 1995:112), something which justifies a continued search for that form of social identity which is able to connect real individuals in their empirical lives to public authority. Rousseau’s activist and participatory conception goes some way to this conclusion, but ultimately fails on account of its abstract character. The weakness of liberalism’s abstract individual is apparent even in Rousseau (Lukes Individualism 1973:77) and ultimately vitiates his thought.

In Rousseau’s view, individuals will never quite embrace the democratic-dialogic procedure he adumbrates; they will resist putting reason fully in control. This is why the other model, involving institutions constraining people to freedom, dominates. The space for discourse and pluralism are much diminished in favour of obedience to the general will, the collective internal conscience and authority which establishes the rational norms of a free and virtuous people. Rousseau’s general will thus becomes the categorical imperative externalised, an alienated conscience (Heller 1989:86).

Rousseau has modernised classical themes in his solution to the problem of diremption. He has combined virtue and citizenship in the just state, freedom and reason with popular sovereignty and equality. Ultimately, however, Rousseau remains a prisoner of liberal assumptions. The same authoritarian image which is the counterpart of abstract individualism is evident: ‘individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what he wills… This makes a Legislator necessary’ (Rousseau SC 1973:193). Since each person is both an individual and part of the public, they are in need of double guidance.

Though the participatory theorist par excellence, Rousseau ultimately remains a liberal in endorsing the necessity of the state as a result of corruptible human nature. Though his ethical theory demands it, reason will never manage to be so fully in control as to permit the discarding of the state as an apparatus for forcing people to be free (Levine 1987:33/6). It is in this continuation of the state that critics discern the implied suppression of otherness in the Rousseauan politics of the common good. Though his critique shreds the ethical basis of liberal theory, Rousseau evinces the ‘liberal failure to include everyone in the argument for political equality’ (Pateman PPO 157). However radical, Rousseau remains liberal, the persistence of the case for the state resting upon an abstract view of the individual.

On the whole, however, the balance is positive in Rousseau’s favour. Rousseau establishes an emancipatory interaction between individuals constituting political order. The relational core of this principle makes it possible to transcend the rational-lawful freedom into an associative-communal freedom. In this reading, reconciliatory experience situated on the level of the everyday world of solidarity, reciprocity and exchange is inherently free in a way that participation in the public sphere cannot be given its separation from the real society of individuals. 

In sum, Rousseau’s vision of political association affirms that the true freedom of each and all can be achieved through the creation of a social identity which integrates public and private happiness. The genuine realisation of individuality is possible only in a community which facilitates the realisation of individuality for all its members. Rousseau’s achievement is to have conceived of a democratic and libertarian authority which is constituted freely and equally by all individuals as integral to their own autonomy.

The practical realisation of ‘rational freedom’ may have been ambiguous, specifically, in terms of the modern state as an agency of human freedom and, generally, in terms of the repressive rationalisation of capitalist modernity. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s great achievement is to have affirmed the possibility of setting individual freedom within an ethical political framework that ensures the freedom of all. The ethical component of reason, then, can be expressed on the modern terrain.

The specific institutions and relations of this ‘rational freedom’ may have proven elusive in practice. With modernity coming to be characterised by a Weberian disenchantment and nihilism, ‘rational freedom’ remains an ideal to be realised. If there is no automatic relation between reason and freedom, so that human emancipation is not an inevitable consequence of modern rationalisation, it is precisely because the philosophy of ‘rational freedom’ argues powerfully that reason and freedom are cognate that there is every reason to conclude that the line from Aristotle to Habermas via Rousseau and Kant, deepened in a socio-institutional sense by Hegel and radicalised by Marx, remains the greatest, most ethically satisfying and intellectually coherent hope for human freedom as a universal condition.

And in this line of descent, the attempt by Rousseau to put the necessary relations between all individuals composing a community on an ethico-political basis stands out as the most influential in the modern world. Rousseau profoundly influenced the three giants of ‘rational freedom’ who followed him – Kant and his universal law, Hegel and his state as ethical agency, Marx and his communism as an associative ideal. And Jurgen Habermas, too, as the greatest of the contemporary ‘rational’ thinkers, shows a pronounced Rousseauan emphasis in his notion of a communicative community of free and equal beings engaging in an uncoerced discursive practice. In Habermas’s democratic community, the decision goes not to force but to the better argument. Reason is in control. In this respect, Habermas exhibits a strong Rousseauan strain. 

This is interesting given Habermas’ defence of the Enlightenment tradition against poststructuralism and postmodernism. Rousseau as both in against the Enlightenment avoids any simply dichotomy that forces us to choose one or the other. Rousseau did more than remind the age of enlightenment, reason and civilisation of the meaning of simple humanity; he offered the age the hope of regeneration. Rousseau did not demand that human beings go back to nature, he demonstrated how they could and should go forward to nature, to their nature within, the realisation of Being. Rousseau restored philosophy to its origins, penetrating deeper than the intellectual shell of reflection and abstract speculation to original Being, demanding the renewal and ultimately the realisation of the entire Being of individuals. 

Rousseau’s criticism of the rationalism of the age of Enlightenment does not imply that his thought is guilty of or encourages irrationalism. Rousseau criticised Enlightenment rationalism for not being rational enough: Rousseau sought an integral conception of human nature realised through the harmonious cooperation of the human capacities, with reason functioning in harmony with sensibility. This harmonious development issuing in the authentic personality, however, required the rediscovery and revaluation of the conditions of authentic experience within the shell of subtlety, artificiality, and corruption encasing contemporary civilisation. By recovering simplicity and innocence, moving on to the plenitude of new experience. In coming to achieve fulfilment in this manner, the human being would be like ‘a new being recently come forth from nature’s hands’. Rousseau rules out the possibility of going back to the lost paradise of primitive innocence; instead he urges that human beings go forward to discover happiness in the rediscovery of goodness and the realisation of all the potentialities of human nature.
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